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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an attempt to provide a case study of the
problems faced by Benito Juarez and the Mexican liberals in the period
of Mexican history known as the Restored Republic (1867-1876) and the
liberal's attempts to deal with those problems. The study focuses on
the state of Oaxaca which was, in many ways, representative of the
social, economic, and political conditions. Socially, the state was
composed of a large unassimilated Indian population which the federal
and state governments sought to incorporate into Mexican society by in-
stilling in them the middle class values of the liberal leaders. The
liberals attempted this social transformation by secularizing society.
Thus, the liberal anti-clerical reforms of the l850's, culminating in
the Constitution of 1857. During the era of the Restored Republic,
liberals unsuccessfully sought to translate the implicit promises of the
Constitution into actions through such things as the creation of a sys-
tem of public education and assumption of the role of the church
in
the provision of various social services.
Another major theme in the era was the liberal attempt to estab-
lish a federal political system. The experience in Oaxaca
demonstrated
not only the problems involved in such an attempt, but
it also demon-
strated that the nation was unprepared. In the short
span of four years,
from 1867 to 1871, the state was transformed
from an integral part of
the federal system to a tumultuous secessionist
state under the leader-
ship of Felix Diaz. Oaxaca was subjected to many of
the political
pressures that affected Mexico during this era: the contest among
liberals over how stringently the Reform Lavs and the Constitution of
1857 vould be upheld, the personal ambitions of individual state
leaders, and the growing rivalry between Juarez and Porfirio Diaz on
the national political level.
The political leaders of the Restored Republic were prisoners
of their own history. Ever since independence, Mexican politics had
been characterized by opportunism and a lack of any real ideological
commitment. By decentralizing power, the Constitution of 1857 actually
encouraged the independence of state governments and strong state
leaders like Felix Diaz in Oaxaca or Negrete in Puebla or Garcia de
Cadena in Zacatecas and San Luis Potosi. In Oaxaca, Felix Diaz imposed
his own political regime upon a state that had been split between the
successful liberal factions, a phenomenon that occurred throughout
Mexico.
Aside from political considerations, Mexico was handicapped in
its efforts tc rebuild the nation in a number of ways that the Juarez
administration never really overcame. The most chronic problem faced
by federal, state, and local leaders during the Restored Republic was
the lack of funds. By 1867, the treasury had been empty for years
and the national debt greatly increased. Almost every phase of the
nation's economy had been disrupted or destroyed by years of warfare.
Mines had ceased operation, agriculture existed on only the most primi-
tive level, and commerce—the source of most tax revenues—had been
severely retarded. Hence, one of the favorite liberal economic panaceas
was internal improvements. Despite the emphasis upon stimulating eco-
nomic activity by building roads and introducing new commercial agri-
culture and industry, the era of the Restored Republic did not bring
about a great economic upsurge. Oaxaca reflected the nation's economic
problems. The state government had few sources of revenue at its dis-
posal and, like the national government, unsuccessfully sought to
develop internal improvements.
In summary, the study reveals that the regimes of Benito Juarez
as president and governors like Felix Diaz in Oaxaca achieved few
tangible results. This was the inherent tragedy of the Restored Re-
public. By the end of the era most villages remained unchanged, the
people remained isolated, backward, and far removed from the pale of
the modern world.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 1867, Mexico's continuing struggle to establish a
viable political system began a nev phase. On that date, Benito Juarez
returned to the nation's capital to resume the direction of a government
that had been forced to flee by the invading army of Napoleon III. When
Juarez returned he continued the struggle that Mexican liberals had been
waging since long before the Emperor Maximilian ever set foot on Mexican
soil.
The collapse of the Imperial Intervention engendered a spirit of
patriotic optimism among Mexicans in the summer of l867. 3 Many Mexicans
expected a great deal of the liberals who, after all, had issued the
far-reaching Reform laws and the Constitution of I857, had successfully
withstood the civil war of I858 to l86l, and had preserved the nation's
sovereignty against the alien occupation , The very optimism with which
many Mexicans greeted the return of Juarez to the capital, however,
worked to the president's disadvantage. The problem was that many peo-
ple saw the liberals as selfless patriots and, as such, were likely to
be disillusioned when the liberals failed to maintain their heroic pos-
ture. Juarez and the liberals aroused hopes of immediate, tangible
Daniel Cosio Villegas. Historic modcrna de Mexico. La
Republica Reotaurada. La vida politica (Mexico, 1955), If 111-13.
2improvements in the lives of the people, and in the power and prestige
' of the nation. This, of course, proved impossible because, while
liberals agreed on general goals, they were far from unanimous about the
specific steps to be taken to achieve stability and progress.
In general, the years from 1821 to I80T had been characterized
by political turmoil, economic stagnation, and humiliating foreign
intervention, as well as by ideological struggles between liberals and
conservatives all over Mexico.
While historians are not yet agreed upon the origins and nature
of the liberal/conservative contests, it is clear that by the period of
the Reforma (1555-1867)* they had developed certain dogmas that they
wanted to translate into action.
The heart of nineteenth-century Mexican liberalism was indivi-
dual freedom. While most liberal politicians may not have been phil-
osophers
,
they instinctively believed that Man was perfectible, if
society created institutions that allowed individuals to develop freely.
Thus, liberal efforts focused largely upon creating a world, or an en-
vironment, that would encourage the evolution of all levels of Mexican
society. Conversely, while most liberals celebrated the individual,
they were increasingly wary of a strong centralized government.
Socially, Mexican liberals were egalitarian in abstract princi-
ple, "out remained somewhat elitist in practice, a contradiction that
reflected the middleclass background of many liberal leaders. This was
but one of many contradictions in nineteenth-century Mexico. While
liberals advocated equality of economic and political opportunity,
equality before the law and before the tax collector, they did not be-
lieve that the masses were ready to handle these freedoms and opportuni-
ties without some tutelage. Liberals tended to act paternally, assuming
the right, if not the obligation, to decide how and when Mexican society
should be improved
•
Economically, the liberals were caught in another contradiction
in their acceptance of a theory of non-intervention and their recogni-
tion that the government had to provide incentives to induce develop-
ment of Mexico, they were forced to provide official incentives to pri-
vate investors.
A political contradiction inherent in the liberals 1 beliefs was
their faith in the sovereignty of the people. While liberal politicians
celebrated the collective wisdom of the people , most liberals were un-
willing to allow political decisions to be made without their guidance.
Liberals had some reason to fear uncontrolled democracy in light of
their nation's experience with demagogues and personalist leaders.
Because Mexican liberals in the nineteenth century were never
unanimous about specific measures for perfecting their society, the
evolution of a program that could be translated into action took place
very slowly. Moreover, by the time the Restored Republic began in 1867
,
factionalism threatened to tear the liberals apart before they even
began to implement their ideas.
Anticlericalism, an issue on which liberals had usually agreed,
ceased to evoke the kind of commitment it had aroused during the Wars
of the Reform and the Intervention. Federalism, an idea that
had long
kbeen regarded as a liberal political panacea, was challenged by the
policies of Juarez and Lerdo in 186?. 2
The principle of individualism, which liberals had long regarded
as a prerequisite for development, was contradicted in the Juarez ad-
ministration's economic program vhich included government subsidization
of industrialization and internal improvement projects in order to en-
courage private entrepreneurs. 3
The purpose of this study is to explore the efforts of the
liberals of the state of Oaxaca to execute a program, and the problems
they encountered. At the same time, it will seek to examine the nature
of the relationship that evolved between that state and the federal gov-
ernment. Hopefully, such a project can serve as a case study of the
larger issues of centralized control versus state autonomy that underlay
the political life of the Restored Republic; and provide a commentary on
the viability of political democracy in Mexico during the Restored
Republic
.
The state selected for this study was chosen for a number of
reasons. In addition to the fact that it was the birthplace of such
/ / f
people as Juarez, Porfirio Diaz, Matias Romero and Justo Benitez, among
others, Oaxaca had been a key site in the struggle between liberals and
conservatives during the l850 f s. Most Mexican states experienced this
kind of political polarization, but Oaxaca's troubles were nationally
significant because the men who were active there went on to become the
67.
2Qnilio Rabasa, La constitucicm y la dictadura (Mexico, 1956),
3See Leopoldo Zea, El positivismo en Mexico (Mexico, 19^3).
major protagonists in the nation's history for the last half of the
nineteenth century.
The political polarization of the nineteenth century which
eventually led to civil war and foreign intervention did not begin to
affect Oaxaca until the late iSHo's.
1
* The literal/conservative struggle
in the state led to the accession of Benito Juarez as the temporary
governor in lQk*[* During his year in office, Juarez committed his ad-
ministration to a liheral-positivist program that emphasized progress
through a program of material improvements. He gained sufficient public
support with his programs to be elected governor in his own right in
I8U9. During his term as governor, Juarez exhibited the best aspects of
a liberal administrator, launching an ambitious campaign to revive the
economic and governmental life of the state. He fashioned an adminis-
tration that undertook a wide range of reforms from organization of the
state's National Guard, to the promotion of education and the construc-
tion of roads.
When his term ended, Juarez stepped down, but he was caught in
the wave of conservative resurgence that brought Santa Anna back to
power. Oaxacan conservatives generally were comprised of the wealthy
oligarchy of large land and mine owners and Church officials. This
group, which supported Santa Anna, was strongly opposed to the liberal
reforms of Juarez who became the target of their attacks. Escaping
an
^Charles R. Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of
Oaxaca, 1857-1867" (University of Texas unpublished dissertation, 19b n,
72.
assassination attempt by a member of the conservative faction, Juarez
was arrested and exiled on Santa Anna's orders in 1853.
The liberal assault upon Santa Anna, launched when the Plan of
Ayutla was issued in March, I85U, was not immediately successful in
Oaxaca. In fact , the liberals did not regain control of the state until
January, 1656, after the brief tenure of the conservative, General Jose
Maria Garcia. Despite the return of the liberals, conservatives re-
mained active in the state and, indeed, were able to launch a rebellion
in Oaxaca in 1856 in protest against the famous Ley Lerdo, which limited
the amount of land that civil and church corporations could hold. The
law said that only land used for immediate operating needs could be
retained, and all other land had to be sold.
While liberals attempted to administer states such as Oaxaca in
the midst of this kind of political climate, two events in the nation's
capital created a situation that led to the civil unrest of the late
l850's. The first was the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of
1857. The second was the vacillating policy of President Ignacio Comon-
fort in the face of a conservative-sponsored coup. Ccmonfort, who had
cone to power as a liberal, renounced his own government when he thought
the conservatives were about to overthrow it, and gave Juarez, as presi-
dent of the Supreme Court, a claim to the presidency. While these
events were transpiring in Mexico City, the liberals in Oaxaca
rewrote
the state's constitution in accord with the Federal
Constitution.
The commitment of Oaxacan liberals to their political
creed was
tested and tempered by the same conditions of internal
strife that
7affected all Mexicans in the decade after the promulgation of the Con-
stitution of 1857. During that decade, Oaxaca witnessed the struggle
between the liberals and conservatives that culminated in the French
Intervention. Oaxaca itself was captured when Porfirio Diaz surrendered
the state to the French in January, 1865. Minor resistance continued in
the form of a few guerrilla bands operating in the mountains. Many
Oaxacans, including Felix Diaz, fled to join Juarez's forces in the
north.
During the Imperial occupation, however, many potentially active
Caxacans remained in the state and cooperated with or at least accepted
the reality of the occupation. Only when the French troops withdrew in
1866 did the Imperial government begin to lose control. The Republican
forces, led by Colonel Felix Diaz frcm the north and General Porfirio
Diaz from the south, moved to recapture Oaxaca in July, 1866. The re-
maining months of 1866 were marked by the occupation of the state capi-
tal, and the pacification of outlying districts. Thus, as the Restored
Republic began in 1867, Oaxaca returned to Mexican control under zhe
military administration of Porfirio Diaz who was serving as commander
of the Army of the East. In that position, Diaz used Oaxaca as a base
of operations to continue his campaign against Maximilian, pursuing him
to Queretaro.
The overthrow of the Imperial government occupied Mexican atten-
tion until the summer months of 1867. The effort to reestablish Mexican
sovereignty created an atmosphere of patriotism that transcended many of
the divisions among the nation's political leaders, not only in Oaxaca,
8but in the nation as a whole. Thus, once again it can be argued that
subsequent political events in Oaxaca illustrate more general trends in
the nation during the years of the Restored Republic. In fact, the
situation in Oaxaca was indicative of many of the conditions and prob-
lems that confronted the Mexican nation in 1867.
Oaxaca, isolated by mountains and long distances from the
nation's capital, is a semi-tropical state characterized by rough moun-
tains surrounding the central valley. The central valley has always
been the economic and political center of the state. Most of the
600,000 Oaxacans in 1867 were descended from the Zapotec and Mixtec
civilizations which had flourished in the area during the pre-Columbian
era. For the most part, the state was rural and the Indians isolated
from the center of government. The state's professional or middle class,
which was always very small during the post-Independence period, was the
only group that was ever politically active. This group, which consisted
of doctors, lawyers, military men and landowners, dominated the poli-
tical and ideological struggles of the nineteenth century in Oaxaca.
5
While political activity remained the prerogative of a relative
few, farming was the chief occupation of most Oaxacans. The major agri-
cultural products in the state included maize, sugar cane, coffee and
indigo, as well as a variety of vegetables such as tomatoes, beans,
and
5ln 1867-68, the state listed only fifteen physicians and
thirty
lawyers in a population of over 600,000. See Oaxaca. Gobernador.
Memoria que el ejecuUvo del estado presento al cangreso del memo.
(Oaxaca, 1871), n «P-
9avocados. 6 Because of the primitive agricultural methods, the general
exhaustion of the soil after centuries of growing the same basic crops,
and the absence of any feasible transportation facilities, agriculture
was limited to local production and local markets.
Transportation in Oaxaca was confined to a series of wagon roads
and trails between the various towns. Commerce moved over these roads
only as fast as the numerous mules could pull or carry it. Generally,
the maintenance of existing roads was the responsibility of the munici-
pal governments, although, as will be discussed later, the state govern-
ment occasionally lent financial support. In general, however, the
municipal governments were too poor to provide much in the way of road
construction or maintenance. As a result, by 186? , the only main roads
extended from the capital north to Tehuacan, Puebla, and easterly toward
7Veracrus. 1 However, even these roads were little more than rough cart
tracks
.
Industry in Oaxaca was not very highly advanced by the time of
the Restored Republic. The people of Oaxaca generally imported most
manufactured goods with the exception of the few products produced by
the state T s limited light industries. By 1870, Oaxaca could only boast
that it produced its own glass, soap, handwoven cotton, alcohol, and
some iron.^
^Ibtd.j and doc. no. 13
.
1Ibid. s 19.
^Ibid. , 25 and doc. no. 15, n.p.
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Although Oaxaca had supported seme gold and silver mining during
the colonial era, this industry was dormant after the civil unrest of
the 1850 's. Like agriculture, mining in Oaxaca was handicapped by primi-
tive methods and the absence of easy access to markets. Miners had to
pack their equipment in, and their ore out, on the backs of mules. The
difficulty and the expense of large-scale mining, plus the apparent
paucity of the mines
,
discouraged investors from developing new mines
despite the encouragement of the state government.
These, then, were the conditions in the state after the over-
throw of the Imperial government. Most Oaxacans were apparently ready
and willing to forget about the war and return to their simple, pastoral
live3. Most of the population remained scattered throughout the state
clustering around the small district centers.^ Under these conditions,
the daily lives of many Oaxacans remained unchanged and untouched except
for those moments when state political developments interjected them-
selves.
The anticlerical Reform Laws notwithstanding, the traditional
church-centered village life resumed along familiar lines. Life still
revolved around holy days and religious festivals. The farmers still
met weekly to sell their products, barter for wares, or simply to trade
gossip.
The people of Oaxaca continued to face the potential dangers of
90nly about Q% of the state's population lived in the capital,
or central district, during the years from 1867-1872.
I
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epidemic diseases just as they had always done by hoping and praying
that they would he spared. The state government began to provide vac-
cination information in the vain hope of educating the people; but, this
was apparently not very successful since the state continued to repub-
lish this kind of information periodically. Similarly, the state was
apparently woefully lacking in hospital facilities with only one public
hospital located in a former convent in the capital. As mentioned in
footnote 5, the state only claimed to have fifteen doctors as late as
1869.
Primary and secondary education was practically unknown. Only
in the central district did schools exist and these had ceased almost
completely during the years of unrest since 1858. Despite the fact that
the state Constitution of 1857 made provision for public primary
schools, Oaxacan children were not really afforded this luxury until
after the overthrow of the Imperial government and the establishment of
civil control in 1867.
These, then, were the conditions that existed in Oaxaca, as In
so many other states in 186?. These were the conditions and problems
that the liberals attempted to change and improve after more than a
decade of struggle.
To provide a framework for understanding the liberals' goals and
methods, the first chapter will examine the constitutional arrangements
adopted at both national and state levels in 1857. These charters repre
sent the formal or ideal relationship that the liberals envisioned
for
the federal and state governments in the rebuilding of the
nation.
12
Subsequent chapters will explore the programs and accomplishments—in
short, the realities of the liberal regime—by examining their social,
financial and economic policies, security arrangements and, finally, the
interaction of state and national politics.
While the term "Restored Republic" is generally understood to
mean the period between 1867 and 1876, this study will concentrate on
the first five years down to 1872. Two reasons explain this decision:
first, these years coincide with the presidency of Benito Juarez when
the chief policies of the Restored Republic were determined. The second
reason is that Oaxaca's attempted secession from the Union in late 1871
marked the complete breakdown of the experiment in federalism in Oaxaca.
Thereafter, the state was governed by authorities representing Presi-
dent Lerdo. Thus, the focus is on the years 1867-1872 although seme
chapters trace developments as far as 1876 to illustrate the contention
that the Lerdo presidency was a continuation of the policies, goals,
and methods of the Juarez administration.
CHAPTER II
FEDERAL-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
Mexico's fifth Constitution was promulgated in February, 1857,
after prolonged debates. These debates were primarily over methods
,
rather than goals, for what their authors were seeking was essentially
an institutional structure that would leave Man free to develop his own
abilities. The device the liberals felt best suited to that purpose was
federalism.
First proposed in the Constitution of 182U , and again in 1857,
federalism became a liberal panacea for most Mexican problems.
1
The
inclination toward a federated government was generated by several fac-
tors : the ideas of the Enlightenment which assumed that Man could per-
fect himself; the example of Mexico's prosperous and powerful neighbor
to the North; and a negative reaction to the conservative, centralized
2
state which existed since the colonial era.
The liberal ideal was most influenced by the United States.
While many of the liberals' ideas and constitutional forms were borrowed
from Europe, the United States' constitution offered Mexicans an
appeal-
ing interpretation of federalism. Unlike the decentralized federalism
^•Jesus Reyes Heroles. El Ubevalismo mexiaano (Mexico, 1961),
III, 337-38; 401.
2
C. H. Haring, "Federalism in Latin America," in
Conyers Read,
ed. , The Cons'tiPution Reconsidered (New York, 1938),
3'+2.
13
Ill
of the ancient world, the United States' constitution brought to the
western hemisphere a system of centralized federalism. 3 During the
nineteenth century, centralization increased whenever the liberals grew
stronger. This apparent paradox in the liberal position led critics
3uch as Emilio Rabasa and Justo Sierra to argue that they were capti-
vated by the rhetoric of federalist writers without really understand-
ing the meaning of their words or the difficulties in fulfilling their
k
promises.
Federalists equated individual liberty with decentralization.^
They believed that a political system based on the power of the states
permitted the greatest individual opportunities. Unfortunately, the
opportunities many federalist politicians were concerned with were their
own. Federalism was generally the platform of political outsiders dur-
ing the early years after independence.^ Throughout most of the first
thirty years of independence, federalism meant little to most of its
adherents who either failed to understand it fully or never really
cared to. A genuine melding of liberalism and federalism did not occur
^William H. Riker, Federalism, Origin, Operation, Significance
(Boston, 196U), U-6.
^Sierra and Rabasa' s positions are critically examined by
Daniel Cosio Villegas in La constitucion de 1857 y sus oriticos
(Mexico, 1957).
5
J. Lloyd Mecham, "The Origins of Federalism in Mexico," in
Conyers Read, ed. , The Constitution Reconsidered, 353-5^.
6
Ibid., 355.
1
until the overthrew of the Santa Anna dictatorship and the Constituent
Congress of 1855-1856. The catalyst that finally brought about the
fusion of literalism and federalism was the Catholic church.^" The
church, which had traditionally allied itself with the conservatives
came under increasing attack from Mexican liberals after 182U. This
criticism only heightened the gulf between liberals and the church
hierarchy. Consequently, the Catholic church in Mexico aligned itself
more and more with the group that best suited its interests—the con-
servative centralists. By 1855-1856, the lines of battle between the
two groups had long since been drawn. It remained for the Constituent
Congress to formalize this union of Mexican liberalism and federalism.
Their work was completed when Mexico's fifth Constitution was promul-
gated in February, 1857.
The Constitution clearly emphasised the states as the reposi-
tories of the peoples' will. While the executive "branch was conceived
of as a weak agency, the unicameral legislature was invested with a
great deal of power. Congress, composed of elected representatives of
the people, was regarded as the true instrument of federalism. The
3
members of Congress also regarded themselves in this way. While Con-
gress was expected to uphold the sovereignty of the states, each state
^Paulin Machorro Narvasz. La Constitucion de 1857 (Mexico,
1959), 20.
^Mexico. Congreso General Constituyente. Constitucion Federal
de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico, l857)» 15-16.
16
was expected to rewrite its ovn charter in harmony with the federalist
Constitution of 1857. In order to understand better the federalist re-
lationship and the way in which it was affected by the exigencies of
successive events, it is first necessary to examine the Constitution in
greater detail.
The first item of concern to the constituents was the delinea-
tion of individual guarantees. Articles 2 and 5, for instance, declared
that all who were born in Mexico were free. Any slave who set foot on
Mexican soil was also free by virtue of his presence. Article 7 af-
firmed the freedom to write and to print—a guarantee the Juarez admin*
istration maintained even in the face of virulent personal attacks. The
spirit of the Reform Laws was incorporated into Article 13 which adopted
the Ley Juarez* abolition of special corporate fueros. The final arti-
cle of this section provided the basis for Juarez' administration of
Mexican affairs for the first ten years after the promulgation of the
Constitution. Article 29 stated that in the event of invasion, serious
disturbances of public peace, or anything else that seriously threatened
society, the president, with the approval of the Congress, could suspend
9 t
the guarantees granted in the Constitution for a limited time. Juarez
ruled Mexico during the War of the Reform and the Intervention by virtue
of this clause. He also resorted to the suspension of individual guar-
antees in specific states during local uprisings.
The federated form of government was outlined in Title XI,
Ibid., 3^-35
IT
Article hO:
It is the will of the Mexican people to constitute
a representative, democratic federal republic com-
posed of free and sovereign states in everything con-
cerning their internal management, but united in a
federation established according to the principles
of this fundamental law. 10
The federal relationship was subsequently outlined in Title II
with the specific provision that in no case could the state constitu-
tions contradict the federal constitution. All powers not specifically
delegated to the federal government were the prerogative of the states.
The division of powers followed the model of the United States 1
Constitution with an executive, legislative, and judicial branch. Con-
gress was created as a unicameral body elected for two years.^ Indi-
rect elections, a legacy from past experience, were adopted revealing
the framers 1 unwillingness to turn the selection of officials over to
the people without some control. In so doing, the framers reflected
the attitude of the founding fathers of the United States who also felt
that unchecked democracy was dangerous.
The federal nature of the Mexican Constitution also was evident
in Article 65 which allocated the power to initiate laws to the presi-
dent of the Republic, Congress, and the state legislatures. Laws pre-
sented by the president and the states had to be submitted to a
10
Ibid., ko.
^Amended to create a bicameral legislature ,with a House and
a Senate on November 13, l&lk. See Felipe Tena Ramirez, Leyes Funda-
mentales de Mexico, 1808-195? (Mexico, 1957), 693.
18
congressional committee before they could be presented to Congress for
a vote. Congress was given a vide range of powers over the states: the
admission of new states, approval of the federal budget with its con-
comitant share that each state would have to contribute, control of the
National Guard units within the states and, of course, the right to pass
enforcing laws.
The Constitution treated Congress as the collective voice of the
states,, and the executive as an administrative agent. Aside from emer-
gency situations, executive duties were confined to the execution of
laws, appointment and removal of administrative officials and titular
12leadership of the Army and the National Guard.
Title V of the Constitution of 1857 dealt most specifically with
the states. Article 109 instructed the states to adopt a popular re-
publican representative government. In addition to this directive, the
Constitution specifically denied the states certain unilateral powers.
Without congressional approval they could not conduct foreign relations,
13
issue their own currency or stamped paper, ^ or retain any permanent
troops. The state governors were charged with the publication and ex-
ecution of all federal laws. This function provided a certain amount of
leeway for the state executives who could occasionally delay publication
120ne of the changes that Juarez unsuccessfully sought in the
convocatoria of 186? was the veto power for the executive.
13While the letter of this clause was observed, the spirit was
not. Throughout the era of the Restored Republic, various federal mints
scattered about Mexico often operated without any effective federal
control
.
19
of lavs they disagreed with. The federal government, for its part,
assumed responsibility for the protection of the states against foreign
invasion and, upon the request of the states, in the event of internal
disorders. Article 117 restated the federalist relationship by declar-
ing that all powers not delegated to the federal government were the
prerogative of the states.
The framers of the Constitution, at the invitation of the radi-
cal Ponciano Arriaga, added one final power to the list cf federal pre-
rogatives: the right to deal with all religious questions. This clause
took control of the church out of the hands cf state officials in the
hope of applying a more even enforcement of federal policies.
The Constitution of 1857 indicates the development of liberal
political thought. Time proved the framers of the Constitution were
extremely unrealistic in their expectations. Clearly, it was impossible
to reorder Mexican society by simply writing new constitutions.
Oaxaca* s liberal constitution, promulgated on January 1, 1858,
is indicative of one state's conception of the federal-state constitu-
tional relationship.
In the official preamble of the state constitution, Manuel
Dublan, president of the constituent assembly, affirmed the legisla-
ture's acceptance of the charge by the Federal Constitution to rewrite
lU
the state constitution along liberal lines.
Following the example of the federal charter, the Oaxacan
^Oaxaca, Congreso constituyente. Constitution del Estado de
Oaxaca (Oaxaca, 189^), iv.
0constitution began with a long list of individual rights. Most of the
rights enumerated in Articles 1 through 21 repeat the guarantees of
Federal Constitution: freedom from enslavement, freedom of speech,
equality of all before the law and the prohibition of retroactive lavs.
The state constitution specified additional individual legal rights as
well. Article 8 stated that no one could be compelled to testify
against himself in any way. No one could be held for more than seventy-
two hours without being informed of the charges against him; and an
accused had to be brought to trial within a reasonable time. Further,
no one could be tried twice for the same crime. Finally, these rules
were declared by the Constitution to be inviolable.
Title II addressed itself to the sovereignty of the state and
its affiliation with the federal government:
The state of Oaxaca is free and sovereign in every-
thing that exclusively concerns its internal regu-
lation, and it is obliged to guard the political
Constitution of the Mexican Union and the general
laws.
Article 2k recognized the state's territorial limits as defined by the
Federal Constitution.
The form of government and the division of powers duplicated the
federal example. Oaxaca adopted a popular representative republican
government as instructed. It also organized the government into execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative branches. The state's Congress was a
unicameral body whose representatives were elected for two year terms
just as in the national Congress. The state constitution created a di-
rectly-elected legislature which reflected the liberal belief that an
21
elected representative body was the true repository of the people's
will. The state constitution affirmed the state legislature's right
to initiate laws and submit them to the federal government. The state
legislature could pass laws on any matter not expressly assigned to the
federal government by the Federal Constitution of 1857 including autho-
rization of the state budget and the assignment of taxes. Its judicial
powers were several: the formation of a civil code, criminal and pro-
cedural codes, and the right to grant amnesty in cases of capital punish-
ment
.
Title IV delineated the office of Governor. Unlike the presi-
dent of the Republic, the state's chief executive was directly elected;
and, if no one received an absolute majority of the votes, the decision
would then be made by the state legislature. Elected for four years,
the governor's powers and duties included the publication and enforce-
ment of federal and state laws and the naming of state officials includ-
ing the jefes politicos. The governor was also empowered to fine the
presidents and members of local ayuntamientos for failure to comply with
the laws of the state and the nation. The governor served as the com-
mander of the state's National Guard unit. Although the federal Con-
gress controlled the administration of this agency, the governor was the
immediate commander. His powers as commander were limited only to the
extent that he needed permission from the state legislature to assume
command. A secretariat headed by a secretary of the state was created
These tasks were not completed until 1869-1870
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to aid the governor. The secretariat handled the administration of laws
for the executive. The secretary of state's signature had to he in-
cluded on all the governor's regulations, decrees and orders in order
for them to he valid.
The state was divided into administrative districts and then
into mun'icipios which were similar to United States' townships in their
size. Each district was under the direct jurisdiction of a jefe poli-
tico; each municipio was administered hy an ayuntamiento. While the
jefes were appointed hy the governor, the ayuntamientos—the lowest
level of government—were directly elected.
1^
Title VII contained miscellaneous clauses (including Article 91)
which stipulated that Mexicans living in Oaxaca were obliged to serve
in the National Guard; the organization of the National Guard itself
was
left to subsequent legislation.
Titles VIII and IX dealt directly with the state constitution.
The former section made provisions for formal revision of the
Constitu-
tion. A two-thirds vote of all members of the state Congress
who were
present was necessary in order to change the document. The
latter title
reflected the last article of the Federal Constitution
which declared
the state constitutions to be inviolable. If a state
constitution was
overturned or replaced by a rebellion, it would be
reinstated as soon as
that interruption could be concluded.
Thus, the two constitutions reflected, in
general terms, the
l6Both of the offices were defined in
subsequent
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framework for the revival of the Mexican nation. The relationship be-
tween the two levels of government was a revision of the federalist
system which granted autonomy to the states in terms of daily functions
and duties while it required them to obey and comply with federal laws.
The commitment made to the constitutions was sincere for many Mexican
liberals. They truly hoped and believed that such a document and such
a system would provide the means for greater development of their
nation.
The liberal political leaders who sought to reshape Mexico's
destiny by means of written documents either ignored or were unaware
of the enormity of their task. Constitutions and rhetoric meant little
to people whose horizons were generally limited to walking distance.
To the Mexican people, constitutions were of little consequence until
they became the cause of one of the frequent political eruptions that
disrupted the lives of all Mexicans during the nineteenth century.
Furthermore, constitutions were worth little if they were unenforceable.
This was certainly the case in 1857- Ten years and two major wars would
delay the full application of that document and would seriously alter
the government's approach toward it. During the period from
1857-
1367, the Juarez administration, and in particular its key
minister,
Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, became increasingly convinced of the need
for
greater central control of Mexico. Considering the
events of the per-
iod, there is little wonder that the administration
felt compelled to
increase rather than diminish the federal government's
powers.
The single most important factor in elevating
the Constitution
of 1857 above its predecessors was the French Intervention. Once the
conservatives cooperated with the French and the government of Maxi-
milian, they helped sanctify the Constitution of l6S7 as the symbol of
national sovereignty rather than the manifesto of one political faction.
When the liberal government of Benito Juarez assumed complete control
of the government in 1867, it had a mandate to carry out the principles
of the Constitution.
The problems that had been built into the Federal Constitution
of 1857 remained for Juarez to deal with a decade later. By relying
upon the judgment of the states to determine the priority and often the
solution of their problems, the liberals ignored the fact that the
states were ill-equipped to meet the enormity of the problems confront-
ing them.
CHAPTER III
THE EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGE
When the liberals resumed control of Mexico in 1867, one of the
most pressing responsibilities they faced was in the field of educa-
tion. The challenge of creating a public system of education confronted
not only the federal government but also the government of Oaxaca.
The liberals' educational program reflected the influence of
Auguste Comte.'*" Comte, a Frenchman and advocate of a positivist phil-
osophy, urged the study of exact knowledge, particularly the sciences.
Much of the Juarez administration's educational program was the direct
2
work of Gabino Barreda who had studied under Comte in France . Barreda
r (
offered his own interpretation of positivism in his Oracion Civica which
he presented in Guanajuato on September l6, 186? . This speech was pub-
lished at the time Juarez was considering the reorganization of Mexico's
educational system. In it, Barreda argued that a church-dominated
1
Albert J. Delmez, "The Positivist Philosophy in Mexican Educa-
tion," The Americas, VI (19^9), 32. See also Irma Wilson, Mexico. A
Century of Educational Thought (New York, 19^1) , 225-35.
^uben Rodriguez Lozano, Vida y ohra del Dr. Gabino Barreda
(Puebla, 1968), 7. Barreda, in 1867, was the leading advocate of Mexi-
can positivism. His interpretation of the Ccmtian philosophy called
for
the creation of a system that would guarantee the individual the
oppor-
tunity to make a contribution to society. While this interpretation
was
acceptable to Juarez, it was later perverted, according to Leopoldo
Zea,
into the aggressive positivism of the Porfiriato. See Leopoldo
Zea,
"Positivism," in A. Robert Caponigri, ed., Major Trends in Mexican Pnil-
osophy (Notre Dame, 1966), 231-^5*
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education was insufficient for the development of a modern nation. 3 He
contended, instead, that education should ultimately place its greatest
emphasis upon the production of a "generation of logical, practical
|fllmen." Barreda made a distinction between the roles of the church and
the state in the educational process. He contended that the church
should assume responsibility for the infusion of a common set of values
or loyalties based upon positivist principles.
Impressed with Barreda, Juarez urged his appointment to a
special committee charged with reorganizing Mexican education in 1867.
Barreda is generally regarded as the guiding spirit of the committee's
*
report. Ultimately, the report became the basis for Mexican education
until after the Revolution of 1910, Juarez codified the Barreda report
by decree on December 2, 1867, under the title of the Organic Law of
6
Public Instruction for the Federal District.
"barreda 1 s Oraoion Civica is reprinted in Jorge L. Tamayo, ed.
,
Lev Organioa de Instruceion Publico, en el Distrito Federal, 1867-1967
(Mexico, 1967).
Delmez, loo. cit. , 35-36. Lie. Jose Maria del Castillo, secre-
tary of Gobernacicn, described education as "the indestructible basis
of the prosperity of the people, from which they will become freer and
more opulent." Sria. de Gobernacicn. Apendiae de la Memoria que el
Secretario de Estado y del despaaho de Gobemaaion presento al sexto
Congreso constituoional y documentos en ella se eitan (Mexico, 1871), 39
^Ibid.y 37. See also Rodriguez Lozano, Vida y obra del Dr.
Gabino Barreda, 7-8.
^Manuel Dublan y Jose M. Lozano, eds., Legislaoion rnexicana.
Coleacion oompleta de las disposioiones legislativas expedidas desde la
independencia de la Republica, 3h vols. (Mexico, 1.876-190U), X, 193-205.
The official newspaper, Diario oficial, meanwhile, touted the value of
education as a means of bringing Mexico into the world of modern
nations.
The translation of the administration's educational program into
a law for the Federal District revealed the liberals' determination to
adhere to the federalist principles of the Constitution of 1857. This
document precluded the imposition of a national educational system. The
Organic Law, accordingly, applied only to the Federal District although
it was hoped that it would also serve as a model for the states in estab-
lishing their own educational systems.
Because it represents the educational program of the Juarez ad-
ministration and because it did influence educational developments out-
side Mexico, it is worth examining the Federal Organic Law of Public
Instruction in some detail.
The Federal Organic Law 3tated with great confidence that the
system it embodied was the most efficient way to inculcate the Mexican
people with a sense of freedom as well as respect for the Constitution.
The law specifically authorized the municipal governments of the Federal
District and the federal government to share the cost of schools within
the district. Four primary schools (three for boys, one for girls) were
to be paid for by federal funds. Any additional schools deemed neces-
sary by the municipal governments were to be financed out of local
revenues. The Organic Law did not provide for a breakdown of the educa-
tional system by grades. Rather, the law listed the specific courses
that constituted what the Barreda committee thought necessary for com-
pletion of a primary education. The primary curriculum was composed of
reading, penmanship, Spanish grammar, letter-writing, arithmetic, the
decimal system, rudiments of physics, the arts based on chemistry and
28
practical mechanics, linear drawing, morals, manners, notions of con-
stitutional rights, and rudiments of history and geography, especially
7
of Mexico
.
These courses reflected Barreda's emphasis upon posit ivist
education. Primary schools (which later evolved to grades 1-6) were
part of a graduated program constructed so that the student's education
was complete only after he had finished every phase of the educational
program. In other words, each educational level, in fact, each course,
was a progressive step in building a total body of knowledge. Such a
combination of courses, it was believed, would produce a generation
capable of making decisions upon rational scientific principles.
In addition to the primary educational system, the Federal
Organic Law also called for the creation of several secondary schools
which were essentially specialized preparatory schools. They were open
to anyone who completed his elementary education and could qualify by
8
passing a series of entrance examinations.
While Juarez 1 special committee prepared the plan for education
in the Federal District, the states prepared their own educational pro-
grams. In Oaxaca, the state legislature approved its own version of a
liberal educational system with the Organic Law of Public Instruction on
^Dublan y Lozano. Legislaaion mexicana, X, 193-9 1*-
Secondary education included the Schools for Preparatory
Studies, Medicine, Surgery, Pharmacy, Agriculture, Veterinary Sci
Engineering, Arts and Crafts, Natural Sciences, Fine Arts, Music
Speech, a Normal School, A School for Deaf-mutes, an observatory,
Academy of Literature, and Science and a botanical garden.
29
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October 9> l8o7» The Organic Law of 1867 was actually a successor of
an earlier attempt at public education which was initiated in I858.
The first attempt had hardly been initiated however before the outbreak
of civil war. The state government attempted to renew its primary
educational program again in i860, but the program was not very well-
defined and it was not translated into action before affairs in the
state were disrupted by the French Intervention. Consequently, the
Oaxacan Organic Law of 1867 was the first significant opportunity
liberals had to actually implement their ideas.
Felix Diaz expressed the liberal goals for education:
Intelligence is the auxiliary of strength,
and for the seiae reason, education is the
natural ally of work. A government pretends
in vain to promote the public enrichment with-
out promoting education. Only the study of
the sciences brings in its wake, progress to
agriculture, to the arts, to commerce, and
every industry prospers.
H
The federal and Oaxacan educational codes shared many features
indicating the pervasiveness of positivism among Mexican liberals. Like
the federal government, Oaxaca recognized the need for public
assump-
tion of an educational system. The state law endorsed the
ideal of
free compulsory education for all children between the
ages of five and
fifteen. Although the state retained the right to dictate
educational
90axaca. Leyes, decretos, eta. ,IV, 325-
100axaca. Ley OrgSniaa de InstvucciSn Pfolica
dearetada par el
H. Congreso del Estado (Oaxaca, l86l).
nOaxaca. Gobernador. Memoria (1871), 62-63.
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policies, local administration of education was left to educational
juntas formed in each municipality. The state's Organic Law did not
define the makeup of these juntas in any detail. In practice, the
ayuntamientos or town councils usually assumed direct responsibility
for education even though the law stated that the municipal councils
were responsible to the jefes politicos whose role in the educational
program was generally limited to that of a liaison between the municipal
and state governments. The jefe was required to forward correspondence
and funds from the state's Administrator of Public Instruction to the
municipalities; he also forwarded, without comment, regular reports on
education from local governments to the state* This administrative
structure crea.ted a system which theoretically gave the state govern-
ment control of policy decisions while relying upon the municipal
governments to see to the enforcement of the policy.
Oaxaca's Organic Law also dealt with the curriculum for the
schools carefully defining the areas of required study for at least the
first five years. The specific requirements reflected the break from
any religious orientation as well as the positivist emphasis upon
science and reason. 'The general stress was on a practical, scientific
(or technical) approach to learning. During the first year, students
were required to study reading, writing, and basic arithmetic. In
their
second year, they again had basic reading and writing, but were
also
introduced to Castilian grammar and the rudiments of arithmetic.
The
third year of study exposed students to reading, courtesy,
grammar, and
more arithmetic. By the fourth year, the students were
required to
study writing and advanced grammatical problems as
well as a course in
31
civics and an introduction to the decimal system. Commerical arithme-
tic vas added to the curriculum for the sixth year as was world history
and the concepts of the metric system.
At first glance, the new Oaxacan curriculum does not appear to
be drastically different from the traditional pre-Reform elementary
curriculum. Under the older system, students were also given religious
instruction, and they did not have courses in civics and commercial
12
arithmetic
.
In addition to the absence of religious instruction, it is clear
that significant changes took place in the recipients of Oaxacan primary
education. Prior to J.86T* education generally had been the prerogative
of the privileged. Schools were neither publicly funded nor were they
obligatory except for the abortive attempts in 1858 and i860. Schools
were traditionally church-supported with the exception of a Lancastrian
school in Oaxaca City. Under these circumstances, the curriculum was
limited to subjects that church officials regarded suitable for the
upper classes. Education was marked by a scholasticism that held little
13
meaning for Mexico's lower classes.
^Jorge L. Tamayo, ed. , Ley organica de Instruction Publica, 9.
This vas apparently true in Oaxacan primary schools as well. See Berry,
"The Reform in the Central District Of Oaxaca, 1856-1867/' 38-39-
13
The old curriculum was outlined in Catecismo politico dedicate
a la instruccion primaria de la juventud oaxaqueno jOaxaca, 1857), 38-UO
See also Fidel Lopez Carrasco, Historic de educacion en el
estado de
Oaxaca (Mexico, 1950), 26-3U; and George F. Kneller, The Educatvon of
the Mexican Nation (New York, 1951 h 30.
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In addition to specifying the curriculum, Oaxaca's new educa-
tional law included provisions for annual pupil examinations and
teachers 1 reports. These provisions were the basis for subsequent state
supervision of a wide range of details including the approval of new
courses, the review of graduating students, and the criteria for hiring
teachers. The director of the State Institute of Arts and Sciences
was also the director of the state 1 s primary educational system. In
these ways, the state government retained some control of educational
policies and standards.
The Organic Law paid lip service tc the idea cf education for
women by calling for a system of primary education open to all citizens
regardless of their economic status or sex. In practice, however,
women never participated widely in the educational system (see Table I).
While the liberals proclaimed their faith in the principle of equality
of opportunity for all, in reality, they gave a very low priority to
educating women.
While the Federal and Oaxacan Laws of Public Instruction
theoretically represent the liberals' educational goals, the true test
of their commitment to public education was the performance of the state
and local administrations. In Oaxaca, the educational program was im-
plemented visibly through the construction of new schools most of which
were built in the initial years of the Restored Republic. Under the
terms of the state's Organic Law, each municipality of 1000 people
was
to have a school and many local officials and Jefes politicos
strove to
fulfill this goal. Governor Felix Diaz's administration
(1867-71)
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publicly committed itself to school construction, and in 1867 it found
the Oaxacans receptive to such a building program. The initial enthu-
siasm may have been a reflection of the fact that the years of fighting
between 1857 and 1867 had left Oaxaca's few schools in a moribund
state.
^
The execution of the primary educational program commenced al-
most as soon as the liberal armies regained control of the state in
lQ6f. Community-minded Oaxacans did not wait for either the state or
the federal governments to encourage school openings. Schools were
organized and put into operation as early as March, 1867, when the dis-
tricts of Villa-Alta and Ocotlan notified the state that their munici-
pal schools attended by boys and girls were being taught by provisional
teachers entirely supported by community funds.
^
This exercise of local initiative had its roots in a desire for
a normal existence after the years of warfare. As the jefe politico of
Juchitan observed in a letter to La Victoria; no schools had existed in
his district for two years and his people were anxious to begin rebuild-
17
ing their lives along more stable lines. Public-spirited Oaxacans
there, and elsewhere, regarded schools as a means of improving the
^Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of Oaxaca, 1856
1867," 39.
l6
La Victoria (May 2, 1867), 1.
17
Ibid. (May 26, 1867), 1.
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community and as a sign of progress. For its part, the Oaxacan govern-
ment administered by a military commander and a civil governor at the
onset of the Restored Republic took pains to encourage this kind of
local initiative wherever it occurred. In June, 1868, Luis Perez
Castro, editor of La Viatoria y complimented the people of Villa-Alta for
their actions. He particularly mentioned the jefe politico, Pedro
Renero, for his success in opening a number of schools in a relatively
u * + . 183hort time.
Despite some initial activity, the state f s districts were not
uniform in their school programs. The major obstacle present in all
districts was their lack of funds. As a later governor Miguel Castro
observed:
In vain the Executive [of the State] reminded the
municipios, in numerous circulars, of the obliga-
tion of the law to build and maintain primary
schools, . . . The government saw with regret,
that its instructions were dashed against the no-
torious poverty of the municipios. ^9
In an effort to aid the districts that could not afford to hire teachers,
the administration of Felix Dias occasionally authorized special funds.
In January, 1870, the state legislature, at the governor's urging,
Ibid. (June 11, 1868), k. La Victoria also cited other dis-
tricts or individuals for their efforts, such as Tehuantepec, for
secondary schools, and Miahuatlan when it opened several schools in the
space of two months.
190axaca. Gobernador. Memoria que el ejecativo del Estado
presentada al congreso del nismc (Oaxaca: Imprenta del Estado, 1873),
p. Uo.
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agreed to pay the salaries of six teachers in Tehuantepec. 20
The Oaxacan Law of Public Instruction had provided for the
financial "burdens to be shared almost equally between the state and
local governments. It authorized a direct tax of 6-l/U centavos per
month for each taxpayer. The municipal governments were charged with
the duty of collecting this tax which was to be used for school con-
struction and maintenance. During the years from 1868 to 1871, the
municipal governments annually collected 100,000 to 118,000 pesos in
this way. But this was hardly sufficient to provide enough schools.
It is evident, judging from frequent state complaints, that the local
governments were not efficient in collecting this tax. The state govern-
ment, for its part, annually allotted 100,000 pesos from the state bud-
21
get to be disbursed to each district for teachers' salaries.
While the state legislature occasionally authorized additional
funds, these were totally insufficient to build, staff, and maintain
schools for all school-age children in the state. The situation was
commented on by public officials. As Benito Cartas, jefe politico of
the Central district observed:
With regard to the instruction of the people who compose
this district vhich is totally native, with the exception
of the capital, it is entirely retarded, so that the
majority of municipal authorities do not know how to read,
and even less how to write; because the pledge of authority
to establish schools in each town is not enough; it has not
been possible because of the lack of funds most of the time.
20
La Victoria (January k, 1870), U.
21
Ibid. (November 3, 1867), 2; and ibid. (January 9, 1868),
3-U; and ibid. (January 8, l869), 5-
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This same kind of sentiment was expressed by the Jefe of Villa-Alvarez,
Cristobal Salinas:
The people of the district are generally docile, hard-
working, and economical. They do not know because no
one teaches them.
. . . Education would elevate them.
. . .Primary instruction as the government proclaims itdoes not satisfy the needs of the community.
.
There ought to be a school where there is a desire for
intelligence. ... The people want the promise of the
executive [for funds] to be realized. 22
Oaxacan education was also retarded by the dearth of qualified
teachers. Some districts such as Tehuantepec and Ocotlan solved the
problem by hiring itinerant teachers. In Tehuantepec, for instance,
five villages employed the same teacher, Florentino Gonzalez, in 1868
for an annual salary of twenty pesos each.
One reason the state legislature was disposed to relieve Tehuan-
tepec of some of its financial burden was that district's efforts to go
beyond primary level education. Tehuantepec was the only area outside
of the Central district that supported a secondary school. The Colegio
de Santa Infanci'a, as it was known, opened its doors in 1869. This
colegio (or high school) began with rather modest course offerings:
English, French and Castilian grammar
,
arithmetic, draftsmanship, and
bookkeeping.
Despite so limited a curriculum, the school's opening was hailed
in the capital as a substantial step "distinguished by the cultivation
of science." [True to the positivist doctrines, Tehuantepec ' s colegio
Both statements are found in Oaxaca, Memoria (l873),
doc. no. 6.
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va3 oriented toward the ideal of a practical education which would pro-
vide Oaxacans with the opportunity to move into the ranks of the nascent
Mexican middle class.] La Victoria stressed the overall benefit the
school would bring to the state:
It is of little importance whether a town is called
Teotitlan or Villa-Juarez, Miahuatlan or Tehuantepec;
what ve desire, what we seriously aspire to is that
all are one by work, by instruction and by positive
advances; since only by this method are the people
made great, governments worthy, vigorous and
esteemed. 23
The model for secondary education in Oaxaca was the long-estab-
lished Institute of Arts and Sciences created by the Oaxacan legislature
2k
in 1826. From its inception, the Institute has been associated with
liberal Oaxacans including the more innovative clergy. In the early
*
years, priests were not only hired to teach in the Institute but several
actually served as its director. Many members of the clergy had co-
operated with and supported the Institute because they regarded it as a
means of extending or continuing ecclesiastical influence in education.
During the first year of liberal control in the mid-18 30' s, however,
its curriculum was modified to give more emphasis to professional and
technical training. Included in the courses offered at that time were:
law, medicine, pharmacy, and mathematics. From then until the Reform,
the Institute attracted many liberals, both priests and laymen. By the
23
La Victoria (February 9, 1869)
9
2
**Ray F. Packard, "Institute of Arts and Sciences of Oaxaca
(M.S. Thesis: Mexico City College), 21.
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mid-l8U0's, the Instituted liberal outlook was widely recognized, but
it was only during the Reform era that clerical influence was reduced
and finally eliminated. 2 *5
The Institute's success was at least partially attributable to
the fact that it was the only state-supported secondary school in
Oaxaca. It did not have to share its budget with Santa Infancia in
Tehuantepec, and it drew students from all of Oaxaca. Throughout the
Restored Republic, the state's programs for secondary education were
concentrated at the Institute. From time to time it expanded its offer-
ings to incorporate additional courses as the state government saw fit.
Most of the twenty-six curricular programs offered by the Institute were
26
available in Oaxaca City.
The state was able to maintain a constant influence upon secon-
dary education through a director of Public Instruction. The director,
appointed by the governor, was empowered to make all personnel and
curricular decisions. The state legislature, upon the recommendation
25
By 1867 the church was completely removed from the educational
process.
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By 1868 the aatedras (chairs) in the Institute were:
Typography French Geography
Gymnastics English Physics
Music Painting History
Design Syntax Chemistry
Castilian Logic Pharmacy
Fine Arts Mathematics Natural History
Special legislature Agriculture Anatomy
Civil rights Pathology
Greek
Civil law
Public law
UO
of the director, approved scholarship recipients and exemptions from the
annual examinations which were required for advancement.
Oaxacans of various social strata expressed their support for
public education in two ways: educated, literate and professional peo-
ple wrote letters, editorials and speeches; the less sophisticated
Oaxacans, living in the outlying districts, responded by voting for
schools and by sending their children to attend these schools. La
Victoria periodically published editorials and letters endorsing the
positivist program. Luis Perez Castro, editor of the Oaxacan journal in
1868, strongly urged that the federal government emphasize a scientific
but utilitarian education:
We recognize our ignorance ... we have a vehement
desire that our people have a fountain from which
to absorb ai good education, neither literary, nor
fine arts, but of useful and productive arts: we
are conscious that a good carpenter, a good lock-
smith, a good mason, is more useful than the most
knowledgeable Greek scholar, the best and most
erudite Latin scholar, the most eloquent and florid
poet and the most profound canonist. 2i
Throughout the period of the Restored Republic, other Oaxacans such as
Juan N. Cerqueda, a lawyer in the central district, praised the admin-
istration's educational program. In a letter to La Victoria in 1870,
Cerqueda expressed his hopes for the new educational system which he
saw as an avenue for progress and modernization in Mexico. Cerqueda
*La Victoria (May 28, 1868), 3- 1*. Perez Castro also spoke out
vigorously in favor of an expanded educational program for women. How-
ever, as noted earlier, women were largely ignored by the educational
system.
Ibid. (March lk 9 1870), U. The editors of Lx Victoria also
1*1
also praised the state legislature for emphasizing education founded on
scientific principles and professional training. An ardent advocate of
positivism, Cerqueda argued that one method of establishing political
stability vas to promote a peaceful, productive, and industrious people
through education.
The sentiments expressed by Cerqueda and Luis Perez Castro il-
lustrated the positivist belief in education as a means of engendering
an era of peace. Their celebration of the virtues of work as a social
and political panacea reflected the view that progress vas possible only
in a well ordered society. After the years of turmoil, the establish-
ment of schools for the training of technicians and craftsmen was
heralded as the inauguration of a new phase in the restoration of the
Republic.
As Table I indicates the state of Oaxaca had only 30,255 pupils
enrolled (28,166 boys and 2,089 girls) in primary schools in 1869-1870.
These pupils constituted less than 5% of the state population (see
Table 2) and in certain districts numbered less than 1% of the popula-
tion. 29
While it is not possible to state with precision the number of
school-age children in Oaxaca in 1870, it can be presumed that they
occasionally encouraged the expansion of the education program.
29
Ibid. (December U, 1868); and ibid. (December 28, 1868), 3;
and La Victoria (November 2, 1867), 3. Complete figures were not
available by 1867 because of the unsettled conditions and the general
indifference to recording statistical information.
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TABLE 2
POPULATION AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 3Y DISTRICT, 1869-1870 30
DISTRICT TOTAL POPULATION SCHOOL POPULATION
PERCENTAGE OF
POPULATION
Centro
Coixtlahuaca
Cuicatlan
Choapam
Etla
Huajuapani
Janiltepec
Juquila
Miahuatlan
Nochixtlan
Ocotlan
Tehuant epec
Teotitlan
Teposcolula
Tlacolula
Tlaxiaco
Villa-Alvarez
Villa-Alt
a
Yantepec
Ejutla
Juchitan
Silacayoapam
Pochutla
Tuxtepec
Villa-Juarez
1+T,T58
13,021
16,176
9,581
22,677
37,113
33,1*11
1U.85U
31,163
32,235
25,999
19,1*10
2l*,297
2l*,885
33,313
38,826
39 , 070
38,730
20,909
15,197
27,335
19,071
10,039
17,987
19,909
1951
1019
791
375
11*92
30 51*
910
236
31*16
2681
171*0
726
503
101*0
875
800
807
2115
801*
986
156
12 31*
561*
593
1387
k.0%
12.7
1*.8
3.9
6.5
8.2
2.7
1.5
1.0
8.3
6.6
3.7
2.0
l*.l
2.5
2.0
2.0
5.k
3.8
6.5
0.5
6.1*
5.6
3.3
_6^_
TOTALS 632,1*56 30,255 1*.7
30
Oaxaca. Gobernador. Memoria (1870), doc. no. 69.
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vastly outnumbered those enrolled. Some idea of the disparity between
enrollees and the school age population is suggested "by the 1895 census
which indicated that at that time the 6-15 year age group constituted
over 2k% of the state's population (see Table 3). If the same percent-
age prevailed in 1870, and there is no reason to assume a smaller 6-15
year age group for that year, the number of children who should have
been attending Oaxacan schools under state law was 151,789. In other
words, only one child in five was enrolled in a primary school despite
the commitment of state and municipal leaders to the ideal of public
education.
The failure of the liberal regime to carry out its public com-
mitment to provide free public schools for all children is even more
clear when it came to girls. As evidenced in Table I, half of the
state's districts never opened any primary schools for girls while the
remaining districts had only 31 schools for girls as opposed to a total
of 678 schools for boys.
It is difficult with the materials available to assess the
quality of instruction provided in the schools that did exist. Some
insight is offered, however, by the data on student-teacher ratios. One
immediate observation is that the ratios were generally high and varied
sharply from district to district, as shown by Table I.
The reasons for this variation are not related directly to the
size of population. To be sure, the Central or Capital district
(U7,758 population) had one of the highest ratios (89 to l) and the next
largest district, Villa-Alvarez (39,070 population) had a ratio of k2
to 1, but two districts with almost identical population,
Tlaxiaco
1+1*
TABLE 3
SCHOOL-AGE AND TOTAL POPULATION IN OAXACA BY DISTRICT, 189531
DISTRICT TOTAL POPULATION 6 TO 10 YEARS 11 TO 15 YEARS
Centro
Coixtlahuaca
Cuicatlan
Choapam
Etla
Ejutla
Huajuapam
Ixtlan
Jamiltepec
Juchitan
Juquila
Juxtlahuaca
Miahuatian
Nochixtlan
Ocotlan
Pochutla
Silacayoapam
Tehuantepec
Teotitlan
Teposcolula
Tlacolula
Tlaxiaco
Tuxtepec
Villa-Alta
Yautepec
Zimatlan
65,732
16,818
21,058
11,731+
2l+,060
30,032
1+3,367
27,077
kk,99k
kk,53k
21,1*67
19,783
1+0,53*+
kl,22k
33,1+72
20,398
27,169
31,009
35,530
31,068
1+0 , 881
63,282
28,399
1+0,118
23,U62
1+5,699
7,315
1,783
2,977
1,508
3,11+1+
l+,337
6,1+88
3,397
7,287
6,587
3,027
2,51+1
5,31+3
5,991
l+,l+68
2,933
3,670
1+,128
!+,880
l+,530
5,786
9,166
l+,366
5,363
3,017
6,180
11. US)
10.62)
9.5%)
12.9%)
13.0%)
lk.k%)
lk.9%)
12.52)
16.22)
lU.32)
11+.12)
12.82)
13.12)
Ik. 6%)
13.32)
11+.22)
13.52)
13.32)
13.72)
11+.62)
li+
. 12
)
Ik. 5%)
15.1+2)
13.1+2)
12.92)
13.5%)
7,119
1,590
2,1+21+
1,093
2,560
3,299
l+,735
2,673
4,870
l+,587
2,597
1,811
1+,1+11
4,257
3,628
2,237
2,887
3,21+2
4,053
3,076
5,043
7,031
2,753
3,939
2,531
1+,70U
11.02
9-52
11.52
9.32
10.72
11.02
11.02
9.92
10.82
10.32
12.12
9-22
10.92
10.32
10.92
11.02
10.62
10.52
11.1+2
9.92
12.32
11.12
9.72
9.82
10.82
10.32
TOTALS 872,902 120,181 (13.72) 93,151+ (10.6;
^ Mexico. Ministerio de Fomento. Direccion General de Esta-
distica. Censo General de la Republica Mexicana, 1895 (Mexico, 1899.
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(38,826), and Villa-Alta (38,730), had student-teacher ratios of UU:1
and 53:1 respectively.
Most of the districts with populations less than 20,000 people
(Choapam—9,581; Pochutla—10,029; Juquila--ik&ki and Cuieatlaa~
16,176) had relatively low student
-teacher ratios ranging from 26:1 to
38:1. However, the districts of Ejutla (15,197) and Coixtlahuaca
(13,021) had student-teacher ratios of U9.3 and 56.6 respectively. The
same inconsistencies existed between the districts with populations
above 20,000.
The student-teacher ratio was not directly proportional to the
wealth of the districts. The Central District, for instance, the eco-
nomic hub of the state, maintained the second highest student-teacher
ratio in the state (89:1). In contrast, Juchitan, one of the remote
agricultural districts and Cuicatlan, a mountainous, isolated district
in the northern part of the state, had student-teacher ratios of lU:l
and 26:1 respectively. In fact, the student-teacher ratio was not di-
rectly proportional to the wealth of the district, the proximity of the
state capital, or the size of the district. There was probably no sin-
gle factor that determined the number of schools or the student-teacher
ratios in the various districts. One can only conjecture about the real
factors that affected the Oaxacan school program: the personality and
predilections of state and local leaders, the effectiveness of the state
government's encouragement; and the grass-roots commitment to the lib-
erals 1 vision of education as a means to a greater, more unified
society.
1*6
The federal government, insofar as Oaxaca was concerned, played
only a minor role in the educational process. It did nothing to sup-
port primary schools or the Oaxacan Institute of Arts and Sciences, but
it did provide secondary educational opportunities in the Federal Dis-
32
trict. - In fact, with the slow economic growth of some states, the
burden of providing secondary specialized education fell increasingly
33to the federal government.
Theoretically, the federal government made opportunities for
higher education available to the citizens of all the states. However,
since its schools were located in the Federal District, they were not
3h
easily accessible to the majority of Mexicans. On the other hand,
the provision of some scholarships by the federal government did open
the door slightly.
Under these circumstances, the opportunities for advanced educa-
tion belonged to those best able to afford them. The state government
never actively undertook the creation of a system of higher education
beyond the Institute. Recognizing the relatively low level of
Secondary schools created by the Juarez administration in
the Federal District included a Law School, Medical School, School of
Agriculture and Veterinary Science, an Engineering School, a School of
Fine Arts and Trades, and a School for Deaf-Mutes. See Jorge L. Tamayo,
ed., Ley Ovganica de Instrucaion Publica, 2U-25- See also Oaxaca.
Gobernador. Mernoria (l87l), doc. no. 67.
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Ia Victoria (November 9, 1367 ), 1.
Ibid. (November 23, 1867), 3.
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development of the people and the poor condition of the treasury, the
state abdicated the responsibility for advanced study to the Juarez
t
admini strat ion
.
In summary, then, the federal and state governments shared re-
sponsibility for education. The states assumed sole administrative
responsibility for primary education while the federal government at-
tempted indirectly to influence primary curricular policies by the ex-
ample of the Federal Organic Law of Public Instruction. Ultimately,
however, the final decision on curricular matters was left in the hands
of the states. The pervasiveness of the posit ivist philosophy was evi-
dent in the educational programs established at both the federal and
state levels. In the case of Oaxaca, the state appears to have anti-
cipated the federal government as in the Organic Law of Public Instruc-
tion. The implementation of the state's education program was incom-
plete; but certainly at the primary level, Oaxaca 1 s program complemented
that of the federal government. Oaxaca needed no push from the Juarez
administration to undertake its own version of a positivist educational
system. Undoubtedly, this effort received at least moral support from
35
the national capital. The state's educational program, in turn, be-
came a source of pride for many ordinary citizens
The state and federal governments were usually in accord on
3
^J. M. Casauranc, ed. , La Educaaion publico en Mexico a troves
de los mensajes pvesidenciales desde la consumacion de la independencia
hasta nuestros duzs (Mexico: Publicaciones de la Sria. de Educacion,
1926), 13-lU.
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educational policies. The federal government, in fact, assumed re-
sponsibility for much of the technical, advanced education that was
36
offered. Rather than interpret this as a threat to their preroga-
tives, the states accepted the practice willingly. The major reason for
their ready acceptance was the fact that it freed the state governments
from the burden of developing their own secondary educational systems.
Thus, the relationship between the federal and the Oaxacan governments
was one of cooperation rather than competition in the field cf education
Oaxaca's educational policies were built around this cooperation be-
tween the state and the Juarez administration.
Despite the enthusiasm for education expressed by its governors,
/ '
including Felix Diaz, Oaxaca's educational program was only feebly
pursued after 1870. Apparently, the municipal governments continued
to be unable or unwilling to bear the costs of school construction,
staffing, and maintenance. By the time of the Revolt of La Noria in
1871, all attempts at public education had ended in the state. On De-
cember 1, 1871, Governor Diaz closed all of the state's schools and
37
ordered that state educational funds be diverted for other uses. The
Francisco Larroyo, Historia comparada de la educacion en
Mexico (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1956), 186-9 1*. See also Kneller,
The Education of the Mexican Nation; Irma Wilson, Mexico, A Century
of Educational Thought (New York: Hispanic Institute in the U.S., 19^1;
Leopoldo Zea, Del liberalismo a la revolucion en la educacion Mexicana
(Mexico: Instituto nacional de estudios historicos de la revolucion
Mexicana, 1953-
3
^Oaxaca. Gobernador. Memoria (l873), UO-Ul.
order closing the public schools however was apparently only a formali-
zation of a process that had been going on for some time. In 1872 the
jefe politico of Ocotlan, B. Alvarez, stated:
The state of primary education is generally moderate,
"because, as the Governor knows very well, in this
district, and in others, the establishments of pri-
mary letters were closed early by the past [Diaz]
administration for more than three years; thus it
is that the people of this district are little ad-
vanced in the field of education . . . even the few
schools that remain open are viewed with a great
deal of abandonment, since the Law of Public In-
struction that was created was neither respected
nor reformed. 33
Formal education in Oaxaca generally halted with the revolt in 1871 and
did not resume on any major scale during the remaining years of the
Restored Republic. The federal and state governments were too pre-
occupied with the maintenance of order to devote time or money to educa-
tion.
*
Thus, the liberal educational program, based on positivist
ideals and intent upon rebuilding Mexican society, was initiated with
a great deal of hope and enthusiasm, but ended dismally. The major
problem was the enormity of the task. The Mexican and the Oaxacan
governments had no real experience with public education and were there-
fore handicapped in their efforts to create a system that would serve
all of the people. Furthermore, the efforts of the federal and state
governments were predicated upon the assumption that under a federal
system, the people, through their municipal governments, would respond
Ibid*> doc. no. 6, n.p
50
to the call for the creation and maintenance of a public school sys-
tem. Finally, the educational program also assumed a peaceful, harmoni-
ous political relationship between the federal and state governments.
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the educational program
was doomed to failure because none of the above assumptions proved
correct.
CHAPTER IV
THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL WELFARE
The era of the Restored Republic was a time of consummation
rather than innovation in the evolution of social policy. This period
vas one in which both the federal and state governments sought to ful-
fill the promises of the Reform. In Oaxaca the restoration of the Re-
public in 1867 meant new responsibilities for the state government as
it faced the challenge of creating, administering, and preserving a new
society. In general, there were two responsibilities that presented
themselves. 1 The first was the secularization of Mexican society im-
plicit in the Reform Laws. Second, was the provision of social ser-
vices, a role that had traditionally been left to private charity as
represented by the church.
Of all the problems and/or responsibilities that confronted the
victorious liberals in 1867, the final elimination of the church as a
political and economic power was perhaps the least difficult. For all
intents and purposes, the Catholic church was no longer a major factor
in Oaxaca even before the interlude of the French Intervention.
In reality, the power and influence of the church had begun to
decline in the wave of secularism that swept through the Catholic world
^Exclusive of the provision of educational opportunities and the
preservation of order, discussed in separate chapters.
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in the eighteenth century. The effects of this decline were felt in
Oaxaca long hefore the era of the Reforma; as the number of volunteers
for service as priests and nuns declined steadily, church wealth began
to disappear, and the incidence <f disputes between church officials and
playmen increased. * Because of its traditionally privileged legal and
economic status during much of the colonial period, and because of its
conservative political position after Independence, the church had been
one of the most visible targets of the liberal reformers.
The movement to limit the power of the church which began shortly
after Independence had grown steadily throughout the nineteenth century.
In Oaxaca it began to gather strength during the decade of the lSUo's
with the rise into politics cf such people as Benito Juarez, Jose' Juste
Benitez, Felix Romero, and Manuel Dublan.
Oaxaca was not exempted from the disorders that characterized
Mexico during the l850 f s and l860 f s. The successful Revolution of
Ayutla and the passage of the first anti-clerical laws evoked only a
mild response from the church in Oaxaca. The church hierarchy in the
state did not oppose this legislation even when the Lerdo Law of 1856
led to the adjudication of over 100 pieces of church-owned property
3
ranging from haciendas and houses, to city lots. The failure of the
church to respond vigorously was most likely a reflection of an already
2
Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of Oaxaca, 1857
1867, " 30.
*Ibid. s 79-80.
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weakened condition.
Publication of the Constitution of 1857, however, led the
Oaxacan church officials to drop their passive attitude. Church leaders
went so far as to threaten denial of the sacraments to anyone who took
an oath of allegiance to the new Constitution, The federal government,
in turn, threatened to prosecute anyone, including clergymen, who op-
posed the new Constitution.
When conservatives revolted against the Comonfort government in
December, 1857, Oaxaca was subjected to an invasion by the army of Con-
servative General Jose Maria Cobos who occupied the state for nearly a
year. One consequence of the civil war that raged through Mexico in
1858-1859 was the federal government's acceleration of its attacks upon
the church in an attempt to deprive the conservatives of a potential
source of wealth. In July, 1859, the federal government claimed all
ecclesiastical property and set forth a step-by-step elimination of the
resources and manpower of the church.
In Oaxaca, the July law struck a blow at the church (particularly
the regular orders) by calling for the suppression of all monasteries,
the confiscation of all church properties except those specifically used
k
for religious services, and the phasing out of all nunneries. This last
clause was strengthened on February 25, 1863, when the federal govern-
ment ordered the complete suppression of all nunneries, the return of
Ibid., 159-160. Other specific laws which followed in rapid
succession were the Law of Civil Matrimony, the Law of Civil Registry,
the Law of Non-interference in Cemeteries and the Law Regulating
Religious Holidays.
nuns to civilian life, and the refunding of their dovries. The latter
lav, hovever, vas not enforced in Oaxaca until after the restoration of
peace because the Reform program vas interrupted by the struggle to
maintain national sovereignty.
When the liberals regained undisputed pover in 1667, hovever,
they vere divided over the enforcement of the anticlerical lavs. The
radical reformers generally favored an unrelenting consummation of the
Reform lavs that applied to the church vhile moderate liberals, includ-
ing Juarez and Lerdo, vere inclined to relax the strict enforcement of
the Reform lavs.
In Oaxaca the completion of the Reform lavs focused upon the
nunneries primarily because there vas little else left of the former
church vealth. Felix Diaz, military governor at the time, moved to
enforce the lav of February 26, 1863, vhich called for the closing of
all nunneries. On April 18, 1867, he demanded in a private letter to
the civil governor, ' Jose Maria Maldonado, that the state close all nun-
neries as soon as possible.^ The nunneries as the last vestige of the
former vealth and influence of the church had the only remaining prop-
erty of any real value in the state. The convents vere particularly
coveted because they vere easily convertible to public and private use.
The pressure from Felix Diaz vas only partially motivated by
his commitment to radical anti-clericalism. He vas also moved by a
very
real political consideration—the opportunity to discredit the
5La Victoria (April 21, 1867), 1.
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provisional civil governor and thus enhance his own chances for election
to that post. 6 Consequently, he sought to force Maldonado into a policy
that would surely cause considerable discontent among Oaxaca's Roman
Catholics.
After delaying and attempting to stall what was obviously a con-
troversial move, Maldonado was finally forced into action by Diaz who
caught the civil governor in a public contradiction. When the civil
governor denied even knowing of the existence of the decree of February,
1863, Diaz had La Victoria, the state newspaper, publish a letter from
Maldonado in which he referred to that very decree.^ Because of this
maneuvering, Maldonado was forced to carry out the federal law. In
December, 1867, the outgoing governor ordered the state secretary of
Hacienda to confiscate church property including all the nunneries in
the state. The state duly reported that it was not only seizing the
property in the name of the federal government, but that the state
planned to use at least six convents for its own, rather than federal
8
purposes.
Oaxaca subsequently received from the federal government cession
of the convents of San Agustin and Betlenites for its own use. The lat-
ter was designated as a civilian and military hospital. It was this
^Berry, op, cit,, 315.
7La Victoria (May 12, 1867),
6
Ibid. (December 31, 1867), h.
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type of federal grant that enabled the state to transform the convent of
San Francisco into Oaxaca's first General Hospital. 9 Thus, vhile en-
forcing the federal law, the state gained for itself the right to use
confiscated property.
Roman Catholicism did not collapse in Oaxaca simply because of
liberal attacks. The closing of the convents and the forced evacuation
of the nuns aroused a great deal of sympathy among Oaxaca's loyal Roman
Catholics. 10 But it was more than pity that was evoked by these mea-
sures; Catholics continued to act as a vociferous and influential pres-
sure group. For example, they were able to delay the secularization of
cemeteries in the state until 1870. 11
During these years, the church and its supporters vaged an open
propaganda campaign against the Reform Laws. In 1870, the Catholic
Society of Oaxaca (an organization dedicated to the preservation of
church power and prestige) began distributing a newspaper, La Verdad
12
Reliqiosa, printed in Puebla. La Verdad'8 editor, Albino Lopez, urged
all Catholics to consider which public officials were most sympathetic
to the church and to vote for them. In Oaxaca, La Victoria took
9Ibid. (November 9, 186T), k.
10
Berry, op. cit. , 323.
i:L
La Victoria (February 7, 1879),
12
ia Verdad Religiosa (December 29, 1879), 3- 1*. HN
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exception to this kind of stand and argued that the church vas interfer-
ing in political natters. Thereafter, the two newspapers vere engaged
in an intermittent debate over the role of the church in Mexican soci-
ety. The outspoken position of the Catholic Society and the ideological
commitment of La Victoria's editors led the latter to take an increas-
ingly strong stand against the Catholic church, and to warn against pos-
sible excesses. An editorial written by Pedro Ortega in 1870 contended
that:
The Catholic Society [through its newspaper, La Verdad]
does not limit itself to either religious discussion,
or to works of charity, as it ought to . . . [and] they try
to mix in political things. We believe that they do harm,
that they damage themselves by their imprudent conduct,
and that with time they will give occasion to the develop-
ment of lamentable and exagerated passions. 13
The administration of Felix Diaz while not issuing new laws,
undertook the enforcement of existing anticlerical legislation that had
been carried out unevenly because of the unstable political conditions. 1^
In general, this administration took an uncompromising attitude toward
13
La Victoria (August 29, 1870), k.
Ik
The denunciations of church and civil property were infre-
quent during Diaz 1 governorship; and the confiscations of property
were generally confined to the immediate post-Intervention period when
collaborators were required to pay fines. Since the denunciations were
usually by the name of the piece of property, rather than specific loca-
tion and size; and since the state's notorial archives were closed to
this researcher, it is difficult to determine exact statistics. Note
that Jan Bazant does not include Oaxaca in his Los Bienes de la Iglesia
en Mexico, 1856-1875 (Mexico, 1971).
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the Catholics. Diaz not only supported the radicals after 1867, he also
interpreted any opposition as a challenge to his civil powers.
It was largely in defense of Diaz that El Siglo XIX3 a leading
newspaper in Mexico City, published an attack upon the Sociedad Cato-
lica. Manuel Payno, a long-standing liberal and the editor of El Siglo,
wrote:
We do not know if in some of the details the periodical
[La Verdad) would be correct, ... but in general, it
is a fact that one could not dispute, that Oaxaca pre-
sents an aspect of peace, of order, of regularity in all its
operations, which we truly desire for all the States of the
Republic
.
15
/
In 1870 Diaz defined his position with regard to lax enforcement of the
Reform Laws in his Memoria to the state legislature when he wrote that
his administration was pledged to enforcing compliance with the Reform
Laws. He also vowed to punish all who resisted these laws. 1**
Felix Diaz 1 administration did not undertake a widescale program
of nationalization and disamortization despite his radical public atti-
tude toward the church. This was not out of any lack of commitment on
the part of Diaz but simply reflected the prostrated position of the
church in Oaxaca. Having sustained the intense attacks of the liberals
since 1858-1859, that institution had little real property left to sur-
render. Once the nunneries were seized, its holdings were reduced to
15l
El Siglo XIX (August 22, 1870), k.
"^Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (l870), kO.
virtually nothing.
By 1867 the wealth of the church was only a legend from the
past. The liberals had successfully reduced the church's strength by
taking over most of its property and taking over many of the functions
it had once performed. Hence, by the time of the Restored Republic,
any further attacks upon the church in Oaxaca were nothing more than
17
gestures.
As of 1876, the Catholic church in Oaxaca exercised little of
its former economic or political influence. However, it still retained
its spiritual hold on the populace. The proselytizing efforts of Prot-
estant sects, despite permission by the state, achieved only minor re-
sults. Indeed, in the capital city, police protection was needed to
protect Protestants from angry crowds opposed to the opening of an
evangelical church.^
Social Welfare
The success of the Oaxacan liberals in reducing the Catholic
church to a strictly spiritual role created a void in the provision of
social services. Mention has been made of the transformation of con-
vents into public hospitals, but the Church had performed other charit-
able services which it no longer was able to undertake. Would the state
now assume responsibility for ministering to the needs of the unfortun-
ate?
An early test of the state's capacity to do so was provided
El Regeneradov (June 22, 1875), k.
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shortly after republican forces took control of the government. In
September, 1867, heavy rains continuing over a period of weeks caused
serious flood conditions in a number of areas. The most severe damage
vas incurred by the districts of Tuxtepec and Villa-Juarez. 19 The state
government's first response was to dispatch some supplies to the sur-
vivors. When the full extent of the losses in property and lives be-
came known, it was clear that these districts required more than a token
gesture from the government. The Secretary of State, Felix Romero, how-
ever, asserted that while the state government wished to help the flood
victims, its funds were already committed "to other indispensible ob-
.20
Jects. Romero suggested, instead, that relief come from private
citizens particularly the survivors of the floods in Tuxtepec and Villa-
Juarez. Perhaps conditioned by tradition, official Oaxaca thus pre-
ferred to relegate the burden of aiding the unfortunate to unofficial
sources.
Throughout the nineteenth century, dependence upon private
rather than public charity was the characteristic approach to social,
welfare. The commitment to individual rights was not complemented by a
corresponding concern for individual suffering. If Oaxaca was typical,
and there is no reason to doubt that it was, liberal-controlled govern-
ments did not recognize a responsibility for relief.
The one relief measure that the state government did undertake
19La Victoria (October 12, 1867),
20
Ibid. (October 17, 1867), k.
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was the provision of a number of pensions to the families of patriots.
This appears to have been an area of welfare in which Oaxacans of all
shades of opinion could readily agree. The following figures indicate
the amount that the state spent on pensions to thirty-six survivors in
families of military heroes and to ten civilian families who had suf-
21fered some hardship. The sums below represent less than 2% of the
annual state budget during the Restored Republic:
Military pensions IBS. i£6p l8j0$6,51*0.00 $6,8lTo^5 $6,530.00
On December 30, 1868, the state legislature issued Decree Number 53 which
established a montepio, or welfare fund to provide financial aid for
22
widows and orphans. The fund was entirely administered by the state
government. Apparently because of the lack of capital, the state re-
sorted to lotteries to raise funds for the montepio. It was in the
creation of the lottery that the federal and state governments cooper-
ated on the problem of relief. The federal government had prohibited
all public lotteries or raffles on June 28, 1867 because,
. . . lotteries are considered prohibited games
and are prejudicial to society because they con-
sume the savings of the fruits of labor of the
less fortunate classes. 2^
21
Compiled from state budgets which were reprinted annually in
La Victoria and in Oaxaca. Leyes, decretos> etc., IV.
22
La Victoria (January 11, 1869), 2.
Dublan y Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, X, 22.
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Before decreeing the creation of a lottery, the state petitioned Con-
gress for pennission. While Oaxaca awaited the congressional approval,
the state legislature allotted ten thousand pesos as an initial operat-
ing fund. This money was raised by the imposition of additional taxes
upon the various districts until the lottery could successfully provide
funds needed for the montepio.
In April, 1870, the state made one additional gesture toward
Oaxaca f s indigent population. The state announced the reopening of the
official monte de piedad; or state pawnbrokerage
.
2
^ This agency's
operating fund was established by the state legislature at twenty thou-
sand pesos.
With these steps, the state government's efforts on behalf of
public welfare virtually ended. From the discussion above it appears
that the state lacked any real commitment to a welfare program. The
benefits granted were usually offered in response to cases of extreme
emergency. Even in such cases, however, the state government made no
significant effort. The lack of an immediate and extensive official
reaction reflects the degree to which official Mexico had been condi-
tioned to ignore the perpetual problems of human suffering and depriva-
tion. In the cases of relief for flood and earthquake victims, and in
the establishment of the montepio, the state and federal governments
were not in direct competition. Perhaps one reason was the fact that
neither government considered it an important or desirable prerogative.
La Victoria (April 25, 1870),
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Both governmental levels were willing to rely upon private philanthropy
for at least partial assumption of the burden of relief work*
This relationship between government and the private sector
suggests more than official indifference. It also reflects the poverty
of the federal and the Oaxacan governments at this juncture in their
history. Neither government had money available to undertake the neces-
sary programs.
Another social function performed at one time by the church had
been the provision of medical care for the poor. The church, and parti-
cularly the nunneries, had traditionally provided medical facilities,
care for orphans, and jobs for those unable to help themselves in
2S
Oaxaca. During the Restored Republic, the liberals' attacks upon the
church focused on the nunneries and brought about their final elimina-
tion in Oaxaca. By 1867 most of the former church property had already
been confiscated or depleted by forced loans during the years of warfare
after independence. At the onset of the Restored Republic only the
nunneries retained any real estate or buildings that could easily be
ceased its welfare efforts in Oaxaca. With the suppression of the
church's social services, the civil government found itself pressed into
immediate action. The assumption of responsibility for social services
was only reluctantly accepted by both the state and the federal govern-
ment during the Restored Republic.
converted to public use.
26
Once the nunneries were closed, the church
25
Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of Oaxaca 18-19.
26
Ibid., 318-19.
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Despite official reluctance, there was a genuine grassroots de-
mand for services no longer offered by the church. For example, in
May, 1867, the Jefe politico of Ocotl^n requested the establishment of
a hospital and a supply of potable water in his district citing the dire
needs of the citizens there. 27
. ,
It was in response to this kind of local pressure that the state
government sought to convert former church property. When the nunneries
were confiscated in 1867, one of them was converted to a General Hospi-
28
tal. This project was rationalized in Positivist terms. The justi-
fication offered by the state government was that a hospital could un-
dertake rehabilitative work that would eventually help produce a more
orderly, stable society. Such a service would help transform the
"ragged, filthy people" wandering Oaxaca's streets into useful, induo-
29trious, and peaceful citizens. Accordingly, the government authorized
the expenditure of approximately twelve thousand pesos annually for the
maintenance of such an institution.
In addition to a hospital, the state government also subse-
quently granted additional funds for medical supplies and even for
30
vaccinations for the people when epidemics threatened.
21
La Victoria (May 26, 1867), k.
Ibid. (November 9, 1867),
29
Ibid. (May 18, 1967), 2; and ibid. (July lU, 1870), 2
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Aside from these infrequent and insufficient efforts, neither
the federal nor the state government displayed a willingness to undertake
the massive expenses and efforts necessary to relieve the Oaxacan people
of their suffering • Even if the federal, state, and municipal govern-
ments had been unanimous in their commitment to a widespread educational
system, they all faced a common problem: chronic poverty.
CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC POLICIES
When Mexican liberals returned to pover in 1867, they vere faced
with the task of developing a program for the nation's economic revival
and growth. Mexican economic life vas static after the years of civil
warfare and foreign invasion. Mines were badly deteriorated, agricul-
ture was reduced to a minimum, industry was almost non-existent, and
commerce was greatly impaired by the deplorable system of transporta-
tion. The political chaos of the preceding decade was only partially
responsible for the dearth of economic life. Agriculture, for instance,
was limited not only because of the years of warfare but also because of
the poor natural conditions: irregular rainfall, poor soil, and primi-
tive agricultural methods. 1 Industry had been greatly handicapped by
the unsettled civil conditions, the reluctance of investors, and the
expense of carrying their goods to markets. Commerce was similarly re-
tarded by the prohibitive system of internal taxes and the expense and
difficulty of transporting goods within Mexico and to the outside world.
When the Juarez administration resumed control in 1867, these
were the conditions that required solution. The policies, that the
liberals attempted, illustrated the contradiction between the liberal
"'"Francisco Calderon, Historia moderna de Mexico. La Reptibliea
Restaurada. La Vida Eoonomica, Daniel Cosio Villegas, ed. (Mexico,
1955), 52-53.
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ideal of laissez-faire and the realities of underdeveloped nations in
which private capital tended to invest in land. In general, the eco-
nomic policies of the liberals during the Juarez administration were
designed to revive agriculture, introduce new industries, and expand
trade by fostering the development of a system of transportation. These
grandiose goals ultimately forced the government to actively intervene
in the functioning of the economy if it hoped to succeed. This chapter
attempts to examine the economic programs and their effects on Mexico.
At the heart of all the liberal plans for economic growth was a
recognition of the need for better internal and external communications.
Without better roads, agriculture, mining, and commerce were fated to
remain parochial activities. The great majority of Mexican farmers
either engaged in subsistence agriculture or sold their crops to an
extremely limited market. The mining industry, long considered the
greatest potential source of wealth for Mexico, was also limited by
transportation deficiencies. Consequently, public and private efforts
to exploit Mexico's mineral wealth included the development of a system
of roads and the promotion of railroads and river improvements as well.
Just as farming and mining needed better roads and river transportation,
commerce obviously was most dependent upon highway, river, and harbor
improvements.
The liberals of the Restored Republic accordingly devoted a
significant proportion of their energies and resources to the develop-
ment of internal improvements. While the liberals advocated economic
development without government interference, the federal government,
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during the Restored Republic, provided subsidies for larger-scale pro-
jects which private entrepreneurs could not, or would not take on them-
selves. However, the state and national governments did not assume ex-
clusive responsibility for their accomplishment. Liberal leaders pre-
ferred to grant virtual monopolies to private individuals or companies
who were willing to undertake projects that the government deemed neces-
sary. Furthermore, the federal government placed significant responsi-
bility for internal improvement projects upon the state governments.
Not only did the state governments provide much of the pressure for
undertaking specific projects, they also bore a great deal of responsi-
bility for the completion of projects approved by the federal government.
The state of Oaxaca witnessed the evolution of most of the
liberal economic policies and provides an interesting example of their
unfolding.
Oaxaca was basically an agricultural state although there were
many kinds of economic activities. Agriculture was the traditional pur-
suit of the peaceful Zapotec and Mixtec Indians. Their farming methods
like the rest of their lives were primitive. Their methods of cultiva-
tion and the crude implements they used were much the same as those of
the colonial period. A description of these methods was given by an
American observer:
Modern agricultural implements were not used by these
people, the tilling of the ground being usually accom-
plished by means of a plow, said to resemble that used
by the ancient Egyptians, where a sharpened log, some-
times shod with iron, fitted with a stick for a handle,
scratches a shallow furrow in the soil. These plows
are drawn by a pair of yoked oxen urged by a thorn
fastened in the end of a long stick. The field may
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also constitute a threshing floor, where, after thegram has been trodden out of the hulls by two or
three horses and a burro hitched together and driven
in a circle with the driver as the pivot- the first
favorable breeze is utilized to waft away the chaff,
the grain falling to the ground when the mixture is*
tossed into the air. After the cornfield has been
harvested, the stalks or "Zacate," are stored in the
branches of trees to prevent them from becoming food
for the animals allowed to roam, while the corn is
conveyed to conical adobe huts.
2
The most important commercial crops in Oaxaca were cotton, cacao,
tobacco, coffee, and indigo. In addition, the state continued to pro-
duce a variety of staple foods for home consumption.^
The state attempted to develop some industries but these appar-
ently did not amount to much by 1867. One of the few industries in
existence by the time of the Restored Republic was cochineal production.
The governor mentioned in his Memoria of 1867 that cochineal had been
produced since the colonial period, but it had long since passed its
peak because of the development of more easily produced substitutes in
Europe and in Guatemala.^ Cochineal was a dye produced from the
2
John Birkinbine, "Industrial Progress in Mexico. A Trail
Through the Mountains of Oaxaca," Reprint from Vol. XXVI, no. 3 of the
Proceedings of the Engineers Clul> of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1909),
25-26.
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1871), 26.
Nrhese included maize, beans, and wheat, sugar cane, alfalfa,
peanuts, tomatoes, peas, and citrus fruits. Berry, "The Reform in the
Central District of Oaxaca," 1*2-1*3.
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1867), 27
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grinding of small red spiders that lived in large numbers on the nopal
cactus abundant in the Oaxaca area. Besides providing employment for a
number of people, the cochineal industry made vealthy men out of several
Oaxacans vho also played an important role in the state's economic af-
fairs during the Restored Republic. Two of Oaxaca »s wealthiest families,
the Esperon and Maqueo families, reputedly used capital obtained from the
cochineal industry to buy up large tracts of disamortized church prop-
erty during the years of the Reforma. 6
Periodic attempts were made in Oaxaca to stimulate new indus-
tries. In 1869, a group of individuals interested in promoting industry
in the state formed a corporation and attempted to raise a capital stock
of 200,000 pesos through the sale of shares. 7 The proposed company
called itself "El Progreso," and its founders planned to use the operat-
ing capital for a variety of economic activities in the state. The en-
trepreneurs asked the state government to help establish these indus-
tries by providing some funds, and also, the use of national guardsmen
as construction workers. The argument used to justify this unusual
break with a laissez-faire policy was that only with such government
^Porfirio Diaz, Archivo del General Porfirio Dxaz: Memoriae
y documentos (Mexico, 1950), II, 955-56.
CPD. nos. 1285-1286. The proposal was presented unsigned to
Porfirio Diaz, and was dated October 15, 1869. See also Cosio Villegas,
ed. , Historia moderna, II, 102.
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assistance vould the project be able to get off the ground quickly
thereby widening the basis of grovth for the state and the general
public
.
In their request, the proposers argued:
Many calls for action have been made in Oaxaca, but
nothing has been completed. If the State wishes to
place itself on the road to progress, it needs to
demonstrate it. Such is the price of the salvation
of the country.
The company also presented a two-year timetable for the estab-
lishment of a series of industries which included textile factories,
ironworks, a foundry, meatpacking plants, a sugar refinery, cotton
mills, coffee, tobacco, and cochinilla plantations. The company also
stated that it intended to develop mining in the state by importing new
machinery.
The proposed company never became a reality (probably because
of a lack of sufficient capital) but some individual efforts were made
to begin new industries, and the state government did provide limited
g
aid. Despite the fact that such efforts made little significant head-
way during the Juarez and Lerdo administrations, the state continued to
advertise Oaxaca as the home of potential new industries such as coffee,
9lumber, and even silk-raising. In truth, however, by 1872, Oaxaca
could cite only a few light industries actually in operation. These
generally existed before 1867, and they supplied local products and
o
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1870), 28
9Ibid., 28-29.
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local needs: flour and sugar mills, soap factories, tanneries, three
cotton gins, and even a gunpowder factory. 10
Although agriculture was the main pursuit of Oaxacans, mining
vas also recognized as an activity with a great deal of potential value.
During the colonial period, gold and silver mining had flourished
briefly in the state. With independence, the mining industry began a
long period of decline. 11 By 1870, the optimistic Felix Diaz reported in
his Memoria that mining was still one of the state's greatest potential
sources of wealth. In addition to gold and silver, the governor also
reported that Oaxaca was rich in iron, lead, salt, and coal in a number
12of deposit areas in the stare. The governor also urged development
of newly-discovered oil deposits. Oil was just becoming popular as a
source of illumination. Actually, the oil enterprise had begun in 1868
when three partners, Senores De La Barca, Fernandez, and Pritchard
claimed oil fields in Pochutla. Their efforts were slowed because they
first had to build roads to enable them to bring in their equipment.
13Not until after 1873 did they achieve any significant output.
Diaz's report, in citing Oaxaca' s iron, coal and oil resources,
Ibid., 91-92.
^Ibid., 60-63. See also Cosio Villegas, op. cit. , II, 126-26.
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (l37l), 29. The chief mining
areas were: Ixtlan, parts of Juchitan, Jamiltepec, Pochutla, and
Tlaxiaco. The most important of all mining districts, however, was
Villa-Juarez. See also Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1873), 902-903.
Cosio Villegas, ed. , Hietoria moderna de Mexico, II, 125
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explained past failures to exploit them:
Mining, as well as other lucrative pursuits, have
not received the kind of attention that they should
have, because of the same circumstances that have
paralyzed the rest of the Republic during the
Revolution. 1^
However, he took pains to assure the state legislature that his admin-
istration was doing everything in its power to encourage the growth of
new economic possibilities. He made it clear that:
.
. .
everyone, Mexican or foreigner has the liberty
to make exploitations or investigations necessary for the
discovery of minerals now in the underveloped lands, the
public, or private lands. 15
This statement reflected the benevolent policy toward foreigners that
was pursued in Oaxaca during the Restored Republic. The results were
quite modest however. In 16*70, for instance, a Frenchman named Ossaye,
with the approval of Felix Diaz' administration, initiated plans for
a European agricultural colony to be established in Oaxaca for the
purpose of growing cotton and indigo. It is not clear however whether
or not the project ever began. ^ The Diaz administration's policy
toward the foreign investor reflected the ideas of the Minister of
Treasury, Matias Romero, rather than the isolationist attitude of
17 -* /Lerdo. In so doing, Felix Diaz anticipated his brother's policy with
"^Oaxaca, Memoria (1871). 50.
"lWd.j 50-51.
^Cosio Villegas, op. cit. , II, 76.
Scholes, Mexican Politics . . . ikk.
Ik
regard to foreign capital which the latter made a hallmark of his ad-
ministration.
Not only did the state government recognize the need to diversify
Oaxaca's economic activities, it also acknowledged the need for better
internal communications in order to facilitate the hoped for economic
growth. Oaxaca's problems were not unique. The national government
openly acknowledged the problem as well. In his Memoria of 1868, the
Minister of Fomento (Public Works), Bias Balcarcel said:
The lack of roads in Mexico is one of the causes that
most retards the development of agriculture, industry,
and commerce;
. . . consequently, the sources of
wealth remain paralyzed, without life and without
movement
.
As in other parts of Mexico, the mountainous landscape made transporta-
tion difficult and expensive. Financial stringency together with poli-
tical unrest had prevented Oaxaca from making any significant improve-
ments in transportation since Independence. Even when funds had been
available, the work would often be interrupted by disorders or banditry.
Consequently, by 1867, the roads in the state were not much better de-
veloped than they had been during the colonial era. Most were little
more than wagon trails; and even the better roads, such as the one that
ran north from the state capital to Tehuacan, Puebla, were often
Mexico, Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria que el Sria. de
eatado y deopaolio de Fomento, colonimcion, industria y comercio de
la Republica mexicana presenta al congreso de la union. Correepondiente
al ano trascurrido de I de julio de 1868 al 30 de junio de 1869.
(Mexico: Imp. del Gobierno, 1870), 15-16.
impassable. 1^
A sensitivity to these conditions and a demand for improvement
characterized educated opinion in Oaxaca at the beginning of the Re-
stored Republic. The editor of La Victoria, Luis Perez Castro, spoke
for many of his compatriots when he called for an end to the banditry
that infested the existing roads and the creation of a new communica-
tions network, both railroads and wagon roads, to link Oaxaca with both
20
oceans.
The Oaxacan desire for internal improvement s
—roads
,
railways,
telegraph lines, canals—was a regional manifestation of a sentiment
that was nationwide at this time. The problem for the government was
how to respond to it; how to finance the undertakings demanded by public
opinion. At both the federal and state levels the response was similar.
Wherever possible they turned to the private sector. In granting con-
cessions for railroads, highways, etc., they followed a practice that
predated the Restored Republic. 21
In Oaxaca the administration of Felix Diaz made internal im-
provements one of its major goals despite the tenuous state of its
19A general picture of Oaxaca 's roads becomes evident when one
reviews the reports of the jefes politicos from the various municipios
These reports, which were regularly reprinted in La Victoria, provide
a detailed picture of local conditions.
20
La Victoria (August 31, 1868), h.
Cosio Villegas, op. cit. 3 II, 527
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finances. During his tenure as governor, the state undertook an ad-
mirably ambitious program. It sought to connect Oaxaca with the Pacific
Ocean by building a major highway to Puerto Angel and authorized the
enlargement of overland connections with both Mexico and the Atlantic
Ocean by expanding the major north-south highway via Tehuacan. 22 Be-
sides these two roads, the state also endeavored to maintain and improve
its secondary roads. This task was left to the local governments.
These roads were usually little more than well-worn trails between the
various villages. They were maintained by the municipios under the
direct supervision of the jefes politicos. 23
The Oaxacan government received a number of requests from in-
dividuals for projects such as railroads and telegraph lines. The few
potential sources of private capital in the state were not overly
anxious to invest in road-building projects. The municipios bore the
major burden for the construction of such roads. This responsibility
weighed heavily upon the people of the districts because they could ill
afford to hire someone to build roads for them. It was not unusual,
therefore, for the jefes. politicos to get the work done by the "volun-
tary" labor of the people under their jurisdiction. One such case was
22
The progress of these two roads was closely followed in the
state newspaper throughout the period.
23Oaxaca, Leyes y dearetos del Estado de Oaxaea, II, 109.
CPD. no. 1288. Unsigned letter to Porfirio Diaz (October 15,
1869).
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cited in La Victoria. Referring to the jefe politico of Pochutla who
succeeded in completing his portion of the road to Puerto Angel, the
newspaper commented:
The people of the district voluntarily lent their
services, and they have positively pledged tofinish their labors quickly. 25
There is, of course, no way to determine how freely the people of
Pochutla volunteered in this case.
The government actively sought to promote this kind of activity
as an expression of loyalty to the state. 26 In order to make voluntary
labor more palatable, the government offered exemptions from both fed-
eral and state military service. 27 These exemptions were formally
written into the contracts for specific projects and were apparently
attractive to many villagers.
The advantage of free as opposed to wage labor was obvious;
and, in order to procure this kind of cooperation, the various states
often embarked upon public campaigns in which they sought the endorse-
ment of leading regional figures for specific projects. In Oaxaca, the
government was able to procure the endorsement of both Felix and Pro-
firio Diaz for the road from Tehuacan to Puerto Angel. This kind of
25
La Victoria (March 10, 1868), k.
26
Ibid. (March 13, 1868), k.
27
Cosio Villegas, op. cit. > II, 585
The endorsement of these roads was presented as an expression
of local patriotism in the effort to rally the people to come out and
work for nothing.
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campaign accounts for the publicity given to the various districts as
they completed their sections of the road with free labor. The com-
pletion of all sections of the road by l8Tl was a tribute to the determ-
ination and the power of Felix Diaz's administration.
Porfirio Diaz had long been an advocate of public improvement
especially road building and the establishment of telegraph communica-
tions between Oaxaca and Tehuacan. 29 While commanding the Army of the
East, Diaz had named Jose Pardo to direct the construction of telegraph
lines as soon as the area was under his control. 30 Once civil control
was restored, the administration of Felix Diaz instructed the Institute
of Arts and Sciences to offer courses in the training of telegraph oper-
ators and maintenance technicians, thereby freeing Oaxaca from dependence
upon operators from the United States. While the federal army laid tele-
graph lines between Tehuacan and Oaxaca during the War, lines connecting
the state with Veracruz and Puebla were constructed during the Restored
Republic by private concessionares.
By 1870, Oaxaca' s telegraph service was confined to the line
from Tehuacan, Puebla to Oaxaca, a distance of 272 kilometers. 32
Throughout the Restored Republic, Porfirio continued to receive
29Cosio Villegas, op. cit. 3 II, 559.
30
La Victoria (August 9, 1867),
31
Cosio Villegas, op. ait. y II, 561.
32Ministerio de Fomento, Merr.oria (1870), 17-18.
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proposals from private individuals who sought his support for one in-
ternal improvement or another. While some correspondents simply wanted
the general to use his influence to have a road huilt to their district,
entrepreneurs such as Juan A. Wolf and Emilio La-Sere were interested in
enlisting Diaz's help in procuring approval of large-scale projects. 33
Of all the projects for the improvement of Mexican commerce, the
most grandiose was the construction of an interoceanic canal across
Oaxaca's Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The value of such a crossing had long
been recognized. For Mexico, the canal would mean easy communication
between its Gulf and Pacific coasts; for other nations, it would mean
a saving of the two thousand mile voyage around South America, and hope-
fully, Mexico would become the crossroads of the Western Hemisphere.
The idea for the project had been discussed by Alexander von Humbolt as
early as 1803, and the first Mexican survey was undertaken in l82h.^
The proposed canal was important not only commercially but strategically
as well. The United States recognized this and was among the first to
propose the project to Mexico. As early as 181+7, the United States un-
successfully sought transit rights through the Isthmus. The ill-fated
McLane-Ocampo treaty also included provision for the assignment of
JCPD. no. 1038. Juan A. Wolf to Porfirio Diaz (June 9, 1868);
ibid., no. 1219, Hilario Cuevas to Porfirio Diaz (September 6, 1868);
ibid. (November 9, 1868); ibid., no. 9^0, Wolf to Diaz (August 18, 1868);
ibid. 9 no. 1288, Wolf to Diaz (March 13, 1871).
Mexico, Ministerio de relaciones, interiores y exteriores
de la Republica de Mexico, Mcmoria (Mexico, 1826), lU.
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rights of transit across Tehuantepec. The United States' desire for
those rights vas explained by the chief of a Navy Department reconnais
sance expedition in 1870, Admiral Shufeldt:
... a canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec is anextension of the mouth of the Mississippi River intothe Pacific Ocean, converting the Gulf of Mexico into
an American lake in time of war closing the Gulf to allour enemies, 3?
cen-
The canal project vas started several times during the nineteenth
tury beginning in 181*2 vith an unsuccessful concession to Jose' de
36Garay. There vere several other unsuccessful attempts in 1850, 1853,
and i860, all of them made on the basis of concessions granted to Ameri-
37
cans. Finally in I867, Juarez granted a concession to an American,
Emilio La-Sere, empovering him to undertake the joining of the tvo areas
by intersecting Tehuantepec. Unlike the earlier concessions vhich
called for a canal, the concession to La-Sere gave him three years to
build a railroad and a parallel vagon road. La-Sere negotiated vith the
Juarez government over the details until January 7, 1868, vhen the fol-
loving terms vere agreed to:
1. The company vas to build and maintain its railroad,
a highvay and telegraph lines.
2. The government granted the company land for rail-
road, the road and extra land on either side for
its ovn use.
35Cosio Villegas, op. ait., II, 699.
36 r ,
Dublan y Lozano, Legislation mezicana, IV, 507
37
Cosio Villegas, op. cit.
,
II, 700.
3. The company could import whatever materials it
needed free of all duties.
k. The government allowed the company to collect
all duties on goods and passages for seventy
years. J°
While La-Sere was initiating this enormous task, he also received the
concession to build a canal across the Isthmus. 39 The canal project
was viewed with some skepticism as evidenced by an editorial in La
Victoria in 1870. Lu/s Perez Castro expressed nationalistic resentment
of "these reprobate and adventurous speculations. ..." whose major
goal is not to bring about important developments for Mexico, but only
to take money from the government (in the form of subsidies).
1*0
Despite the criticism, speculators like La-Sere benefited from
the enthusiasm of many liberal leaders. Critics such as Perez Castro
generally proved to be correct however. In order for La-Sere to accom-
plish the task he set for himself, he needed a great deal more talent
and capital than he had at his disposal. The Tehuantepec project never
higot beyond the planning stage. Despite disappointment over the fail-
ure of La-Sere, Mexican planners did not forsake the isthmian project.
On December 1^, 1870, the federal government approved another project,
1-2.
38
The agreement was printed in La Victoria (January lk, 1869),
39
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this time « inter-oceanic railroad proposed by Rene Masson. Like so
-any of its prececessors, however, this project was aborted by the
failure of the concessionaires to put up the required bond.
Another foreign investor interested in the Isthmus of Tehuan-
tepec was the Tehuantepec Company of New York. After the La-Sere pro-
ject failed to materialize, the Mexican government issued a charter to
the Tehuantepec Company on January 9, lQll. k2 Like the La-Sere con-
cession, the company was instructed to build a railroad, a wagon road,
and a telegraph line across the Isthmus. When the projects did not get
underway, presumably because of the expense, the Mexican government,
in 1873, granted the company a subsidy of 12,S 00 pesos for each mile of
construction completed. As was the case with so many of these subsidies,
the federal government proposed to pay for them by pledging part, of the
expected customs duties.
The project, however, remained only a dream throughout the
presidency of Benito Juarez. On January 15, 18^, during Sebastian I
Lerdo de Tejada's tenure, the federal government reaffirmed its commit-
ment to a connecting link between the oceans when the administration
granted a two year extension to the company of Rene Masson for his
railroad project efforts. The Lerdo administration eventually provided
a financial incentive for the completion of the project. On December lU,
h2
Edgar Turlington, Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors (New York
Columbia University Press, 1930), lQk-85.
ki
Dublan y Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, XII, 555.
lBlk 9 the federal government pledged a bonus of 7,500 pesos for every
kilometer completed after the first twenty kilometers/ 1*
In 1875, Oaxaca was the site of still another internal improve-
ment project. On May 29, the Mexican congress approved the granting of
a contract to Jose Esperon for the construction of a railroad and
parallel telegraph line between the city of Oaxaca and a suitable point
along the Mexico City-Veracruz railroad line.
^
The terms of the contract were very similar to those signed be-
tween the La-Sere and Tehuantepec companies and the Juarez administra-
tion. Like Juarez, Lerdo relied upon the entrepreneurs to pay for most
of the project. The company was instructed to begin raising the neces-
sary funds and to submit a proposed route to the Minister of Fomento.
The company was given two years to complete the line.
The federal government agreed to reimburse the company for its
efforts in several ways. The company was to be given virtually all
profits from the operation of the railroad for fifteen years. The
government did retain the right to collect a limited number of taxes
and to fix the maximum rates for passenger and freight fares. As an
additional incentive, the government granted 9,000 pesos for each kilo-
meter completed after the first twenty. The government also gave the
company an exclusive right of way to a seventy meter strip of land for
Ibid., XII, 602.
lHd. s XII, 730-33
the entire length of the line as veil as any buildings, water, or other
lands or materials belonging to the federal government free of charge
if they were deemed necessary for the construction of the line. Fur-
thermore, the contract called upon the federal, state, and even local
governments to ».
.
.
provide whatever protection and help the company
needed" in its construction efforts.
The methods used to promote the development of Mexican trans-
portation were consistent throughout the Restored Republic; the results
were about the same. Like the Juarez administration, Lerdo's efforts
on behalf of internal improvements were severely hampered by the govern-
ment's limited funds and the inability of the various entrepreneurs to
complete the projects they contracted. Also like the Juarez adminis-
tration, Lerdo's term of office ended with little real accomplishment
in the way of internal improvements in Oaxaca. By the time Lerdo was
overthrown by Porfirio Diaz, Oaxaca still did not have an inter-oceanic
canal, nor did it have a connecting line between the state capita], and
the Mexico City-Veracruz line.
Thus, by the end of the Restored Republic, Oaxaca' s dream of
greatness was still unfulfilled and Mexico's Gulf and Pacific ports
remained isolated from each other. Commerce remained restricted to
local consumption, and the major transportation improvements in the
state consisted of the completed road from Oaxaca to Puerto Angel (com-
pleted under Felix Diaz) and the nearly completed section from Oaxaca
to Tehuacan, Puebla (completed under Lerdo).
By the end of this period, road construction was the onljr
S5
visible material improvement in Oaxaca. While railroad projects had
been encouraged, the state and the federal governments were never able
to provide the funds so that transportation projects could be com-
pleted; and private entrepreneurs were similarly unsuccessful in the
state. Because of its distance from the commercial center of the nation,
and its relative unimportance to foreign investors, Oaxaca remained an
underdeveloped region even at the close of the Restored Republic.
CHAPTER VI
FINANCIAL POLICIES
The end of the Intervention in 186? found the Mexican government
in serious financial straits. Not only were the foreign and internal
debts extremely high, but the years of warfare from 1857 to 1867 had
effectively destroyed most of the normal sources of revenues. The na-
tion received little from import duties because they had been pledged
as payment for foreign debts. 1 The disruption of internal commercial
activity by war conditions meant the decline of federal revenues from
the alcabalas or sales taxes on goods entering the federal district.
Finally, during the War of the Intervention, the federal government had
surrendered the tax collecting duties to state, local and military
2
governments. The result of these conditions was to force the Juarez
administration to reevaluate seriously its financial policies as it
reentered Mexico City in I867. Consideration of the nation's financial
program was complicated by the fact that the president's extraordinary
powers ended when Congress convened in November, I867, and began to
exercise its role in financial matters as prescribed in the Constitution
Cosio Villegas, Historia moderna de Mexico, II, 23^-35.
Mexico, Sria. de Hacienda y credito publico. Memoria de
liacienda y ovddito publico, correspandiente at cuadragesimoquinto ano
eaanomico (Mexico, 1870), 678-79.
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of 1857. 3 The reactivation of the legislature meant that the Juarez
administration had to contend vith the branch of the government that was
most directly responsible to the desires and views of the state govern-
ments. As a result of these conditions, the Juarez administration vas
slov to evolve its financial policies.
During the Restored Republic both the federal and the Oaxacan
governments tended to rely upon traditional forms of taxation. The
major sources of federal revenues were the federal contribution, the
profits from the sale of goods and property which had been nationalized,
the products of maritime and frontier duties, revenue from the sale of
stamped paper and from the postal service, and the federal share of the
regional mints which were leased to private concessionaires.
1
*
The federal contribution was the tax which relied most for its
collection upon the cooperation of the state governments. In essence,
it was a surtax of twenty-five per cent upon the revenues of the state
governments. Established in l86l, it wa3 a source of revenue that im-
posed a proportional burden upon the states.^ Those states with the
3Specifically, Congress was empowered to decree taxes and
authorize expenditures; contract local loans and recognize the national
debt; and prevent excessive restrictions on the nation's internal com-
merce.
^ * , s 'Mexico, Sria. de Hacienda y credito publico. Seccion quinta,
El erario federal en el ultimo decenio, 1869-1879 (Mexico, 1879), n.p.
Dublan y Lozano, Legislaoion mexicana, IX, 337-38
greatest revenues paid the highest amounts to the federal government.
The Jukrez administration had another great source of revenue available
during the early years of the Restored Republic in the sale of nation-
alized property. Most of the goods and property came from two sources:
the church and former supporters of the Imperial government, although
most of the nationalized property had already been sold.^ One other
source was the wastelands which belonged to the federal government in
each state. The sale of nationalized property was a boon not only for
the federal government, but for the states as veil. The latter were
allowed to keep twenty percent of all goods and property auctioned off
by the federal government.
Perhaps the oldest form of federal revenue was the system of
duties on internal and external commerce. Customs duties and alcabalas,
although separate taxes, both relied upon the sustained commercial
activity of the nation. It is no wonder then that the federal and state
governments consistently sought to encourage the revival of Mexico's
commercial life through such projects as highway and road construction
and harbor improvements. The alcabala (which will be discussed later)
remained as the most glaring inconsistency in the liberal scheme of
taxation based on commerce.
The sale of stamped paper was very similar to the stamp duties
Great Britain imposed upon itself and upon the American colonies in
For an examination of the church wealth in Mexico by 1867
see Jan Bazant, Las bienes de la Iglesias en Mexico, 1856-1875
(Mexico, 1971).
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1763. All official documents including drafts, bills, receipts, dis-
patches, promissory notes, purchase invoices ana sales receipts, con-
tracts, bills of lading from muleteers, and in general all debts or
obligations over ten pesos had to use stamped paper. 7
Oaxaca, like other states, relied primarily for its revenues on
the capitation or personal head tax, the alcabalas, and several specific
gdirect taxes. During the Restored Republic, one of the most pervasive
state taxes was the capitation which was collected from all males be-
tween the ages of sixteen and sixty. 9 The capitation was strictly a
state tax despite some discussion of converting it to a federal tax.
The idea of raising the capitation to the level of a national tax was
generally rejected, according to Francisco Calderon, by the states
themselves. Not only did the state governments make it clear that they
regarded the capitation as their own form of taxation, but they also
began to enforce it more effectively.
In Oaxaca the ordinary rate, fixed by the state, was twelve and
one-half centavos per month during the years 1867 to 1876. However, in
1867, the state also imposed an additional 6-1A centavos per month to
help defray the costs of primary education. 10
Cosio Villegas, op. ait.
,
II, 271-72.
Q
Ibid, j II, 355.
o
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (l87l), k5-k6.
^Initially, during the Restored Republic, the products of this
tax were designated to defray the costs of primary education. However,
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Oaxaca retained the capitation tax in one for, or another con-
tinuously from its introduction in l8l 5 . Several reasons accounted for
this. First, the natives accepted it placidly having become accustom
to it vithout any significant resistance. 11 Second, it vas relatively
easy to detect anyone vho had not paid by simply checking the tax
records; third, the capitation vas retained because it vas a regressive
tax and therefore did not arouse the opposition of those in a position
to remove it: the most vealthy a*d influential. Finally, the tax vas
a major source of revenue for the state. According to the l870 budget,
it vas expected to produce about one-third of the total revenues. Com-
bined vith the 6-1A centavos additional tax money for primary education,
capitation taxes accounted for approximately fifty percent of the anti-
cipated state revenue. This percentage actually increased over the
next several years to a point at vhich the regular and additional capi-
tation taxes constituted over fifty-three per cent of anticipated tax
revenues collected by the state. 12
in 1872-73, the state budget combined the revenues of all taxes into a
general budget, and educational expenses vere doled out of general state
funds.
"^Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1871), 1*6.
12 *
Oaxaca, Coleccion de leyes, decvetos* circulares (Oaxaca,
1878), V, 55-85. The significance of this tax is seen in the schedule
of anticipated revenues for 1870:
Capitacidn 190,072 00
Productos de 6-1A 106,03^ 00
Contribuciones de titulos 2,100 00
Productos de fincas del Estado 85O 00
Asientos de gallos 700 00
Fondos de instruccion publica 7,200 00
91
The greatest burden of this method of raising revenues was borne
by those least able to afford it and least able to protest. It was not
coincidence, then, that Oaxaca as well as several other states with heavy
Indian populations retained the capitation through most of the nineteenth
century.
Of all the fiscal legacies of the colonial period, the alcabala
was most detrimental to Mexican commerce. The alcabala, a sales tax
introduced in New Spain in 1575, survived at varying rates until the end
of the nineteenth century despite its prohibition by the Constitution of
13
1857. During most of the nineteenth century, it vas synonymous with
the sale of goods rather than with manufacturing. Initially, the alca-
bala was the exclusive prerogative of the Spanish government; but with
independence and the subsequent political crises, it became the major
source of revenue not only for the federal government but for many states,
and even for municipal governments.^
Costas y derechos de testimonios 150 00
Multas 1,500 00
Contribuciones directas 70,000 00
Contribuciones de la granas y anil 206,85^ 00
Registro civil 300 00
Periddico oficial 600 00
Telegrafo 2,000 00
Casa de moneda 3,800 00
592,160 00
13 / /
Fernando Rosenzveig, "El desarrollo economico de Mexico de
1877 a 19lV El trimestre economico, XXXIII (1965), ^06.
^ F« Lopez Camara, La estructuva economica y social de Mexico
en la epoca de la Reforma (Mexico, 1967), 179-80.
The alcabalas vere collected in customs houses (aduanas) oper-
ated by the states. The number of aduanas in each state varied depend-
ing upon the size of the state, volume of trade, and the number of
roads. *
The alcabala symbolized the fiscal short-sightedness and narrow-
ness of the state leaders. In addition to imposing burdens on the ex-
change of goods with other states, the alcabalas were also subject to
the worst aspects of parochial control. State and local governments,
relatively free from careful supervision and scrutiny by the federal
government, frequently violated the spirit of cooperation between them-
selves and the federal government by imposing their own extra duties on
goods coming in from other states. 16 The combination of federal and
regional alcabalas tended to discourage the very internal commercial
activity the state and national governments wanted to promote.
Local officials directly responsible for the operation of the
customs houses and forwarding the federal government's revenues were
also a major problem in the functioning of the fiscal system. Despite
the complaints of merchants, it was very difficult for the federal
government to eradicate abuses of the alcabalas by state and local offi-
cials. The states believed that their viability depended upon retention
17
of their most consistent source of revenue. The dependence upon
15
Ibid., 185. ' '
^Tbid. y 180. See also Cosio Villegas, ed. , op. cit. , XX,
297-
Lopez Camara, op. cit. 3 180.
93
alcabalas made it extremely unlikely that the states would give them
up unless another source could be substituted. Intransigent state
leaders, many of whom retained power because they controlled the trea-
sury, vere unwilling to cooperate with the federal government's efforts
to eliminate the alcabalas. Without state support, the federal admin-
istration could not hope to reform the internal tax system. Consequently,
Mexico was locked into a vicious economic cycle: high internal taxes
were levied to raise revenue from commerce, which was depressed even
further because of the high internal taxes.
The reason the federal government did not vigorously insist
upon the elimination of alcabalas was official reluctance to relinquish
the revenues raised in the Federal District. The national capital (the
commercial center of the nation) had the most to lose by the abolition
18
of internal taxes. The alcabalas provided a lucrative source of tax
revenue for the Federal District. The federal government could hardly
insist that the states give up their alcabalas without eliminating the
alcabalas from the Federal District; and it could ill-afford to cut off
a source of revenue that equaled the maritime rents from the entire
Pacific coast. Despite the fact that the alcabala system was generally
regarded as a reactionary fiscal institution, it was retained through
the years of the Restored Republic. In spite of the fact that they were
-1 Q ,
Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda, Memoria de hacienda y credito
publico correspondiente al cuadragesimo-quinto ano economico presentada
par el Srta. de Hacienda al Congresc del Union el 16 de Septiembre de
1870 (Mexico, I87O), 717-18.
9h
specifically banned by the Constitution of 185T, alcabalas continued to
. ,
19
exist.
Oaxaca retained its own alcabalas during the entire period of
the Restored Republic, and after. However, in response to criticism for
its continued use of the tax, the state reduced the list of its taxable
items. On March 18, 1868, Governor Felix Diaz announced the abolition
of the alcabala on a number of articles ranging from selected food-
20
stuffs to manufactured goods of all types. In voluntarily abolishing
the alcabalas on these products, Oaxaca complied with the urgings of
the federal government.
A very practical reason for Oaxaca f s deemphasis of the alcabala
was the fact that it was not a major source of revenue. In some dis-
tricts, the state even lost money in the collection process. For ex-
ample, in August, 1870, collection of the alcabala in the district of
Tlaxiaco produced fifty-nine pesos while operating expenses were seventy-
two pesos. The state suffered similar losses in Ocotlan, Zimatlan,
Nochixtlan, and Tehuantepec. Despite the surplus collected in other
districts, the net return from the collection of the alcabala was only
"^Article 12k of the Constitution of 1857 was amended to post-
pone the date of its effectiveness.
20
La Victoria (April 2, 1868), 1; and ibid. (April 9, 1868), 3.
See also El Siglo XIX (April 9, 1868), 3- The state legislature pub-
lished a list of products that were exempted from the alcabala. While
most items were agricultural products, the list also included all goods
manufactured in the state, and all fish.
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685 pesos per month in 18T0.
21
The publicity notwithstanding, the state
not only retained the alcabala taxes on many items but reported a rise
in the revenues from them. Governor Di'az explained his reluctance to
completely abolish the alcabala:
I am certain that the institution [the alcabala]
is not in accord with the Constitution,
. . .
but in my mind it is very difficult to find
other sources that substitute adequately, and
have the capacity necessary to compete with it. 22
By 1867, the liberals in Oaxaca found themselves without a
wealthy church to draw funds from. While the church was left with
little else for the successful liberals to attack, the same was not
true of many of the conservatives who had cooperated with the Imperial
government. When Governor Diaz promulgated the federal requirements
that all collaborators register with the state for possible fines, 207
23Oaxacans obediently complied. The absence of wholesale reprisals
against former conservatives and collaborators indicates a conciliatory
attitude on the part of the state. Governor Dfaz imposed only token
reprisals and the radicals' thirst for vengeance was apparently satis-
fied by a single execution for treason. The only Oaxacan executed for
21
Figures available by comparing the monthly reports of the
state's General Administration of Alcabalas reprinted in La Victoria
(August 15, 1870), 2; and ibid. (September 19, 1870), 3.
22
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1871), *9-50; see also Cosio
Villegas, op. ait. > II, 353*
La Victoria (December 6, l86T)» 2.
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his role in the Intervention was Juan Pablo Franco who had served as
the Imperial Visitor. 21* His execution touched off such a wave of sym-
pathy for the victim that the government did not take any more lives.
The Juarez government added to the conciliatory atmosphere by
decreeing in August, 1867, that in most cases collaborators would be
punished by fines rather than confiscation. 25 Thus, only in extreme
cases could the radicals expect any kind of confiscation.
In addition to the revenue raised by its own measures, the state
also received some aid from the federal government. This took the form
of subsidies to promote internal improvements such as roads, harbors,
and widening rivers. In 1868 the only federal subsidy for Oaxaca was
the sum of 36,000 pesos to assist in the construction of the road from
26Tehuacan, Puebla through the state. Federal aid for Oaxaca' s roads
steadily increased, however, over the years of the Restored Republic.
In 1870, 72,000 pesos were contributed for the road from Tehuacan to
27Puerto Angel in Oaxaca. In addition, the government allotted an
2k
Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of Oaxaca, 307.
Dublan y Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, X, 32.
26
Federal budget for 1868 reprinted in La Victoria (August 6,
1868), 2, and in Mexico. Srfa. de Hacienda y cre'dito publico, Memoria
(Mexico, 1873).
"^Mexico, Ministerio de Hacienda, Memoria que el Secretaruz
del eetado y del despacho de Hacienda y credito publico preeenta al
Congreeo del Union (Mexico, l8?0), n.p. Federal budget for 1870 also
reprinted in La Victoria (November 7, 1870), 1. In 1863-69 the federal
government consigned a total of $1,199,000 pesos in subsidies to all the
states for road construction and improvements. Mexico, Ministerio de
Fomento, Memoria (1870), 16-17.
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additional 20,000 pesos for the construction of a road connecting Oaxaca
and Chiapas through Tehuantepec. The Juarez administration also pro-
vided the engineers for these projects. A related expenditure under-
taken by the federal government was a share of the approximately 1 50,000
pesos to be distributed among all states each year for harbor improve-
ments. The precise amount spent in Oaxaca, however, is not available.
The inverse of the federal-state financial relationship was
represented in Oaxaca as in other states by the federal contribution.
Essentially a tax to be paid to the federal government on the state's
taxes, this was a source of irritation to those states already hard-
pressed to finance their own activities. The unpopularity of the fed-
eral contribution made it an effective lever in the government's cam-
paign to induce the states to drop or reduce their alcabalas. Thus, in
1869, the federal government agreed that all states which abolished the
alcabala would not have to pay full share of the federal contribution.
In the case of Oaxaca which did not rely heavily upon the alcabala, the
proposal required only a token gesture.
During the Restored Republic, Oaxaca was apparently never a
significant source of financial assistance to the federal government.
The state failed to yield large sums from the nationalization of goods,
customs duties, or any other lesser type of tax. The only year in which
it is possible to determine Oaxaca 's share of the federal contribution
28
was 1872 when the state sent 29,725,62 pesos to the federal government.
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1873), doc, no. 17.
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Oaxaca's contribution represented only 1.82* of the federal government V
total revenue from the contribution in the fiscal year 1872-73. The
federal government only reported the total amount of its revenues from
this source rather than itemizing it by state. 29 Consequently, it is
impossible to determine whether or not Oaxaca's 1872 share of the fed-
eral contribution was representative of its annual portion. It seems
likely, however, that revenues in the first year after the revolt of
La Noria were disproportionately low.
One other aspect of the federal-state financial relationship
that bears mention was the control and emission of money. By 1867,
Mexico had eleven mints scattered around the nation including one in
Oaxaca. Because of the prolonged period of instability, it had been
very difficult for the central government to regulate their operations
closely. The poverty of the national government during much of the cen-
tury led it to lease the operation of the mints to private citizens. 30
In this way, the lessees paid the federal government a fee for the priv-
ilege, the private operators collected a fee for their services. While
29 f ' ,
Mexico. Sria. de hacienda y credito publico. Seccion quinta.
El erario federal en el ultino decenio, 1869 a 1879, p. ix.
Year Total federal contribution
1869-1870 1,327,568.96
1870-1871 1,1* 1*8, 062. 73
1871-1872 1,302, 996. 2k
1872-1873 1,619, 55^.^2
1873-1871+ 2,228,5^.25
30Cosio Villegas, op. cit. 3 II, 132.
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the operation of the mints ostensibly remained under federal supervision,
it often proved difficult to maintain strict control, particularly dur-
ing periods of civil unrest and disorder. The Oaxacan mint serves as an
example of this arrangement.
The Oaxacan mint was leased for twenty years in 1857 at the rate
of 5,000 pesos per year. By 186?
,
however, the federal government had I
not received any of its anticipated revenue from the Oaxacan fran-
31
chise. Consequently, in 1869, the federal government absorbed the
losses of the mint in Oaxaca and released it from its obligations for
the preceding five years.
An indication of Oaxaca' s relative unimportance as a source of
federal revenues is given on Table I.
The first two columns present the value of nationalized goods
confiscated, auctioned off, and the proceeds from the auction turned
over to the federal government between 1869 and 1873 in the nation and
in Oaxaca respectively. Most of these goods were the property either
of the church, or sympathizers of the Imperial government. The strik-
ing thing is the inverse relationship between the national and the
Oaxacan revenues. While the national total after 1870 remained around
one-half million pesos per year, the value of all goods confiscated in
Oaxaca dropped from around 5 per cent to less than 1 per cent of the
national total.
There are several possible explanations for this. One is that
Ibid., 161
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by 1871 Oaxacans were no longer actively interested in pursuing a puni-
tive policy against the church; another, is that there may not have been
anything of value left to confiscate; or finally, that the internal
political struggles in the state in late 18?1 diverted attention avay
from confiscation. While the real reason may lie partly in each of the
above, the unsettled political climate and ultimately the outbreak of
the revolt of La Noria were the most likely causes. By 1871, the
Oaxacan government had become increasingly restive under Juarez's ad-
ministration, and was unwilling to do anything to sustain the govern-
ment in Mexico City. The fiscal cooperation on which the federal sys-
tem rested was one of the first things to collapse when a state govern-
ment became hostile to the national authorities.
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their lot, many refused to try to rebuild their former lives, choosing
instead to turn to banditry. 3 Thousands of others were left to find
their own way home. Many were unable or unwilling to do so. Some re-
settled where they happened to be while others applied their military
skills to independent operations.
The problem of controlling these elements confronted Oaxaca al-
most immediately after the victory over the Imperial government. On
August 2, 1867, La Victoria reported the following conditions:
We have the disgust to announce
. . . that vagrants
and deserters, who with an aim of repressing their
people, have formed some bands of malefactors.^
Oaxaca, however, proved an inhospitable place for the ladrones.
The Oaxacan government had three agencies available for enforcing peace.
The most powerful if least used was the federal army which was called
upon only when local rebellions became serious. Federal troops were
used sparingly in Oaxaca during the presidency of Benito Juarez perhaps
reflecting the reluctance of state officials to call upon a federal
agency to solve local problems; or perhaps reflecting Juarez' reluctance
to send federal troops into his home state. Only after the rebellion of
Felix Diaz in 1871 did the the federal army move into Oaxaca. Once in-
volved, however, federal forces remained near the capital until the end
of the Restored Republic.
Scholes, Mexican Politics During the Juarez Regime, 137-38.
14
La Victoria (August 2, 1867),
CHAPTER VII
THE INSTRUMENTS OF ORDER
Despite the triumph of the Republic after nearly a decade of
warfare, Mexico still had not freed itself from the scourge of internal
unrest. Indeed, the problem of domestic security worsened during the
Restored Republic as disorders of one form or another broke out in al-
most every state. In some cases, these disturbances were the work of
restless generals like Trinidad Garcia de Cadena in Zacatecas. 1 But
the years of warfare also created a generation of homeless ex-soldiers
who wandered the countryside living by their wits and often taking what-
ever they could. This group scattered through Mexico and included de-
serters and discharged soldiers. The latter were displeased by the sud-
den cessation of fighting in l86T> and the decision by Juarez and Lerdo
2
to discharge immediately, nearly two-thirds of the federal army.
The American Consul in Mexico City described the effects of this
demobilization on former soldiers who returned to find their homes and
farms destroyed by the fighting or ruined by neglect. Discontented with
1
Daniel Cosio Villegas, Historic moderna de Mexico. La
Republiea Restaurada. La vida potitica, I, 2U3-2UU; 261-262; 26U-265.
2
Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda, Memovia (1868) Secretary of
Hacienda, Matias Romero, justified the abrupt cut in the army ranks as
a financial measure.
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The most active and effective agency for the preservation of lav
and order in Oaxaca during the Restored Republic vas the National Guard.
Although the National Guard vas administered by the state government,
the federal government retained titular control. Article 85 of the Fed-
eral Constitution of 1857 gave the president the pover to utilize the
National Guard to preserve internal order and maintain external defense
with the stipulation that the Guard could not be used outside its home
state except with the consent of Congress. With such consent during
national emergencies, the federal government could assume command of all
available military forces. The Constitution also assigned Congress the
responsibility of issuing the basic regulations for organizing, arming,
and disciplining the Guard (Article 72, section 19), but left to the
states the task of training the units. The National Lav of Security
issued in 1857 vas based on the above provision.
Oaxaca did not get around to organizing its National Guard until
after the civil var that lasted from 1858 to l86l. Up until l86l, the
defense of the state had been the duty of the federal army. On Decem-
ber 17, l86l, the state issued the National Guard Lav, the basis for
the organization, recruitment, and outfitting of the state's military
force.
^
^Dublan y Lozano, LegislaciSn mexicana, VTII, 3^7-360.
Oaxaca. Coleccion de leyes y decretos del Estado libre y
eoberano de Oaxaca, II (Oaxaca: Imprenta del Estado, l86l), 271-281.
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Under the provision of this lav, all males between the ages of
16 and 60 years vere liable for five years of military service. If un-
able to serve as soldiers, they vere responsible for the provision of
whatever supplies the government deemed necessary for the defense of
the Constitution. Mexican independence, and the Reforma.
In order to insure that all possible men vould be available, the
National Guard Lav established an elaborate registration system admin-
istered by the municipal governments. Each citizen vas required to
present himself to specially created registries. The penalty for non-
compliance vas stiff; anyone vho failed to register vas subject to hav-
ing his term in the Guard doubled. Despite this coercive feature,
Oaxacans consistently failed to cooperate with the registration system
during the Restored Republic.*^
The National Guard system established a hierarchy that paral-
leled the state's administrative structure. The governor, according to
Article 6l, section 7, of the state Constitution, vas made the chief
officer of the Guard. His approval or direct orders (vhich had to be
confirmed by the state legislature) vere required before the National
Guard in Oaxaca could assemble, arm itself, or carry out any duties.
Like the state political structure, the Guard was organized by district;
and each district was under the charge of the jefe politico. The jefes
were responsible for the preservation of public order and security, and
La Victoria frequently contained messages from the state govern
ment to the people, reminding them of the requirement that they regis-
ter for military service.
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the Guard was viewed as an instrument for carrying out that duty. The
jefes were also charged with organizing the efforts of the municipali-
ties in the formation of their National Guard contigents. The Jefes'
duties were usually confined to logistical arrangements although they
often served as officers in the Guard units as well. Thus, the Jefes
politicos combined political power with military power. This combina-
tion was strengthened by the Jefes' power to grant or deny exemptions
from military service.
The municipal ayuntamientos were also made part of the National
Guard system. The local civil authorities were not only required to
open the registries, but they were also made responsible for the initial
organization of the Guard units within their jurisdiction. In conjunc-
tion with the jefes politicos, the ayuntamientos were required to form
a junta to elect the junior officers for their Guard units. The state
government, however, retained the right to name commanders and senior
officers.
Despite the fact that the National Guard Law has been passed by
the state government in l86l, the Intervention had caught Oaxaca without
any home forces to defend itself. In fact, Oaxaca did not have a fully
organized National Guard until 1869. Efforts to establish a Oaxacan
National Guard were initiated not by the state but by the federal govern-
ment. In June, 1867, the Juarez administration ordered its regional
commanders in Oaxaca to release part of their forces for police duty,
8
, M
such as maintenance of road security. It was during the exercise of
Oaxaca, Colecaion de leyes, decretcs> etc., X, 31-32.
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these duties that the federal troops were used to train Oaxacan National
gGuardsmen.
The Oaxacan state legislature added few embellishments to the
National Guard Law during the Restored Republic. One noteworthy devel-
opment, however, was the grant of broad discretionary powers to the
governor as commander of the National Guard. Felix Difaz, as governor,
was empowered to command the Guard personally whenever he considered
conditions dangerous enough to warrant emergency action rather than
having to wait for permission from the legislature, as the original law
stipulated. 10 Diaz was also authorized to move the Guard units any-
where he felt they were needed in the state without obtaining prior
permission from the state legislature. Consequently, in the hands of
an ambitious or independent governor, the National Guard was a conven-
ient and potentially powerful weapon.
A third instrument for the maintenance of internal security was
the police force created for the Central District. This agency, whose
functions were limited to the capital area, was jointly administered by
the state and municipal governments. Law enforcement work by this body
commenced almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities in 1867.
To meet the demands of post-war conditions, the capital police force was
created in December, 1867. 11 The force was composed of a municipal and
9El Siglo XIX (February 13, 1869), 1-2.
10
0axaca, Coleccion de leyes. dearetos. .
. ,
V, 111.
i:L
La Victoria (December 17, 1867), k.
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a rural corps; its Jurisdiction included all of the Central district,
not just the capital city. Unlifce the National Guard, vhich was insti-
tuted to deal vdth domestic uprisings and foreign invasion, the police
force vas primarily designed to enforce peace on a relatively local
level.
While other states suffered from chronic unrest and often very
serious uprisings during the Restored Republic, Oaxaca appears to have
remained relatively tranquil. The combination of the three agencies
discussed above proved a severe retarding force. An examination of the
criminal activity reported during this period reveals that crime vas
not a serious problem in Oaxaca once the administration of Felix Dfaz
vas firmly established. 12 This stability vas not only a reflection of
the firm hand vielded by Governor Diaz, it also reflected the var-
veariness of the Oaxacan people. While the state did not face any large-
scale uprisings such as vere experienced by other states, several local
rebellions did occur. The most serious of these broke out in the dis-
tricts of Juchitan in September, 1870, and Ixtlsui in 1871. Both inci-
dents vere ruthlessly crushed by Governor Diaz as the head of the
*
National Guard.
To summarize, the federal government in matters of public secur-
ity relied in the first instance on state authorities. The Juarez ad-
ministration, vith a greatly reduced army, expected state officials and
Based on veekly reports from the Jefes to the state government,
reprinted in each edition of La Victoria from 1867 to 1871.
109
state-controlled military forces such as the National Guard to preserve
order. This policy vas consistent with the federalist view that power
should be decentralized; the National Guard was a manifestation of the
principle that the people should arm themselves for their own defense.
Unfortunately, this system of state-controlled military forces
could not be kept separate from the political rivalries of the Restored
Republic. When tensions between national and state political leader-
ship reached the breaking point, control of the Guard became crucial.
In the case of the Revolt of La Noria in 1871, the National Guard re-
sponded to the call of Governor Diaz, not to that of the president.*
Until the 1871 rebellion, the system of reliance upon state
authorities for the maintenance of order worked exceedingly well in
Oaxaca. Governor Diaz could boast in his 1869 report to the legislature
that:
In effect,
. . . when we see announcements every
day in the periodicals of the other States,
kidnapping, robberies and predatory assassina-
tions; when in many parts one perceives the dan-
ger of the loss of life and fortune of the citi-
zens;
. . . the State of Oaxaca, remains tran-
quil without falling prey to the scandals that
have occurred elsewhere. 13
Why did Oaxaca enjoy a greater degree of tranquility than many
other regions? The answer, perhaps, is found in the comment of the re-
spected Mexico City newspaper, El Siglo XIX:
«
Details of the 1871 rebellion are discussed in a later chapter
13
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1870), 13.
Taxes are not exaggerated; disbursements have been
made regularly; primary instruction progresses;
statistical studies are extensive; peace has been
preserved since the reconstruction of 1867; and the
bandits and criminals have been punished and ex-
pelled from the state by the vigilance of the police
El Siglo XIX (August 22, 1870), U.
CHAPTER VIII
FEDERAL-STATE POLITICAL RELATIONS
On August 25, 1867, Benito Juarez vas feted in Mexico City at
a banquet sponsored by General Porfirio Diaz. 1 Most of the leaders of
the Mexican government and military were there to honor the president
who had preserved the nation's sovereignty throughout the French Inter-
vention. The occasion, however, was hardly festive. Throughout the
banquet, Diaz remained sullen in his seat instead of offering the cus-
tomary first toast. As his silence "became embarrassing, Juarez finally
broke the tension by graciously rising and offering a toast to "Liberty
and Independence."
The incident has been reputed to be one of the earliest signs
of a break in the successful liberal coalition that had resisted both
the conservatives and the Imperial government since 1858. Rather than
marking the beginning of a new split between liberal leaders, the ban-
quet illustrated the political climate at the close of the War of In-
tervention. It also foreshadowed the political problems that Juarez
faced during the last four years of his presidency. The banquet
^Diario oficial (August 29, 1867), 1-
o
The following account is based on reports of the banquet pre-
sented in La Victoria (September 2, 1867), 1? and Jorge F. Iturribarria,
Historia de Oaxaca> IV, (Oaxaca, 1956), 17«
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mentioned above actually bad been organized by friends of the president
and the general who hoped to overcome a growing rift between the two men
that had begun even before the overthrow of Maximilian's government had
been fully accomplished. 3 While the Diaz-Juarez differences were sub-
sequently couched in constitutional arguments and altruistic issues,
the underlying issue between them was power. As various liberal adher-
ents polarized around Juarez and Diaz (and later around Lerdo), the poli-
tical struggle for power was joined-this time among the victorious lib-
eral group.
Porfirio Diaz was one of the many aspiring Mexicans who expected
some reward for their services in the Wars of the Reform and the Inter-
vention. Unlike the professional, non-political Mexican army of today,
Diaz was raised in an age of caudillos characterized by Antonio Lopez
de Santa Anna in which political power was a logical reward for faithful
and successful military service. When rewards were not forthcoming,
Mexico suffered the consequences in the form of revolts led by free-
wheeling army officers.
The weak disjointed efforts of Juarez and the civil government
during the Wars of Reform and Intervention had helped foster this atti-
tude. During the Intervention, the Juarez government was unable to con-
duct a centrally-controlled military campaign. Instead, his administra-
tion had been forced to delegate power to various regional military
Iturribarria, op. cit.
,
IV, 17; and Daniel Cosio Villegas,
Historia moderna de mexico. La Republica Restaurada. La Vida Politica
(Mexico, 1955), I, 76.
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leaders.
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Entrusted with wide-ranging political, economic, and military
responsibilities, they acted largely on their own. They operated as
best they could drawing men and materials locally often with few or no
funds from the Juarez government. Consequently, throughout the pro-
longed period of warfare, the peripatetic central authority was more
akin to a government-in-exile than a real power.
Equally illusory was the Constitution of 1857. For the patriot
forces the only reality was the enemy. Operating in a constitutional
vacuum, the regional chiefs became all-powerful within their respective
bailiwicks. When the wars ended in 1867, it was unrealistic to expect
these men to accept willingly the self-abnegatory role of a Cincinnatus.
Despite the fact that Diaz did attempt to project this image, he typi-
fied the unsatiated ambitions of these men. When constitutional pro-
cedures did not bring success and rewards, they turned to extralegal
means charging the central government with violations of the Constitu-
tion.
Under these circumstances, it was vital that the various state
governments remain politically loyal to the central administration.
Much of the political activity of the Restored Republic focused on
gaining and holding control of the states by political means.
Benito Juarez and the group of advisors that surrounded him
emerged from the Wars of the Reform and the Intervention as symbols of
Mexico's struggle for autonomy. Whatever national pride had been
Ibid., I, 71
Ill*
generated by these experiences vas directed toward the federal govern-
ment and its titular head. Thus, so long as Juarez and his advisors
retained some of the mystique of selfless and long-suffering patriots,
they remained above partisan attacks. Unfortunately for Juarez, and
for the whole federalist system, he was unable to insulate himself from
the political wranglings that turned the federalist experiment into a
delusion. In fact, there is ample evidence that Juarez did not try to
remain above politics throughout the era of the Restored Republic.
Juarez exposed himself to political attacks almost immediately after
regaining control of the national capital.
One thing that is clear about the political situation in 1867
was that Juarez and his closest advisors were convinced of the need to
strengthen the central government and particularly its executive branch.
This was at least partially because of the president's own ambition; but
was also a product of Juarez' prior experience in trying to run the
government, and his conclusion that the nation could not progress
without a stronger central government to direct the affairs of state.
The aonvoaatoria demonstrated the conviction, shared by the president
and Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, that the federalist system established by
the Constitution had to be modified so as to give greater power to the
national government.
On August lk $ 1867, Juarez issued the now-famous
convocatoria
falling for national elections.
5 This document, more than any other
5Dublan y Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, X, U9-56
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single factor, helped galvanize many of the president's potential rival,
into open opposition. By calling for constitutional reforms without
following the established amendment procedures, Juarez laid himself open
to cries of righteous indignation. 6
The convocatoria provided Juarez' rivals with an issue that off-
set his past record. By ignoring the constitutional amending procedures,
he exposed himself to charges of perfidy. Not only Juarez, but his en-
tire administration was discredited by this act.^
The fact that the convocatoria was drafted and engineered by
Lerdo, rather than Jua'rez, made little difference to the president's
antagonists. To them, the whole Paso del Norte group was guilty, and
every member of the administration's inner circle became the object of
open criticism. The ramifications of the convocatoria were greater than
a few complaints from malcontents.
El Siglo XIX (August 18, 186?), 1. The constitutional changes
proposed by Juarez were:
a) establishment of a senate
b) a two-thirds suspensive veto for the president
c) all executive reports to Congress to be in writing,
rather than personally presented
d) limit the right of the permanent deputation to call
special sessions
e) fix the presidential succession beyond the presi-
dent of the Supreme Court
The convocatoria also called upon the people to directly ratify
the amendments, rather than follow the constitutional amending pro-
cedures.
Frank A. Knapp, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, 182Z-1889, reprint
edition (New York, 1968), 12k.
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While the convocatoria drove a vedge into the ranks of the lib-
erals, in truth, they had been factualized before the end of the War
of the Intervention. As Lerdo's biographer, Frank Knapp points out,
the liberals were never really a unified political "party." They vere
personalist groups united against the conservatives. Once the conser-
vatives vere defeated, the liberal factions quickly demonstrated their
tendency tovard fragmentation. This vas the case vhen Juarez issued the
convocatoria. 8 Notwithstanding the political consequences, the convo-
catoria vas a realistic response to the problems of the preceding de-
cade. The experiences of Juarez and Lerdo had demonstrated that a
loose federation vas not feasible for Mexico by 1867.
There can be little doubt, however, that the convocatoria vas
a major political blunder. It provided an excuse for criticism of the
Juarez administration and created an issue around which the supporters
of Porfirio Diaz could rally: constitutionalism. The ensuing struggle
for political power meant, for all intents and purposes, that the lib-
eral experiment in federalism was doomed to failure before it ever began.
Because the Juarez group retained control of the national government,
opponents were forced to 'turn to state politics to build a political
power base. Wherever they succeeded, the state administrations became
increasingly hostile to the central government. Under these conditions,
the federal system, which relied upon cooperation between the federal
Ibid. > 125. See also Cosio Villegas, Historia moderna> I,
1^1-1*2. See also Ricardo Garcia Granados, Historia de Mexico desde la
Restauracion de la Republica en 1867, hasta la caida de Porfirio Dvaz
(Mexico, n.d. ), I, 1*3.
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and state governments, began to break do™. Instead of harmonious re-
lations, the Juarez administration, and that of his successor, Lerdo,
vere confronted by the chronic anarchic political conditions they sought
to avert.
The resumption of civil government in 1867 marked the opening
phase in the internal struggle for political power. Initially, this
contest revolved around Juarez and Dfaz, but within a few years, the
political situation was complicated by the rise of another strong na-
tional contestant: Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada. During the Restored
Republic, advisors and admirers formed around each of the contenders.
Each claimed a sizeable following. Each sought to expand his circle of
followers primarily in the state governments so as to create a political
power base. Each, through subordinates, was guilty of some political
abuses. Mexican political lines were fluid as politicians aligned them-
selves with one political figure or another in the contest for control
of the political system. State politics were generally characterized by
rough tactics in which personalist groups supported one or another of
the national political figures. State politicians also proved fickle,
shifting their allegiances for a variety of reasons: local issues,
their candidate's national prospects, and the relative strength of local
leaders who influenced state politics. In general, the arena of state
politics was a rugged contest in which ruthless and ambitious men fought
for power. Ideology, though often espoused, was usually the excuse
rather than the real reason for perversions of the institutions the
liberals claimed to have fought for.
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Thus, the struggle for state and local support vas prolonged,
tending to rally around individuals as well as ideological arguments.
The povfiristas, adherents of Porfirio Di'az, saw themselves as the
young, dynamic leaders of the future; their goal vas ostensibly the
preservation of the principles of the Constitution of 1857. They were
the challengers vho became increasingly aggressive in their quest for
power. This group, also known as the constitutionalists, was generally
drawn from the ranks of the disaffected. Many felt that the Juarez
circle was closed and that the only road to their own success was
blocked by the group that surrounded the president. Actually, the
Porfirists were a strange assortment of people who were attracted to
Diaz for a number of reasons. To begin with, Diaz was the only major
candidate not already part of the Juarez administration. As such, he
attracted the political have-nots who aspired to public office. A
second group consisted of conservatives who saw his candidacy as the
only real alternative to Juarez. The conservative support for Diaz
was reinforced by his moderate enforcement of the anticlerical Reform
laws. Diaz was also a logical hero for disappointed military men who
recognized in him the only possible hope for continued power and pres-
tige, particularly in light of Juarez' dismissal of a large proportion
of the federal army in 1867.^
Porfirists were increasingly evident in all parts of Mexico as
9Iturribama, Historia de Oaxaca s IV, 30-31; Cosio Villegas,
Historia modernas I, 86-87; and Knapp, Sebastian Levdo de Tejada,
152.
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the Restored Republic progressed, and they apparently came from differ-
ent classes rather than one particular social group. Thus, the Por-
firists were a mixture of radicals and conservatives, militarists and
civilians united only in their faith in their ovn ability to guide Mex-
ico's destiny and their support of Porfirio Diaz in his quest for power.
Aside from these considerations, it is difficult tc determine
any significant differences between the Porfirists, Juarists, and
Lerdists. Despite the distinctions they may have drawn between them-
selves and all arguments about democracy and the elevation of Mexican
society, these men remained politicians at heart.
Porfirists operated with a great deal of success in Oaxaca
throughout the Restored Republic. The state was atypical in that both
Juarez and his chief opponent came from Oaxaca; and yet, in other re-
spects, it was representative of the political cross-currents and con-
troversies that had affected Mexico since the Reform. 10 The ideologi-
cal and political differences that characterized the Restored Republic
were already visible in Oaxaca early in the period of the Reform. Con-
servatives who wished to retain their traditional positions in the
social, economic, and political order did not simply retire in the face
of liberal criticism. On the other hand, the liberals were hardly a
cohesive, harmonious group. While Oaxacan liberals agreed that Mexican
10 / '
Apart from Juarez and Diaz, a number of other national figures
came from Oaxaca including Matias Romero, Sec. of Foreign Relations under
Juarez; Ignacio Mejia and Manuel Dublan, outstanding congressional
figures; and Justo Benitez, the Porfirist congressional leader.
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society should break with its traditional patterns and all of its tradi-
tional inequities, they were by no means unanimous as to how this should
be accomplished. Two factions became distinguishable among Oaxacan
liberals: the radicals, or puros, and the moderates, known as
borlados. 11 Up until the era of the Reforraa, the state had been con-
trolled by a coalition of landowners, mineowners, and professionals.
The wave of popular support for liberalism continued to attract some
members of Oaxaca's liberal group which was initially controlled by the
borlado faction. While borlados were not an organized political party,
they did share a fear of unbridled democracy and sought to prevent the
rise of a demagogue. Attracting many of the state's professional men,
the borlados have been described by Jorge F. Iturribarria in the fol-
lowing way:
They were sincere, but their intellectualism led them
to err by mistakenly underestimating the possibilities
of the people.
I
2
The fact that the borlados traditionally attracted the more moderate
liberals probably explains why many who purported to subscribe to the
liberal cause during the Three Years War and the War of the Intervention
were able to accommodate themselves to the French occupation. They were
not radicals; they had a vested interest in maintaining some voice in
the direction of state affairs.
"^Iturribarria, Historia mexioana, III, kjk
12
Ibid., Ill, 1*73.
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The radicals, much less willing to temporize than the moderates,
wished to see the promises and the spirit of the Constitution of 1857
translated into vigorous and immediate action. 13 For instance, in 1867,
they wanted complete freedom of religious practice which meant breaking
the monopoly of the Catholic church. lk They also wanted to guarantee
other fundamental freedoms such as free speech and a free press. They
adopted a remarkably enlightened view toward justice, particularly
toward the penal system, seeking to convert it into a means of retrain-
ing criminals rather than simply removing them from society. Their
educational program was rooted in the hope of creating a citizenry im-
bued with a sense of patriotism and dedication to the perfection of
Mexican society. 1^
While the moderate liberals sympathized with these goals, they
were much more conscious of the need to preserve order. Consequently,
when it came to implementation of the reform programs, moderates moved
cautiously. It was this difference in approach that ostensibly led to
clashes between the radicals and the moderates almost from the beginning
of the period of liberal control. The developments of the Restored
13
Charles R. Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of
Oaxaca, 1856-1867," 75.
lh
While the borlados agreed to the principle of complete free-
dom of religious toleration, they were not willing to pursue it
vigorously.
15
Ibid., 1UU-1U5.
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Republic must be vieved in the context of this fundamental split between
the tvo groups of Oaxacan liberals.
The divisions within the liberal ranks were evident even during
the War of the Reform. For instance, the borlados gained control of the
Oaxacan legislature in l8 58 while a radical, Jose' Maria Diaz Ordaz, was
elected governor. 16 His administration was marked by a great deal of
criticism from his own party members. When Governor Di'az Ordaz per-
sonally took command of the state militia in January, 1858, he put his
leadership of the liberals on the line. When he retreated from an at-
tack upon the capital city, the state legislature called for his resig-
nation and named Miguel Castro, a borlado and a close friend of Juarez,
as acting governor. This coup was evidently undertaken without the
president's knowledge because he personally intervened to prevent the
appointment of another borlado as the head of the state militia. 1T This
incident is indicative not only of the tactics of the borlados, but also
of the political wrangling that occurred among the liberals even during
moments of military action.
As governor of Oaxaca in the years after the war with the United
States from l8hQ to 1852, and later as president of the nation during
the Restored Republic, Juarez attempted to conciliate the factions by
Iturribarria, Eistoria mexicana, III, hjk.
IT *
Juarez eventually exonerated Diaz Ordaz from charges that he
retreated unnecessarily. The president restored Diaz Ordaz to active
command of the state in November, 1859* See Iturribarria, Historia
mexicana. III, 1*76.
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making appointments from both groups. Despite such efforts, he was un-
able to overcome the growing friction between the moderate borlados and
the radical puros. In view of subsequent political developments in the
state, Juarez would probably have been better advised to have allowed
the subjugation of the radicals. This group, which included Felix and
Porfirio Diaz, Diaz Ordaz, Jose Bemtez, and Tirburcio Montiel, formed
the most intransigent resistance to Juarez and to the subordination of
Oaxaca to the political influence of the federal government. Thus, the
era of the Reform in Oaxaca was characterized by the internal dissention
within the liberal ranks.
For the liberals, the French Intervention did what the War of
the Reform could not do. The experience of the Intervention, identi-
fied as a conservative scheme to regain power, convinced many liberals
that they were involved in a life and death struggle. The War of the
Intervention temporarily rallied liberal support against the conserva-
tives and also strengthened the radicals' ideological commitment.
Nevertheless, during the Intervention most Oaxacans stayed in the state
and accepted the rule of Maximilian rather than join the patriots in
the hills. Those who remained and collaborated were regarded as trai-
18
tors by the radicals.
There was, of course, more to the liberal strife than ideology
or patriotism. Many radical and moderate liberals who had carved
This was the spirit of the decree issued by Juarez on August 12,
1863. This decree made all who cooperated with the Imperial government
liable to confiscation of their property.
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careers from the military were also motivated by personal ambition. The
obvious example is Porfirio Diaz, but his was by no means an isolated
case. Military experience in Mexico had traditionally provided a power
base in state and local affairs, and the war against the Empire was no
exception. Juarez himself, perhaps reluctantly, contributed to this
situation. The exigencies of war had forced him to distort the rela-
tionship between the central government and its regional branches. He
had to grant virtual military and civil autonomy to his commanders in
the field. In Oaxaca this meant that Porfirio Diaz, as commander of
the Army of the East, was the chief executive over the areas that he
cculd recapture from the Imperial forces. Isolated from Mexico City
and even more from the oft-pursued Juarez, Diaz was left to his own
devices. While he was not immediately successful—he managed to get
himself captured in 1863—he went on to emerge as one of Mexico's chief
military heroes and a political rival of Juarez in 1867.
When Benito Juarez entered Mexico City in July, 1867, he must
have taken stock of the situation that confronted him. His nation had
been devasted by a series of wars at least partially attributable to the
liberals 1 campaign to end the old political, economic, and social sys-
tem. He had to be aware of the need to legitimatize his claims to the
presidency. Juarez had, after all, assumed the reins of government
during a civil war and had won a narrow victory in l86l. His presi-
dency had been beset with internal and external attacks through his
whole tenure in office, culminating in the four year occupation of
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Mexico by the Imperial government, during which time he had his term
extended until the end of the war.
These were the kinds of conditions under which Juarez attempted
to regather the reins of government in 1867. One of the first things
Juarez addressed himself to was a reversal of the process hy which the
central government surrendered its powers to the regional military com-
manders. It was in this context that he ordered the reduction of the
army and issued the convocatoria with its attending constitutional
amendments. The latter, in particular, reflected his administration's
desire to secure greater centralized control quickly.
CHAPTER IX
POLITICS IN OAXACA: JUAREZ v. THE DIAZ BROTHERS,
1867-1871
/•
By the time Juarez entered Mexico City, Oaxaca was safely in the
hands of the Army of the East. Porfirio Diaz, who had recaptured the
state in Octoher, 1866, subsequently relinquished direct political and
military control, and on December 11, 1866, he appointed his second-in-
command, General Alejandro Garcia, to the dual posts of state governor
and commandant.^ This, however, was only a temporary expedient. With-
in two months, Diaz split the civil and military commands, naming Juan
Maria Maldonado, one of the liberal magistrates appointed to the state
Supreme Court by Governor Juarez in 1857, and Felix Diaz, as military
2 '
commander of the state. This appointment marks the beginning of Felix
x 3
Diaz 1 career as Oaxaca f s political boss.
Felix Diaz was only thirty-three years old when he was named
military commander by his older brother. A native oaxaqueno, he studied
briefly in the Seminary and the State Institute. Fe'lix later joined the
Oaxaca, Coleceion de leyee* IV, l8U.
2
Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of Oaxaca," 31.
3
The chief biographical highlights of his life were outlined in
a special supplement to El Siglo XIX, (January 29, 1869).
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Army in his brother's batallion and became an officer. Through don
Porfirio's influence and his own performance against Indian uprisings,
he rose through the ranks quickly becoming a lieutenant colonel by the
age of twenty. In his early career Felix was by no means committed to
liberalism. He had supported Santa Anna in 1853 and fought against the
Revolution of Ayutla. He did not Join the liberals until the War of
the Reform was already underway. From that point on, however, he be-
came one of the bright young liberal officers.
Don F61ix was essentially a military man at this time. Up to
the Intervention he had not indicated any strong ideological attachment,
and, as noted above, switched belatedly to the liberal cause. The War
of the Intervention gave him the opportunity to become a general, a
patriot, and a hero. In 1862 he participated in the battle of Cinco de
Mayo. Subsequently, he was wounded and captured only to escape and be
able to participate in several of Mexico's famous battles including the
sieges of Puebla in 1863 and Queretaro in 186?.
Success in war made him, as well as his brother Porfirio, likely
candidates for future political office. But while his brother's aspira-
tions focused on the presidential chair, Felix set his sights on the
governorship of his native state. Jorge F. Iturribarria contends that
Felix was always a member of the more radical faction of the liberals,
but his early career indicates that Felix' radicalism was initially
motivated by political considerations. He was not part of the wealthy
class in Oaxaca. He did not have close ties with any of the traditional
political leaders. Nor was he a member of Juarez
1 close circle of
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confidants. Eut he was an ambitious man, and by the end of the War of
the Intervention, he was a successful general. His entry into politics
was as a man of the people who had risen to great heights because of the
emergency of the times. In his first speech to the Oaxacan legislature
in 1867, he described himself as:
A son of the people, a friend of liberty and
democracy, educated in combat without in-
struction and without any knowledge of ad-
ministrative science; and without any ex-
perience other than that of campaigns and
battles. .
Felix Diaz sought the governorship for himself almost as soon
as he assumed military control of Oaxaca in the Spring of 186?. With an
eye toward the return of civil government and the anticipated elections,
he began to wage a campaign to discredit the interim civil governor,
Maldonado. The issue that Felix used was Maldonado f s failure to act
promptly to enforce the Reform laws.^
On April 18, Felix, as military commander of the state, took it
upon himself to criticize Sr. Maldonado publicly for failure to carry
out the presidential decree of February 26, 1863, which ordered all
convents closed. This decree could not have been enforced during the
Intervention, but once control had been restored to the legitimate
government, Dfaz demanded that Maldonado not only comply, but also
publicly explain his recalcitrance.^ Maldonado, in a letter dated
^La Victoria (December 6, l867)» 3.
^This issue is tangentially discussed in chap. iv.
6
La Victoria (April 21, 1867), 2.
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April 2k, denied ever hearing of the decree ordering the nunneries
closed. Felix Diaz responded to the governor's disclaimer by producing
correspondence which shoved clearly that Maldonado vas lying. La
Victoria reprinted a letter from Porfirio Diaz to Maldonado dated
April 23 vhich referred to an earlier letter reminding Maldonado of the
decree of February 26, l863. T In other words, Porfirio Difaz had ac-
tually told Maldonado of the order to close the nunneries before Felix
had, and before Maldonado had publicly denied ever hearing of the de-
cree.
The incident is particularly noteworthy because Felix Diaz,
with a single stroke, was able not only to embarrass the civil governor
but also to discredit the borlado faction. In the eyes of the Oaxacan
radicals, Felix had demonstrated that they were correct in their assump-
tion that the borlados were not to be trusted with the enforcement of
the Reform laws. In the wave of national pride that followed the Inter-
vention, Maldonado 's mistake probably cost the borlados prestige among
politically-neutral Oaxacans as well. With this incident, Felix Diaz
projected himself into the leadership of the radical faction in the
state. At the same time, he managed to hasten the resignation of
Maldonado who gave up his office five days after Felix issued his ori-
ginal letter of criticism and the day before he denied ever hearing of
8
the order for the suppression of the nunneries.
1
Ibid. (May 9, 1867), 1.
D
Berry, "The Reform in the Central District of Oaxaca," 321.
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On May 6, 1867, Juarez ordered Porfirio Diaz to announce the ap-
pointment of Miguel Castro as acting governor. 9 Castro, a long-standing
borlado, had served as interim governor in 1858 and vould eventually be
reappointed to that position after the Revolt of La Noria. Castro vas
entrusted vith both civil and military powers. Felix Dfaz subsequently
Joined his brother vho vas mounting the last offensive that would end
with the occupation of Queretaro and Mexico City.
The selection of Castro is intriguing. Not only was he a member
of the borlado faction, a wealthy landowner, a lawyer, and a mineowner,
but he had remained in Oaxaca during the Intervention rather than Join
the patriots in the mountains. Even more significant, he had served as
counselor of government to the French during the occupation. He was,
therefore, technically liable to some kind of punishment in 1867. The
fact that he not only went unpunished, but was chosen acting governor
indicates Juarez' reliance upon more experienced administrators rather
than reaching into the ranks of the younger, less-known, and perhaps less
powerful group of liberals for his appointees. Politically, Castro was
a known commodity for the president. He was also a close friend, and
thus theoretically, more reliable. 10 But from the viewpoint of the
radicals, his choice served to strengthen their belief that Juarez meant
to shut the doors to their ambitions.
9 '
Oaxaca, Coleocion de leyee, IV, 202.
10
Iturribarrfa, Uistovia mexicana, III, 1*75
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During the summer months of 1867, Miguel Castro continued to
serve as acting governor and prepared to conduct the elections for nev
federal and state officials in October and November. This position gave
him considerable power and political leverage. One of his political
appointments, for instance, was Pedro Pardo, a borlado, who became edi-
tor of the state newspaper. The political significance of this appoint-
ment was demonstrated during the controversy over the president's con-
vocatoria of August, 1867. At a time when many liberals broke with
Juarez, the Oaxacan state newspaper vas silent on the controversial
document despite the fact that radicals denounced it strongly in their
correspondence with Porfirio Diaz. 11 The convocatoria provided an issue
that reopened the split in Oaxacan liberal ranks
•
As the elections approached, the borlados seemed firmly in con-
trol of the state government. In addition to the interim governorship,
the post of acting interior minister with control of the electoral ma-
chinery was in the hands of a borlado and Juarist, Felix Romero. The
alliance of the borlados with Juarez encouraged opponents of both to
gravitate toward the D^az brothers. In this camp were bureaucrats and
professional men including the head of the state* s postal service,
La Victoria (August 30, 1867), 1. Compare this to reports
in El Siglo XIX (August 25, l867) f 3. El Siglo reprinted a protest
against the convocatoria from Puebla:
The Club "Amigo del Puebla" protests against the
decree of August lk. . .Because it is against the
will expressed by the Mexican people...
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Dr. Jose F. Valverde. 12
The unpredictability of Oaxacan politics became evident vhen
the borlado faction, for all of its apparent advantages, was unable to
field a strong candidate for the governorship to rival Felix D&l.
Juarez, who night have selected a candidate in his home state, was
strangely passive. In this situation the borlados decided not to op-
pose Felix Dfaz, and, instead, concentrated their efforts on winning
control of the state legislature.
Don Felix' formal quest for the governor's chair was bolstered
by the endorsement of his illustrious brother. In an open letter,
Porfirio and Justo Benitez recommended to their friends that they sup-
port Felix for the governorship and Lie. Juan Mata de Vasquez as
Regent of the state Supreme Court. ^
For his part, Felix saw an opportunity to disarm borlado op-
position by supporting Felix Romero for the regency of the state Supreme
Court instead of Porfirio's candidate, Mata de Vasquez. Felix 1 de-
cision to defy his brother's wishes caused an immediate reaction. On
September IT, Porfirio instructed his chief aide in Oaxaca, Jose' F.
Valverde, to caution Felix not "to display his impulsive nature" and to
12
Others were: Manuel Toro who had been appointed Treasurer of
the State by Governor Diaz; Luis Pe'rez Castro, editor of La Victoria;
Francisco Mira, Treasurer after Toro was removed; Juan Figueroa, as
chief auditor of the state; Pedro Toro, General Administrator of Alca-
balas.
13 / ' (
CEHM. Porfirio Diaz and Jose Justo Benitez, an open letter
(September 11, 1867), doc. no. 88.
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offer his help to Mata de Vasquez.
11
* When Felix did not respond and
rumors of his accommodation with the borlados vis-a-vis Felix Romero
continued, Porfirio stepped up his correspondence with supporters urging
them to persuade Felix to support Mata de Vasquez. 15 Valverde, mean-
while, infonned Porfirio of the political machinations in the state
in a letter on October 2:
It has come to our attention that the plan of the
enemy consists of leaving the liberal camp free
[of dissent] so that Chato [Felix Diaz 1 nickname]
will be the governor, provided that they triumph
in the state congress, so that it is possible to
dictate to the Governor or to make him do as they
please. 1"
Valverde's suspicions about the borlado's intentions were worse than he
originally reported to Porfirio. Not only had the borlados actively
sought an accord with Felix, but he was apparently committed to the
political bargain, as well. Felix stubbornly refused to switch his sup-
port for the regency of the Supreme Court from Romero to Mata de Vasquez
IT /
as his brother insisted. Porfirio, in exasperation, warned Felix that
he ran a great risk in reaching an accommodation with the borlados
ll4
CEHM. doc. no. 89. Porfirio Dfaz to Jose F. Valverde ( Septet
ber IT, 186T).
^Ibid.y doe. nos. 91-93 (September 23, 186T); (September 25,
186T); (September 25, 186T).
^Arohivo Diaz H V, 120-21. Jose' F. Valverde to Porfirio D^az
(October 2, 186T).
^Mata Vasquez had been Porfirio' s chief campaign coordinator
in Oaxaca.
13*
rather than trying to vin complete control of the state government vith
porfirista support:
It is preferable to lose the elections than
to be Governor vith an antagonistic President
of the Tribunal and antagonistic Deputies. IB
Federal and state politics were closely interrelated in 1867
as both Porfirio Diaz and Juarez sought to control affairs in Gexaca,
thereby assuring themselves of a pliable governor, state legislature,
and deputies to the federal legislature. Thus, while Diaz dealt vith
his brother's display of ambition and independence, he also attempted to
have his own supporters elected to key positions. Don Porfirio's ef-
forts vere at least matched, if not surpassed by Juarez, and his key
aide, Miguel Castro.
The extent of Juarez 1 direct knowledge and involvement in
Oaxacan political affairs is indicated in a series of letters from
Castro in late September, 1867* On September 25, Castro referred to
tvo lists of candidates that he had received from Juarez. Castro's
letter is significant for several reasons. In the first place, it in-
dicates that Juarez vas in direct contact vith the incumbent governor
vho not only controlled the electoral machinery of the state, but vas
also a partisan supporter of the president. Furthermore, Juarez vas
CEHM. Porfirio Diaz to Felix Diaz (October 30, 1867).
[no doc. no.]
X
^ABJ. Ms. J. 15-2U1*3. Miguel Castro to Benito Juarez (Septem-
ber 25, 1867).
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apparently making his preferences for Oaxacan elected officials known,
thereby disputing any contention that the president was somehow above
politics. Juarez was kept informed about the latest developments
throughout the summer and fall months as the campaign intensified. In
September, Castro warned Juarez that Felix was emerging as the leader of
the opposition in the state, and that the latter was on very good terms
with most of the jefes politicos "who, as you know, control the elec-
tions, and most people vote as they command."20
Despite the rising strength of Diaz, Castro was somewhat reluc-
tant to seek reelection for himself, despite pleas from borlados such
as Jose Lopez Viascan. Lopez Viascan also advised Juarez of Felix'
activities, and urged the president to convince Castro to seek the
21governorship on his own.
>
The Oaxacan elections for state and national officers began on
September 22, 1867 . According to the Federal Organic Electoral Lav,
the state vas divided into fifteen electoral districts—one for every
1*0,000 inhabitants. The ayuntamientos of each electoral district fur-
ther divided the districts into sections of 500 people. Each section
chose an elector by a vote of all males (18 years old if married, and
21 years old if single). The electors cast their ballots between
20
ABJ. Ms. J. 15-2UU3. Miguel Castro to Juarez (September 25,
1867)-
Pi * / '
ABJ. Ms. J. 20-3373- Jose Lopez Viascan to Benito Juarez
(September 30, 1867). Lopez Viascan vas recommended as Inspector of the
Mails by Castro Just before the latter left office.
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he was nominated separately by the brothers for tvo different posts. 25
Porfirio expressed his anger vith Felix in his correspondence
with supporters throughout the campaigns. 26 At one point he instructed
Valverde that he vas not to compromise with the borlados; and if Felix
insisted upon a rapprochement with them, he should be abandoned to his
27
own fate. Nevertheless, Porfirio also prevailed upon Lie. Pantoja
who unsuccessfully sought a reconciliation between Felix and the Por-
/ 9ftfirian candidate, Juan de Mata Vasquez.
While the Porfirists
'
camp attempted to close ranks and pursue
the elections, the Juarist-borlado coalition was similarly engaged. 2^
The ma
t1or difference between the Juarist and Porfirist campaign acti-
vities was the fact that the former controlled most of the machinery of
the state government. Most significant was the untiring support that
Acting Governor Castro gave to the president's cause.
Most of the Porfirists' comments on the campaign were directed
25
CPD. no. 897- Letter to Porfirio Diaz (October 29, 1867).
26 * /
Ibid. t no. 900. Fidencio Hernandez to Porfirio Diaz (Novem-
ber 2, 1867).
2
^CEHM. doc. no. 105. Porfirio Diaz to Valverde (October 30,
1867).
Ibid., doc. no. 106. Porfirio Diaz to Valverde (November 1,
1867).
2
^CPD. Patricio Leon to P. Diaz (October lo, 1867).
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at the state government's intervention in the electoral process. Jose
F. Valverde complained:
In the operation of the elections it [the state
government] committed a thousand dirty tricks,
and frauds, and the last was that the Governor,
Castro, after promising that the government
would not interfere in the elections, removed
the jefe politico, Mauleon, and the president
of the ayuntamiento at midnight on the night
before the election. 30
The implication of Valverde's charge was that the governor was using his
power to name and remove local officials to gain control of the elec-
toral machinery. Valverde 's charge was not unique. Several other Por-
firists reported some kind of government intervention. Juan N. Mendez
wrote from the district of Juajuapam:
The general government and that of the State,
have not omitted interfering, and using force . .
The corruption, the threats of persecution of
our agents have been the order of the day. . . .31
A similar charge of government interference was levied by Genaro
Olquin of Silacayoapam who took personal credit for an electoral victory
in his district, and also thanked Porfirio for his promise of electoral
32
victory later in the elections for the state legislature.
Communications between Juarez and his supporters indicate the
extent of Juarez' activities in Oaxaca. For example, Castro wrote
^°Avchivo Diaz, V, 76-77. Jose' F. Valverde to P. Dfaz,
(September 25, 1867).
31lK<i., V, 268-69. Juan N. Mendez to P. D^az (October 25,
1867).
^CPD. Genaro Olquin to Porfirio Diaz (November 6, 1867).
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Juarez that there were certain enemies of the administration in federal
offices in the state, and he advised the president to get rid of them.
Castro referred specifically to the chief officer of the Federal Trea-
sury in Oaxaca and the administrator of Stamped Paper, the two federal
administrators charged with collection of federal revenues in Oaxaca.
Castro urged the president to name Jose Romero, brother of Matias, which
/ 33Juarez agreed to do. Porfirists, on the other hand, charged the
president and his supporters with repeated interference in the state
elections. Aparicio Cruz of Teposcolula wrote Diaz that the election
of deputies to the state legislature was being "conducted in the face
of much opposition from the Jefe politico, but we will overcome his op-
position as we did in the election of president.""
The reason both Diaz and Juarez were so interested in the outcome
of the state elections was made clear in a letter from Porfirio to
Justo Benitez. On October 21, while awaiting the presidential results
from Oaxaca, Diaz referred to the fact that control of the state legis-
lature was vital because this body "has the power to influence the com-
putation of the votes."
ABJ. Ms. J. 15-2^51. Miguel Castro to Benito Juarez (Octo-
ber 23, 1867). Bernardo Carbajel also urged Juarez to remove unsym-
pathetic federal employees within the administration of stamped paper.
Ibid. , Ms. J. 15-2399. Bernardo Carbajel to Juarez (October 30, 1867).
^CPD. Aparicio Cruz to Porfirio Diaz (November 9, 1867).
35AJB. Legajo 53, no. 89^7 (Porfirio Diaz to Justo Benitez
October 21, 1867).
1U0
Porfirio Diaz chose to believe the allegations of his supporters
and refused to accept the news that he had lost the election for presi-
dent in his home state. The electoral figures reported by Miguel Castro
informed Diaz that Juarez' margin of victory was approximately three to
36
one. Unlike previous Mexican presidents, Juarez enjoyed a rare mom-
ent vhen the only opposition came from within his own party and was not
a serious threat.
In the national elections, Juarez easily beat off the challenge
of the Porfirists despite the frantic efforts of Diaz' supporters such
as Justo Benltez, the chief Porfirian liaison man in Congress, and
Francisco Zarco, who was not only one of the leading liberals in Con-
gress but was also editor of the influential El Siglo XIX. Diaz 1 re-
sponse to the presidential election in Oaxaca was made in a letter to
Castro:
. . . although you declare that it [Juarez 1
victory] was the will of the state, we al-
ready know that the will of the people is
more powerful than that of the governing
figures, and that it has elected the man
who, before August lh f was our flag, our
pride, and the basis of our hopes; but that
with his actions of that date, ... he had
demonstrated that he is not a man in whose
hands we ought to put the future of the na-
tion; I well recognize the opinion of the
whole Republic and I do not believe that he
has been elected. 37
Based on incomplete statistics reported in La Victoria and
Diario oficial. Statistics on the selection of electors in the in-
dividual districts do not exist.
37Archivo Dtaz, V, 73-75. Exact election figures are not
iki
The election of Felix Diaz as governor and the election of state
deputies was apparently less controversial than the presidential elec-
tion. Francisco Rincon, who subsequently became Felix' secretary of
the state, stated that Diaz 1 prospects on the eve of the election were
excellent because F^lix already controlled a majority of the districts.
Miguel Castro, on the other hand, had "worked to the last hour per-
sonally, and by means of subordinate agents; but in my opinion he will
not get 8000 votes."38
Felix won the governorship on November 10, 1867, defeating
Castro and Matias Romero in a direct election that was not entirely free
from coercion. The following table presents the election results as re-
ported to the state legislature in November, 1867 (see table on page lh2)
available for either the primary or the secondary elections, which were
held on October 6. The state officially announced that Juarez obtained
a majority of electoral votes on October 19, 1867. (La Victoria,
October 12, 1867), 4. From reports to Diaz in the Archive Diaz, and
from La Victoria and Diario oficial> it is possible to determine that
the districts of Teotitlan de Cami no, Huajuapam, Teposcolula, Villa-
alta, Centro, Zimatlan and Etla voted for Diaz for president; while
the districts of Tehuantepec, Miahuatlan, Tlacolula, Ocotlan, and
Villa-Juarez voted for Juarez for president.
These results are available in La Victoria* October 12, 1867 and Octo-
ber 19, 1867, and in Archivo Duxzs V, pp. 103-04, 152, 167-68, 182-84,
and 218-19; as well as partial reports in Diario oficial^ October 15-
November 10, 1867.
While Diaz failed to carry his home state, his campaign succeeded in
marshalling public opinion against the constitutional changes proposed
in the convocatoria of August. The state, in a direct vote during the
primaries, voted down the proposed constitutional changes, 86,852 to
23,^62. (La Victoria, December 13, 1867), 3.
CPD Francisco Rincon to Porfirio Diaz (November 9, 1867)
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1*3
Castro had been nominated late in the campaign, and though en-
dorsed by Juarez, he gained his only real support from those borlados
vho found F&lx D*kz totally unacceptable. The name of Matfas Romero
vas likewise a gesture rather than a real political movement as the
state prepared to face the restoration of the Republic under the politi-
cal leadership of Juarez in Mexico and Felix Dfaz at home.
The elections for deputies to the state legislature which were
simultaneous with the voting for governor resulted in a victory for the
supporters of Felix and Porfirio Dfaz.**0 The fourteen-man state legis-
lature was composed of eight deputies who were loyal to Fe'lix, three
porfirists, and only three suporters of Miguel Castro and Juarez.
1*1
The
1*0
The split between the brothers was still not healed at this
time, as indicated by Porfirio f s comment to Valverde on November 8:
You are instructed to convince Felix that he has
interpreted his instructions incorrectly, and that
he should not abandon the body to the enemies.
CEHM. doc. no. 108. Porfirio Diaz to Jose F. Valverde
(November 8, 1867).
hi /
CPD. no. 853. Miguel Castro to Porfirio Diaz (November 18,
l86?); and Ibid*> no. 856. Jose F. Valverde to Porfirio Diaz (November 13,
1867). The deputies elected were:
Centro: Francisco Rincon (felixista)
Zimatlan : Jose' M. Toro (felixista)
Atitlah: Luis Pompa (felixista)
Teotitlan: Valeriano Regules £ felixista)
Tlaxiaco: Feliciano Garcia (felixista)
Teposcolula: Matias Rozas (felixista)
Huajuapam: Jose Pardo (felixista)
Miahuatlan: Mariano Jimenez (felixista)
Etla: Juan Escobar (juarista)
Ixtlan: Joaquin Mauleon (juarista)
Tehuantepec: Agustin Canseco (juarista)
Tlacolula: Sebastian Luengas (porfirista)
Silacayoapara: Jose Segura y Guzman (porfirista)
Ocotlan: Manuel Rojas y Silva (porfirista)
lkk
elections for governor and state legislators marked the emergence of
Felix rather than Porfirio Diaz as the force to be reckoned with in
Oaxacan politics.
The city of Oaxaca was in a festive mood on December 1, 1867,
Inauguration Day. At noon, the governor-elect arrived at the govern-
ment building in a carriage escorted by the president of the legisla-
ture, and the head of his government agencies. After the swearing-in
ceremonies, Governor Diaz addressed the legislators pledging that his
administration would work to "promote the prosperity, the progress,
and the happiness" of the state; and, also, he promised to submit to
the legislature a specific program within a few days. The acting
president of the state legislature, Francisco Rincon, then offered his
support to the new governor. After the ceremonies, the new officials
adjourned to the governor's home for a day of festivities.
The celebration and the gaiety of Inauguration Day could not
alter the fact that Oaxaca remained divided politically. In the new
state legislature, although supporters of Felix and Porfirio Dfaz had a
numerical advantage, some borlados retained considerable influence,
particularly Joaquin Mauleon, a long-standing borlado who was elected
k3
president of the legislature on November 22, 1867. He also had him-
self appointed chairman of the committees on Justice and the Grand Jury.
Up
La Victoria (December 6, 1867), 3-U
k3
Ibid. (December 20, 1867), 3.
1*5
Similarly, another borlado who retained influence was Francisco Rincon,
acting president of the legislature, and chairman of the committee on
the legislature, and chairman of the committee on the Public Treasury
and also a member of the committee on Public Instruction.
While the influence of the borlados in directing state affairs
was in a decline after the elections, it is clear that they sought to
weaken the power of both Felix and Porfirio Diaz by continuing the break
between them. Thus, when Felix removed two jefes politicos who had been
appointed by Porfirio when the latter had been military commander of the
state, Miguel Castro wrote to the general informing him of the new
governor 1 s actions:
This deed appears to me to be notoriously unjust and
ungrateful, particularly with Fidencio [Hernandez],
whom you named and who, in my opinion, is more de-
serving than all the jefes politicos of the state. . • .
For this reason, I believe that his removal is an
insult.
^
Porfirio responded ironically that he would try to use his influence,
if he had any, to correct the injustice.
Diaz, like most Mexican political leaders of the era, recognized
the importance of the state governors in the operation of the political
system established by the Constitution of 1857. In order for the fed-
eralist system to work, it needed the cooperation of the state govern-
ments. Given the political framework in 1867, this meant that the
gov-
ernors were the keys to an effective federal-state political relation-
ship. The governors were responsible, for instance, for the
publication
kk
Archivo Diaz, V, 386-87. Miguel Castro to Porfiro Diaz
(December 7, 1867).
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and enforcement of all federal lavs. An unsympathetic governor could
delay promulgation of legislation and, therefore, retard the implemen-
tation of the federal government's programs.
The right to name state administrators made the governor the
key political figure in the state. From his office came all political
rewards. Without the support of the governor, a political faction found
itself outside the decision-making process. It is no wonder, then, that
the borlados sought an accord with Felix D*az. But he, in turn, needed
their cooperation to build his own power base in the state.
In making his administrative appointments in 1867 and early
1868, the governor demonstrated a willingness to heed the desires of
the borlados. Jose F. Valverde suggested that Felix' choices bore the
mark of Romero. Valverde was particularly suspicious of Romero since
the latter vas largely responsible for the rapprochement between the
radicals and the moderates in the state. Valverde f s bitterness may
have been partially due to his unsuccessful bid for the state legisla-
tive seat from Etla which he lost to Juan Escobar, a borlado.
In filling the important jefes polfticos positions, Felix had an
opportunity to build a personal political machine. These officials,
after all, served as the direct links between the state government and
the people. They also served indirectly as the local links with the
federal government. Appointed by the governor for two-year terms, the
Jefes were the "superior authority of the district." Their duties gave
k5
Ibid., V, 381.
^Oaxaca, Coleccion de leyee* V, 357-58.
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them wide-ranging powers from the publication of laws to their enforce-
ment. Public security was also their responsibility, and as such, they
were empowered to impose levas upon their districts. This power, more
than any other, made the jefe a man to be respected and feared. Acting
as the administration's watchdogs, they were required to report any
laxity on the part of public employees such as treasury or customs offi-
cials. They were given limited judicial powers enabling them to impose
fines from five to one hundred pesos and even imprisonment or forced
labor for infractions. This power, along with the initial supervision
of the district's National Guard, meant that the jefes could fine,
draft, and imprison anyone who violated the state's laws. In the hands
of an able and fair administrator, this powerful post could be an in-
strument for preserving order. In the hands of the wrong people, how-
ever, it could be the instrument for oppression, extortion, and injus-
tice.
Felix Diaz' selections of state officials occupied most of his
attention in the interim between his election and the end of the year.
When he named his jefes politicos on December 13, 1867, Diaz demon-
strated his political shrewdness by including borlados and supporters
of his brother, as well as his own adherents, thereby building a politi-
cal power base for himself among all factions. He named, for instance,
Manuel Maldonado, brother of the former governor, and a borlado, as Jefe
in the district of Tlacolula; and Ambrosio P. Garcia, of
Villa-Juarez
UT
CPD. November 12, 1867; November 15, 1867; November 17,
1867.
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and Patricio Hernandez of Tuxtepec. U8 As footnote number UB indicates,
several jefes were avowed Porfirists. Men such as Felipe Cruz (Tlaxiaco),
Felipe Davila (Etla), and Luis Santibanez (Tehuantepec) had been Por-
firio'
s campaign supporters during the election of 1867.**9 These ap-
pointments indicated that Felix was more receptive to a reconciliation
with his brother.
The political balance of power in the state undoubtedly was in
favor of the supporters of the Diaz brothers by the end of 186?. When
the state legislature passed a bill naming the president "benemerito"
of the state and presented him with an engraved sword, the Porfirists'
champion was honored even more. The state legislature not only named
Porfirio Diaz "benemerito" of the state, but it also authorized the
governor to purchase the estate of La Noria from Manuel Dublan for
$25,000 pesos to be turned over to Porfirio as a reward for his ser-
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vices. From that hacienda, Diaz, after returning to Oaxaca in Febru-
ary, 1868, began his long-range campaign to build support for his presi-
dential aspirations.^1 Unwilling to sit quietly until 1871, Diaz moved
La Victoria (December 13, 1867), The personal affiliation
of the men selected was known by the time they were appointed by Diaz.
For a list of the new jefes and their affiliations see Table 5»
^Archivo Duzz t V, 3^-35- Porfirio Diaz to Jose F. Valverde
(September 11, 1867).
50Iturribarria, Historia de Oaxaca, IV, 31.
Ibid., IV, 32
TABLE 5
JEFES SELECTED IN 1867
lk9
District
Etla
Cuicatlan
Teotitlap
Nochixtlan
Tlaxiaco
Silacayoapam
Huajuapam
Coixtlahuaca
Zimatlan
Ocotlan
Miajuatlan
Juquila
Pochutla
Jamiltepec
Yautepec
Tehuantepec
Juchitan
Villa-Juarez
Villa-alta
Choapam
Tuxtepec
Name
Felipe Davila
Manuel Zuni^a
Anastasio Diaz
Romualdo Zarate
Felipe Cruz
Ignacio Vasquez
Jose Seqtira y Guzman
Manuel Sanchez
Pedro Toro
Martin Gonzalez
Vicente Ruiz
Maximiano Serret
Justo Ziga
Manuel Maldonado
Ramon Pino
Luis Santibariez
Maximo Pineda
Ambrosio Garcia
Pedro Romero
Jose Maria Sanchez
Patricio Hernandez
Affiliation
Porfirist
Felixist
Porfirist
Felixist
Porfirist
Felixist
Porfirist
Felixist
Porfirist
Felixist
Felixist
Felixist
Felixist
Juarist
Juarist
Porfirist
Felixist
Juarist
Juarist
Juarist
Juarist
150
into his hacienda and began actively corresponding with supporters all
52
over Mexico.
In 1868, Felix moved to consolidate his hold on the state by
exercising his patronage powers further. He removed Pedro Pardo, a
faithful supporter of Miguel Castro, as editor of La Victoria and re-
placed him with Luis Perez Castro. From that point on, the state news-
paper gave the governor unquestioning support. Felix moved to mend his
political fences with his brother by appointing Jose F. Valverde Judge
of the First Instance in the district of Juchitan. 53 This move signi-
fied a new phase in the relations between the brothers. Valverde, as
noted earlier, was not only one of the sharpest critics of Fe'lix 1 co-
operations with the borlados, but had also been Porfirio's candidate for
a seat in the state legislature. Another Porfirian supporter, Pablo
Pantoja, was named a district Judge in 1868.^
The state government got off to a rather inauspicious start in
its first year under Felix Diaz. The new state administration suffered
a political embarrassment when Diaz 1 state treasurer, Manuel Toro, who
been an appointee of Felix, was accused of malfeasance by the federal
government.^ Toro was indicted before the state legislature acting as a
32
Ibid.> IV, 32.
53La Victoria (April 9> 1868), k.
5
**ABJ. Ms. J- 22-3688. Pablo Pantoja to Benito Juarez (Aug-
ust 7* 1868).
55La Victoria (June k f 1868), U.
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Judicial body in November, 1868, and was found guilty of not reporting
the state's revenues to the federal government and failing to collect
taxes on land titles. 56 Understandably, the Juarists in Oaxaca enjoyed
the discomfort of the Diaz administration and occasionally reminded the
governor of the incident. The prosecution and conviction of Toro sug-
gests that Juarist influence vas still strong and that Felix Diaz did
not have complete control of the state legislators. El Siglo XIX sug-
gested that the conviction of Toro dampened the chances of a rapproche-
ment between the D^az brothers apparently because Porfirio felt that
Felix should have intervened to protect a staunch Porfirist. 5^
The Toro episode may have persuaded Governor Diaz of the need
to gain even more control over the legislature rather than depend upon
loose alliances. At any rate, he began to concentrate his attention on
the elections held in 1869. These included the selection of eight
deputies for both the federal and the state legislatures.
Understandably, all political figures with state and national
ambitions were also interested. On the national level, the elections
in Oaxaca were essentially a race between the Porfirists and the
Juarists. Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, who was reputedly building a poli-
tical machine for himself at this time, was singularly unsuccessful in
Oaxaca. There his greatest weakness was his reputation as an avowed
centralist. 58 He was regarded as a threat to the state's autonomy and
56
Ibid. (November 16, 1868), k.
^El Siglo XIX (December 29, 1868), 3.
^Knapp, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, lUo.
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to the authority of the government. Nevertheless, his following in
other states did grow enough to represent a threat to Juarez.
In Oaxaca, however, the juaristas and the few supporters of
Lerdo had to contend with the power of Felix Diaz. Despite the embar-
rassment of the Toto incident, Diaz 1 prestige and his control over the
state increased steadily. By February, 1869, El Siglo XIX wrote of
Felix:
General Felix Diaz, as well as his Secretary,
D. Francisco Rincon, may have faults which are
inherent in mankind; but their present conduct
as state officials is clearly justified by the
fact that there have been neither robberies,
nor plagues, nor assassinations, nor rebellions,
nor disorder of any kind in the state that they
govern . 59
Thus, while the national political candidates began to plan
their strategies for the congressional campaign, Felix Diaz was recog-
nized as a capable, tough-minded, and independent governor. Accord-
ingly, Porfirio Diaz, in his quest for a stronger political base moved
60
toward closer relations vith his brother.
The Oaxacan congressional elections, convoked for November 6,
1869, demonstrated the extent of Felix 1 political strength. Although
borlados such as Mauleon and Rincon were returned to the state legisla-
ture, the majority of new state legislators were supporters of the
59El Siglo XIX (February 3, 1869), 3
60
Ibid.' (February 10, 1869), k.
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governor. While borlados retained some influence in the state legis
lature, the extent of Diaz' control over the state rapidly approached
the conditions described by the American commercial agent in Oaxaca,
Lummis L. Lawrence, in 1872:
I doubt if any ruler in the world has controlled more
personal power [than the governor]. The Courts and
the Judges were his most servile tools. The Federal
and State members of Congress were of his own selection
and have been for the last four years."2
In the national elections, held on October 6, the Juarez administration
go
actively campaigned in the state. Jose Justo Benitez, worried that
he would lose his seat in the Mexican legislature, asked for Porfirio
Diaz 1 help against Lerdo who allegedly said that Benitez would be
6k
eliminated.
A critic of Juarez, the historian Niceto Zamacois, has condemned
the president for electoral crimes all over Mexico in 1669, particularly
in Mexico City where his supporters were charged with everything from
La Victoria (November 9» 1869), Manuel Rojas y Silva was
a Porfirist alternate deputy who replaced Martin Gonzalez in 1863. The
other deputies elected were: Jose Maria Toro, Sebastian Luengas, Luis
Pompo, Ramon Ruiz, and Juan Escobar. Luengas was the only borlado
elected.
^National Archives Microfilm Publications. Despatches from
United States Consuls in Oaxaca, 1869-1878 (Washington, 19&). Despatch
sent January, 1872.
63
Ia Victoria (November 6, 1869), U.
Archivo Dtaz, VIII, 26.
15*
stuffing ballot boxes to jailing opponents. 65 These charges were not
levied in the Oaxacan press where the state government rather than the
federal government controlled the electoral machinery.
The elections brought a slight increase for the Juarists in the
federal legislature. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, political
unrest increased in 1869. The apparently perpetual domination of na-
tional politics by the small closed Paso del Norte group helped turn
frustration into rebellion as a number of rebellions broke out in 1869
and 1870. These years were particularly turbulent considering that
major rebellions broke out in Puebla, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa,
66
and San Luis Potosi.
Oaxaca suffered a local uprising of its own in the district of
Juchitan where villagers who had been smuggling indigo and brazilwood
refused to submit to state taxation. Governor Diaz took personal com-
mand of the state's National Guard unit and crushed the smugglers
mercilessly, eliminating many. Diaz was apparently reacting to more
than a simple case of smuggling. Some juchitecos were greatly dissatis-
fied with the conduct of two Porfirists, Priciliano Martinez and
Marcos Matus. When the governor entered Juchitan to rout out tne re-
ported smuggling activity, he extended his attacks to include those who
dissented with his officials. While the exact sequence of events is not
^Niceto de Zamacois,
,
Historia de Mejico desde Sua tiempos
rms remotos hasta nuestros dias (Barcelona, l88l), XX, 7^5-55.
^Scholes, Mexican Politics* 135.
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clear, the governor's actions caused an outburst of violence in the
district. One Juarista in Juchitan, Albino Jimenez, complained of the
state government's actions to the federal government. 67
Felix Diaz, in turn, reacted to further resistance by waging a
war of attrition against the district even to the extent of entering a
church and carrying off a statue of the district's patron saint, Saint
Vincent. In their distress, the Juchitecans appealed directly to
President JuaVez, but he responded that he could do little for them
since the governor had declared that a state of rebellion existed.
Privately, however, Juarez requested that Diaz at least return the holy
statue which the governor disdainfully agreed to do. Although the re-
bellion in Juchitan was subdued within six months, the state government
occupied the district for the next year and a half. 69
The incident in Juchitan revealed one of the principal weak-
nesses of the federal system. The Constitution of 185T limited federal
intervention in the states to those occasions when the state legisla-
tures invited federal forces. Thus, in a situation such as Juchitan,
the president of the Republic was constitutionally bound to allow the
state governor broad discretion in dealing with the crisis.
^Archivo Dviz, DC, 86-87; see also CPD. B. A. Jimenez to
Porfirio Diaz (November 15, 1869).
68
Iturribarria , Eistoria de Oaxaca, IV, 35-36. Felix Di^az
mentioned the incident only indirectly in his Memoria of 1871.
69
CPD. Jose" Montesinos to Porfirio Diaz (April 21, 1871);
CEHM. doc. no. 3128 (May 5, 1871).
CHAPTER X
THE END OF AN ERA: THE ELECTION OF 1871
AND THE REVOLT OF LA NORIA
Felix Diaz' disdain for the federal government reflected the
increasing weakness of the Juarez administration in the state. As the
end of Juarez' four-year term approached, his opponents became more
outspoken all over Mexico. The ambitious and restless Lerdo resigned
from the Cabinet on January lU, 1871, to prepare his own campaign.
Porfirio Diaz, still encamped on his hacienda, maintained his contacts
with supporters all over the nation while his chief political advisor,
Justo Benftez, conducted his campaign in Mexico City.
By 18T1, Juarez had little real influence in Oaxaca. While his
most consistent supporters served a certain nuisance value, they did not
t - /
seriously challenge the power of Felix Diaz. The problem for Juarez
was that members of the borlado faction had maintained a close political
relationship with him not out of conviction, but out of expediency. They
had supported him in order to gain political leverage against Felix Diaz.
As Diaz grew stronger and more independent of the Juarez administration,
the borlados were less inclined to oppose him. Furthermore, Diaz was
astute enough to use his patronage powers to convince the borlados of the
Knapp, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, 150.
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value of supporting him. Thus, as the elections of 1871 approached, it
became increasingly unlikely Juarez could claim a broad base of political
support in Oaxaca.
In July, 1871, an incident in the district of Ixtlan, birth-
place of Juarez, demonstrated the waning influence of the borlados. In
the district, Fidencio Hernandez, former jefe politico and a Juarista,
led a disturbance against an Austrian miner the governor had authorized to
investigate the mineral resources in the district. Hernandez, who had
been removed as jefe by Felix in 1867, vas encouraged by Miguel Castro
who not only regarded the area as his own domain but also resented Diaz 1
interest in developing mining. The former borlado governor encouraged
harassment not only of the Austrian but also of various state appointees.
These officials, including the jefe politico, the local tax collector,
and the district judge finally had to flee to the capital. Once again,
as in Juchitan, Felix Diaz reacted swiftly and harshly to a challenge
to his authority.
The incidents in Ixtlan and Juchitan demonstrated one of the
principal bases of Felix' domination over the state—his control of the
National Guard. The governor had begun building the strength of the
state National Guard almost immediately after his inauguration in 1867-
By 1871, he had effectively mobilized a veil-equipped force that numbered
3
about 3000.
2
Diario oficial (August 29, 1871 ). 3; and ibid. (September 12,
1871), 3. See also Iturribarria, Historia de Oaxaca, IV, U5.
^Archive? Dtaz, IX, 87; ABJ Ms. J. Mauleon to Juarez (October 7,
1868).
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The election campaign was waged during the first half of 1871 as
supporters of the three national candidates addressed themselves to the
question of Juarez' reelection. As Cosio Villegas has noted:
Juarez propagated his candidacy with the magic
formula that reelection was peace.
. . . The
Porfirists openly, and the Lerdist in a whisper,
said that reelection meant war.^
The national elections for deputies to Congress were held in
June amid increasingly angry cries of fraud. Opposition newspaper in
Mexico relayed numerous incidents of government interference as they
were reported from the various states. 5 There is little doubt that sup-
porters of Juarez did resort to some interference in an attempt to de-
feat the challenge of Lerdo and Diaz for the presidency. Felix Diaz
complained that the federal government's worst electoral abuses occurred
in July and August; and that the Juarez administration sent agents into
Oaxaca "with the purpose of buying the authorities."^
While it is difficult to determine Juarez' personal role in
Cosio Villegas, Historia moderna, I, 1*12. Diario ofioial wrote
in 1871:
Reelection is peace, because every state, vith
the exception of some people in Nuevo Leon,
have accepted the legality of reelection. Diario
ofioial (November 10, 1871), 3.
^Emilio Velasco, editor of El Siglo XIX wrote on July ih:
Notices received confirm the abuses of authority
and the incidents of violence without number com-
mitted by the federal executive and his agents. . . •
The use of armed force and a cynical corruption
have been . . . employed by the Juaristas.
JHaeio ofioial (November 27, 1871). 2-3
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these activities, it is equally difficult to believe that he was unaware
of the activities on his behalf, particularly those of the federal
troops under the command of War Minister, Meji'a. 7 In late July, 1871,
in the midst of the presidential election, Mejia ordered General Ignacio
Alatorre (who had replaced Porfirio Diaz as commander of the Army of the
East) to prepare to move into Oaxaca in case of trouble. 8 This action
vas understandably greeted with charges of coercion and intervention by
the Porfirists all over Mexico.
The national and state elections were held in Oaxaca on June 25,
1871, and were marked by violence and coercion by all parties. Felix
Diaz, by now the virtual dictator of the state, was unchallenged for re-
election and was reported as the unanimous choice of the people.^ The
newly-elected members of the state legislature in 1872 were all suppor-
ters of the Diaz brothers thus completing their political domination of
the state.^ The voting for the state's electoral college similarly re-
fleeted the political hegemony of the Diaz brothers. According to the
7 / y
CPD. no. 1790. Letter from Ocotlan to Porfirio Diaz (July 18,
1873).
Reported in El Mensajero (July 3, 1871), 3- Unfortunately,
Mexico City's newspapers are the only available source for the electoral
information, and they carry only incomplete statistics.
9El Siglo XIX (July 3, 1871), 3.
They were: Lie. Jose D. Iturribarria, Juan Fenochio, Lie.
Nicolas Cabailero, Manuel S. Pardo, Jose M. Irigoyen, Antonio Ramos,
Apolinar Castillo, Feliciano Garcia, Albino Zertuche, Gabriel Serranto,
Francisco Cerranza, Lie. Sebastian Luengas, Lie. Ignacio ^Munoz, Lie.
Jose M. Pardo, Lie. Jose M. Ballesteros, and Mariano Jimenez.
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electoral statistics that Oaxaca submitted to the congressional perman-
ent deputation, Porfirio Diaz was the unanimous choice of the Oaxacan
people for president. 11
The voting statistics, alone, indicate that Felix used his con-
trol of the state government and the political machinery to achieve a
complete political victory. The electoral figures confirmed what many
people including Juarez must have been aware of. By July, 1871, Oaxaca,
under the control of Felix Diaz, was for all intents and purposes poli-
tically independent of the federal government.
Despite the successes of the Diaz brothers in Oaxaca, they were
unable to prevent the reelection of Juarez by the new national Congress
El Mensajero (July 28-August 30, 1871). Compiled from sta
tistics as they were reported. The voting in the Oaxacan electoral
college, by district, was as follows:
DISTRICT P. DIAZ JUAREZ LERDO
Capital 61 0 0
Villa-alta 0 0
Ocotlan 79 0 0
Miahuatlan 91 0 0
Jamiltepec 75 0 0
Tuxlahuaca 59 0 0
Huajuapam 99 0 0
Tamazulapam 97 0 0
Coixtlahuaca 61 0 0
Nochixtlan 59 0 0
Yolos 112 0 0
Yalalag 67 0 0
Tlacolula 76 0 0
Tehuantepec 86 0 0
Juchitan 58 0 0
Etla 62 0 0
TOTALS 228 0 0
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on October 12, 1871. 12 The reelection of Jua'rez signaled the beginning
of the end for the experiment in federal-state relations as envisioned
in the Constitution of 1857. On November 8, 1871, Porfirio Diaz issued
the Plan of La Noria in which he denounced Juarez for abusing the
presidency and called for revision of the national Constitution. News
of the Plan of La Noria prompted a sarcastic response from Diavio
ofioial:
Young Moses has come today sounding his trumpets,
and the new tablets, with the name of the Plan
of La Noria, have fallen upon the heads of the
Mexican people. 13
With the support of the Oaxacan legislature, Felix Diaz fol-
lowed the Plan by issuing a proclamation withdrawing the state's recog-
nition of the federal government and seceding from the Union. ^ Two
days later Felix justified the rebellion in true nineteenth century
liberal language:
The political course of the government of Sr. Juarez
has undermined our republican institutions: his con-
duct has destroyed public liberties, and placed our
independence in danger.
There is no justice because the federal justices are
political instruments in the states; . . . there is
no national army because the armed divisions are the
hangmen of public liberties, and not defenders of
public freedoms; there is no national representation,
12
Khapp, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, 1560157
13
Diario ofioial (November lk, 1871), 2-3.
ll+
0axaca, Leyes, decretos, V, 1+37-38.
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because the election has been vicious in
some places, 15
The summary withdrawal of Felix Diaz indicated not only his alliance
with his brother and his personal ambition but also the extent of his
control over the state government. The legislature's willingness to
follow the lead of the governor reflected the extent of his personal
following rather than widespread discontent with the Juarez adminis-
tration.
Oaxacan support for the rebellion was not unanimous, however,
as Diario oficial reported that various members of the Oaxacan legis-
lature had published a protest against the Plan of La Noria. 1^ Juarists
Miguel Castro and Felix Romero were declared fugitives by the revolu-
tionary army.
The declaration of secession brought all viable state govern-
ment to a halt as Felix Diaz assumed complete civil and military con-
l8
trol. He immediately diverted all of the state's funds to his
^Diario oficial (November 27, 1871), 2-3.
^Diario oficial (November IT, 1871), 3. Diario also reported
the state capital was an "armed camp, and that the people were sub-
jected to all kinds of exactions."
^The rebel forces printed their own newspaper, Insurreccion,
in which the declaration against Castro and Romero were published.
Oaxaca, Gobernador, Memoria (1873), 2-3
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campaign and unsuccessfully called upon the National Guard to follow
19his lead. While it is clear that the revolutionary forces in Oaxaca
were extensive, the attempted revolution did not arouse the immediate
widespread support of the people that the rebels had anticipated. When
the rebels occupied the capital district, opposition centered in the
district of Ixtlan where Felix Romero assumed executive power as the
second-ranking state oficial with the endorsement of Miguel Castro.
Romero's claim to constitutional authority was quickly supported by
loyalists in Jamiltepec, Juquila, Tehuantepec, and Juchitan. 20
The federal government responded by ordering the commander of
the Army of the East, General Ignacio Alatorre (who had been alerted
for possible trouble) to move into Oaxaca. Alatorre quickly snuffed out
the revolt routing the rebels in the battle of San Mateo Xindihu{ on
December 22, 1871.
Felix Diaz, whose ambition led him to the mistaken assumption
that he could take the state out of the Union, was captured and sum-
marily executed by Juchitecans who were bent on revenge for his harsh
actions in their district while Porfirio Diaz barely escaped into the
mountains.
Despite the failure of the revolt in Oaxaca, President Juarez
^National Archives, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Oaxaca,
n.p. Diario oficial also reported that Diaz had confiscated all fed
eral tax money, and withheld it for his own use. Diario oficial
(November 20, 1871), 3.
20
Diario oficial (December 10, 1871), 2.
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was denied the opportunity to rebuild the federal-state political re-
lationship when he died suddenly in July, 1872. The remaining years of
the Restored Republic were directed by Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada who
attempted to rely heavily upon the old borlado leaders in Oaxaca, parti-
cularly Miguel Castro and Felix Romero. On the day Juarez died, Castro
was named governor. Castro's tenure in Oaxaca, like that of Lerdo in
Mexico City, was marked by unrest. The Oaxacan legislature, which re-
tained a considerable number of Felix' and Porfirio's supporters, proved
so troublesome that it passed a resolution asking the governor to resign
in 1873.
Once the situation became critical in Oaxaca, Lerdo dispatched
General Alatorre to take command declaring that a state of emergency
existed. Lerdo also appointed Lie. Jose Esperon as acting governor on
November, 1873. Esperon, ruling as a caretaker governor for Lerdo,
retained office until he was driven out by Porfirist forces in the re-
volt of Tuxtepec on January 27 ^ 1876.
Thus, the years after the revolt of La Noria were marked by a
continuation of the trends that had been established during the years
in which Felix Diaz was governor. The growth of the Porfirian movement
continued throughout this period gathering enough strength to challenge
the federal government first within the political system and then from
without. A second trend that emerged was the failure of the experiment
in federalism as outlined in the Constitution of 1857. Ultimately, the
federalist system failed in Oaxaca because the Constitution relied
heavily upon the good will and cooperation of the state governments.
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The state of Oaxaca demonstrated the fragile nature of the fed-
eralist system when a state resisted the influence of the federal govern-
ment. Not only did the central government lack the power to force its
policies upon the states, but the various components reverted to the
principle that they were separate sovereign entities that could grant
or withhold their allegiance to the federation as they saw fit. Under
these political conditions, state governments that were controlled by
personalist leaders were extremely susceptible to a breakdown of the
federal-state relationship.
Oaxaca, controlled by the brother of the most powerful person-
alist leader Mexico has ever known, was on an inevitable collision
course with the federal system as soon as Felix Diaz assumed the
governorship, and as long as the central government remained closed
to the ambitions of Porfirio Diaz.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
Oaxaca vas a fruitful choice as a case study for several rea-
sons. To begin with, the state vas a microcosm of the social, economic,
and political conditions that existed during the Restored Republic, and
the liberal response to those conditions.
Socially the state vas faced vith a large unassimilated Indian
population vhich the federal and state governments sought to incorporate
into Mexican society by instilling in them the values of the liberal,
leaders many of vhora vere professional men vho vere members of the mid-
dle class. Thus, education vas vieved as the means by vhich to trans-
form the "ragged and filthy" Indians into an informed and an industri-
ous citizenry.
While some liberal leaders in Mexico and in Oaxaca made a gen-
uine effort to assure the people a free publicly-supported education,
their efforts vere limited by the restrictions imposed by the Consti-
tution of 1857. Specifically, the Constitution left the burden of im-
plementing the educational program in the hands of the state and local
governments. The dangers or veakness of the federal-state relationship
quickly became evident.
The liberal educational programs in Oaxaca vere neither exten-
sive nor vere they terribly successful. The problem for the state
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government was one which also plagued the other states during the era
of the Restored Republic: poverty. Few states could afford extensive
educational programs. Consequently, the liberal dream of a generation
of liberally-oriented children trained in acceptable public schools was
not to be. The example of Oaxaca raises an interesting question for
the rest of the nation. Did any state maintain a coromitment to public
education throughout the years from 1867 to 1876? One would surmise
that education was an expendable luxury during the era, particularly
in states controlled by administrations faced with threats of civil
uprisings or administrations which were themselves planning to rebel
against the federal government.
Clearly, in the case of Oaxaca, education was quickly abandoned
when the government of Felix Diaz needed money for military expendi-
tures in the 1871 revolt.
In more general terms, the liberal attacks upon the church in
Oaxaca and the rest of the nation were not accompanied by civil assump-
tion of social services on any extensive scale. While the state govern-
ment did provide a hospital and some relief to widows and orphans, it
cannot be argued that the people were any better off under the secu-
larized state than they had been under the care of the Catholic church.
In fact, the demise of the church's programs was followed by an extended
period during which the federal and state governments were too poor
or too preoccupied to provide even minimal social services. There is
no reason to believe that Oaxaca was atypical in its reactions to the
responsibility for social reforms, but this cannot be determined until
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studies such as this one are made of each of the states during the
Restored Republic.
Long before the successful Revolution of Tuxtepec led by Por-
firio Diaz in I876, the experiment in federalism had already failed in
several Mexican states including Oaxaca. The experience in Oaxaca
demonstrated the folly of attempting to establish a federal political
system in a nation that vas unprepared. Once again Oaxaca serves as
a case study of the federal-state political relationship because in the
short span of four years, from 1867 to 1871$ the state was transformed
from an integral part of the federal system to a tumultuous secessionist
state that claimed the right to break with the federal government and
reassert its autonomy. Oaxaca was subject to many of the political
pressures that affected Mexico during this era: the contest over how
stringently the Reform laws and the Constitution of 1857 would be up-
held, the personal ambitions of individual state leaders, and the
growing rivalry between Juarez and Porfirio Dfaz on the national poli-
tical level.
Even while the Imperial government was fighting its last battles
for survival, the liberals in Oaxaca began to factionalize. The two
issues that split the group of patriots who had fought against the
government of Maximilian were the quest for power and the enforcement
of the spirit of the Constitution of 1857- The latter provided the
issue over which the state politicians, moderates, and radicals
could
disagree. In reality, however, the constitutional issue was
simple a
vehicle for satisfying the personal ambitions of political
leaders not
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only in Oaxaca but throughout Mexico.
The political leaders of the Restored Republic were prisoners
of their own history. Ever since independence, Mexican politics had
been characterized by opportunism and a lack of any real ideological
commitment. Consequently, it was unreal to expect that every poli-
tical figure in Mexico would selflessly subordinate his own interests
in a political system that emphasized the sovereignty of the state
governments. By decentralizing power, the Constitution of 1857 ac-
tually encouraged the independence of state governments and strong state
leaders like Diaz in Oaxaca or Negrete in Puebla, or Garcia de Cadena
in Zacatecas and San Luis Potosi. In the case of Oaxaca, don Felix
imposed his own political regime upon a state that had been split be-
tween the successful liberal factions, a phenomenon that occurred
throughout Mexico during the Restored Republic. In such a context, a
powerful personalist leader such as Diaz was able to control the various
political factions, and thus build a tight political rule* This was
exactly what several other state governors did under the federal poli-
tical system created by the Constitution of l85T»
The proliferation of local and regional contenders, each with a
set of personal supporters, remained a serious problem for the Juarez
administration throughout the years of the Restored Republic. Even the
politicians who accepted the federalist concept and worked within the
framework it established helped create an unwieldy political environ-
ment that made political consensus difficult to achieve. Ultimately,
the Mexican experiment in federalism failed because it assumed that the
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sharp distinctions between the various states and the interest groups
within them could somehow be blunted; and the varied elements of Mexican
society blended into a united nation.
During the Restored Republic, the Juarez administration, faced
with the political exigencies of the period, sought stronger more direct
influence in states such as Oaxaca by building support among political
factions such as the moderate borlados. Despite the efforts of Juarez,
the proliferation of local and regional contenders remained a serious
problem from 1867 through 1876, Ultimately, in Oaxaca, as in several
other states, the federal-state political relationship broke down in re-
volt*
In looking beyond the political machinations of the period, it
becomes clear that Mexico was handicapped in its efforts to rebuild the
nation in 1867 in a number of ways, and that the Juarez administration
did not really overcome those handicaps.
One of the most chronic problems faced by all Mexican political
leaders whether they operated at the federal or at the state level
during the nineteenth century was the lack of funds. By 1867, the
treasury had been empty for years and the national debt had greatly in-
creased. The Mexican economy had generally stagnated through the years
of warfare since independence. Neither the federal nor the state gov-
ernments were in a position to unilaterally undertake any significant
reform programs because of their strained financial situations.
Almost every phase of the states 1 economies had been disrupted
or destroyed by the years of war. Mines had ceased operation,
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agriculture existed on only the most primitive level, and commerce—
the source of most tax revenues—had been severely retarded. Hence, the
liberal preoccupation with internal improvements. Despite the emphasis
upon stimulating economic activity by building roads and introducing
new commercial agriculture and industry; the era of the Restored Re-
public did not bring about a great economic upsurge. Mexico's trans-
portation revolution (envisioned by Juarez and Lerdo) had to wait until
the presidency of Porfirio Diaz who successfully courted the necessary
foreign capital during his long tenure in office.
Oaxaca reflected the nation's economic problems to a large ex-
tent. The state government had few sources of revenue at its disposal
other than personal taxes or special assessments for specific expendi-
tures. Such taxes had only limited potential in a poor state. Con-
sequently, the Oaxacan government had to turn elsewhere for future
revenues. Like the national government, Oaxacan leaders sought the
solution to their financial problems in the development of internal im-
provements reasoning that better transportation meant closer and more
regular commercial relations with the rest of the nation and the world.
Accelerated commercial activity also meant increased tax revenues for
the state government, increased jobs for the people, and wider markets
for the state's products. Thus, the Oaxacan government sought the con-
struction of highways, railroads, canals, and harbor improvements as
well as the most grandiose project, the trans-isthmian canal across
Tehuantepec.
Similarly, the state government sought to encourage the
172
development of new types of mining and the introduction of new indus-
tries during the Restored Republic.
The question of the fiscal relationship between the federal
and state governments is one which confounded the men who took control
of Mexico during the years of the Restored Republic. The basic prob-
lem in the federal-state fiscal relationship was the gulf between the
power to tax and the ability to collect. The efforts of the Juarez
administration to lower and abolish internal tax barriers, for instance,
were unpopular and difficult to enforce unless the state governments
chose to comply.
Even when the federal government was able to induce the states
to abolish or at least lower their aclabalas, it had to agree to lower
the taxes required from the state governments. The problem for the
Ju&rez administration was that its tax policies were based upon long-
range planning and the beneficial effects were not felt during Juarez 1 s
lifetime. Again, it was Porfirio Diaz who profited from the mistakes
of Juarez.
Once more the federal government was limited by the federalist
principles of the Constitution of 1857. Without the power to direct
the economic policies of the whole nation, there was little effective
growth. The result was an economy that foundered lamely while states
such as Oaxaca unsuccessfully attempted to accomplish their economic
renaissance individually. Conversely, Oaxaca, which failed to bring
about its own economic growth, never proved a significant source of
revenue for the federal government during the Restored Republic.
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Despite the initial optimism that accompanied the return of the
Juarez administration in 1867, there were few instances of economic
success by federal or state administrations, particularly during the
years from 1867 to 1872. The problem was the gap between planning and
execution. By opting for a program of large-scale, internal improve-
ments, for instance, the federal and state administrations committed
themselves to long-term programs. They also undertook projects that
were extremely difficult and expensive to achieve. When the federal
government relied upon individuals and states to share the burden, they
failed to respond. Neither the federal nor the state governments were
ever able adequately to meet these responsibilities. Oaxaca graphically
illustrated the problems faced by the state governments when they
attempted to bring about their own economic development*
Consequently, the regime of Benito Juarez as president and
governors like Felix Diaz in Oaxaca achieved few tangible results.
This was the inherent tragedy of the economic situation during the
Restored Republic. Time and the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz sub-
stantiated the faith in the potential wealth of Mexico though perhaps
not in the way that the liberals of the Restored Republic had en-
visioned. Because his tenure was cut short by death, Juarez presided
over an economic program that failed to bring about the immediate re-
juvenation he had hoped for. His administration's few accomplishments
were greatly overshadowed by the subsequent spectacular economic de-
velopments that occurred during the administration of Porfirio Diaz.
Because of the tremendous drain of manpower and resources during
the civil and foreign wars and because of the general poverty of the
federal and state governments, there was little money left for the
development of social programs such as education, welfare, and social
services.
By the end of the era of the Restored Republic, many villages
remained unchanged since the colonial era. The Mexican people in
states such as Oaxaca remained isolated, backward, and removed from the
pale of the modern world. In fact, many were worse off by the end of
the era in terms of their need for immediate social services formerly
provided by the church.
The nation and the state of Oaxaca were confronted with one
other general problem: civil unrest. The national government (con-
scious of the need to retain the support of the states) was reluctant
about using harsh tactics against local and regional unrest. The ad-
ministration of Felix Diaz in Oaxaca, on the other hand, was much more
brutal and in the short run much more successful in satisfying the
positivist desire for an orderly, stable society. In both cases, the
Mexican people lost something. They were either victimized by the
absence of an effective federal imposition of peace, or they
had to
endure the excessive law-and-order tactics of state leaders
like Felix
Diaz.
The years from 186? to 1872 brought few noticeable
reforms to
Mexico. The hopes that had been raised by the
promises of the Consti-
tution of 1857 did not provide the immediate surge
of prosperity and
stability that many liberal supporters expected,
and the results were
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inevitable considering Mexico's past political history. The liberals
began to factionalize. The factualization helped create opposition
to the Juarez administration in almost every state including Oaxaca,
and the development of this type of opposition made the successful op-
eration of the federal system nearly impossible.
Oaxaca provided a very good example of what happened to the
federalist system when the state government vas directed by a governor
Who was unwilling to abide by the cooperative spirit implied in the
Constitution of 1857. Without cooperation and harmony, the relation-
ship between the states and the federal government was unproductive and
ultimately led to a complete breakdown in the entire experiment in
Mexican federalism. Similarly, the state exemplified the tendency
toward personalist rule under a decentralized political system.
It remained for Porfirio Dxaz to demonstrate the ways in which
the Constitution of 1357 could be perverted into a strong viable docu-
ment and the basis for creation of Mexico's longest dictatorship. In
order to accomplish this transformation, Diaz destroyed the fundamental
liberal concept of the federal-state relationship.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTES ON ARCHIVES, MATERIALS, AND
RESEARCH FACILITIES
Every researcher who faces field research does so with a cer-
tain amount of trepidation no matter how much preparation he has done
before moving off on his own. Despite the prior warnings of potential
problems from an older and wiser mentor, I packed my bags and my family
and headed for my first trip to Mexico and, ultimately, to Oaxaca.
The first thing one learns about researching topics in state
history is that there are few complete collections of government docu-
ments in either the states or in the National Archives.
The latter institution, headed by the gracious and scholarly
director, Dr. Rubio Mane, contains the greatest nineteenth century col-
lection of bound and unbound documents to be found anyvhere. Con-
sequently, I was able to spend a considerable amount of time perusing
the records of the Ministers of Gobernacion, Fomento, Guerra, and
Hacienda. Unfortunately, none of these branches of the Juarez adminis-
tration were very active nor were they careful about keeping records.
The secretary of Gobernacion, for instance, only published one Memoria
during the years from 1867 to 1872. Consequently, while the limited
documents did provide some information, they were not nearly enough to
provide a complete picture of official activities.
Similarly, the Hemeroteca Nacional in Mexico City (which is the
repository of the nation's periodical collection) contained the most
complete run of the Oaxacan periodical, La Victoria. However, neither
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the Hemeroteca's collection nor that of the archives in Oaxaca vas com-
plete.
The Biblioteca Nacional proved somewhat useful because of its
extensive collection of Juarez' correspondence as well as some pamphlet
literature.
With this research as a background, I then ventured forth into
Oaxaca where I quickly discovered what field research is really like.
The first lesson to he learned is that there is a wide gap between cata-
log listings and the realities of the state's archival holdings. One
also learns why so little has been done and is likely to be done on
nineteenth-century state history.
Woodrow Borah's articles on state archives notwithstanding,
Oaxaca has no significant archives to speak of. Since Borah's survey
of archives in the 1930 's and 19^0's, the Archive del Estado has been
allowed to deteriorate beyond the point of salvation. Many documents
have been lost because they were stored in the basement of a church that
was subsequently flooded. Subsequent to my first visit in 1969, the
state archives have been virtually closed to researchers such as myself
who might at least have been able to point out some things of value that
remained intact. Two trips to the state only served to reinforce the
sense of helplessness at the deterioration of the state's historical
treasures. A much more realistic portrayal of the potential research
problems in Oaxaca is found in Richard E. Greenleaf and Michael C.
Meyer's Research In Mexican History which has just been published.*
n
Note. See Bibliography for complete information.
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During the limited time I was allowed access to the state ar-
chives, I was not permitted to browse freely but had to sit at a small
table outside the door and ask for the papers of specific ramos. The
attendant was a little old man who was obviously suspicious and also
quite obviously uninterested in rummaging through his musty domain*
Despite these conditions, the Archivo did provide some of the invaluable
records of the Diaz administration.
The Archivo Municipal de Oaxaca is housed above a municipal
office building and is in much better condition than the state archive,
perhaps because Oaxaca' s leading historian, Jorge F. Iturribarria serves
as director and maintains an office there. Despite the fact that the
shelves were orderly, and I was allowed to roam freely, all but a frac-
tion of its reputed holdings were missing. When I asked Sr. Iturribarrfa
where I might find the fuentes he had used for his state history, he
asked why I needed to bother and suggested I try the nearest bookstore
to buy his works.
While I was never able to get much cooperation from Iturribarria,
I was more fortunate in dealing with Lie. Luis Castaneda Guzman who is
himself an historian and a collector of old documents and pamphlets. He
was sympathetic and provided a few useful tips on researching in Oaxaca.
After these experiences, I left Oaxaca with the unmistakable
feeling of impending loss. Although some work is being done by con-
cerned archivists, many historical treasures are already lost or destroyed
and chances are that many more will be. Subsequent trips to the state
have not changed that impression.
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My two additional trips to Mexico proved more fruitful than the
first. This researcher would like to point out that while the state
archives were only moderately fruitful, there are other valuable sources
of research data. The most important private collection of material
dealing with the era of the Restored Republic is the unedited Coleccion
de Porfirio Diaz which is now available at the University of the Ameri-
cas. Scholars interested in Porfirian history cannot possibly complete
their research without consulting this collection which contains nearly
one million documents and is under the direction of Professors Laurens
Perry and Stephen Niblo. These two gentlemen are themselves under-
taking exciting research into Porfirian history and are extremely gra-
cious and generous in sharing their information and command of the field.
Another private collection that proved very useful was the
Centra de Estudios de Bistoria de Mexico which is a remarkable collec-
tion of documents on Mexican history sponsored by the Condumex corpora-
tion in Mexico City. The company has amassed a valuable private archive
that includes rare government documents and private correspondence as
well as secondary sources, and it has made these materials available to
any interested scholar.
One other source that proved useful was the Archivo del Lie.
Justo Benitez which is located in the Museo Naaional de Antropologui
as part of its collection of correspondence of the Army of the East.
While the holdings are spotty, they do include valuable correspondence
between Benitez and Porfirio Diaz.
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The following bibliography is composed of materials cited in
footnotes and those sources which were most useful.
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